NextGen Criminal Law · 24-Minute Integrated Question Set
Integrated Set 1: Counseling & Drafting — The Harborview Pharmacy Break-In and Interrogation
Read the client intake facts below and complete all five mixed-form counseling and drafting questions.
Fact Pattern
Two weeks ago in the town of Cedarbrook, Tariq Bell asked Nora Reyes to help break into Harborview Pharmacy at 1:00 a.m. to steal prescription painkillers. Nora agreed to act as the outside lookout and drove Tariq to the alley behind the pharmacy, waiting in the driver's seat with the engine idling while Tariq pried open the locked rear door with a crowbar. Unknown to Nora, Tariq had slipped a loaded revolver into a coat pocket. Inside the darkened pharmacy, Tariq encountered Night Cleaner, panicked, and fired one shot, critically injuring Night Cleaner, who survived after emergency surgery.
Immediately after hearing the gunshot, Nora panicked and drove off alone, leaving Tariq behind. Ten minutes later, Officer Grant stopped Nora's car two miles away because the car's rear taillight was completely burned out. Upon checking Nora's driver's license and discovering it was suspended, Officer Grant lawfully arrested Nora solely for driving on a suspended license, handcuffed Nora, and locked Nora inside the back seat of the patrol cruiser. While Nora sat handcuffed inside the locked cruiser, Officer Grant walked back to Nora's car, opened the closed center console, and found a handwritten note listing Harborview Pharmacy's alarm code.
At the Cedarbrook police station, before any formal charges were filed, Detective Sato placed Nora in an interview room and read full Miranda warnings. Nora stated clearly, 'I want a lawyer before I answer any questions.' Detective Sato stopped questioning and returned Nora to a holding cell. Three hours later—without counsel present and without Nora initiating any conversation—Sergeant Ruiz, who did not know Nora had asked for a lawyer, entered the cell, read fresh Miranda warnings, and asked whether Nora wanted to explain what happened at Harborview Pharmacy. Nora signed a written waiver, admitted driving Tariq to the alley to break into the pharmacy, and mentioned tossing a spare pharmacy key into a public dumpster behind the Cedarbrook diner. Police immediately recovered the spare key from that dumpster.
The next morning, prosecutors formally indicted Nora for conspiracy to commit burglary, burglary as an accomplice, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on Tariq's shooting of Night Cleaner. After indictment and appointment of defense counsel, Detective Sato arranged for an undercover officer to sit in Nora's jail pod and deliberately ask Nora questions about planning the Harborview Pharmacy break-in without Nora's lawyer present, eliciting an admission from Nora.
Nora meets with your defense team for a counseling session and to prepare pretrial motions. Assume the jurisdiction follows general United States criminal law (evaluating both common-law and Model Penal Code approaches where relevant) and the United States Constitution.
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Question 1 of 5Select One of Four
Counseling — Accomplice Liability for Collateral Crimes
During the intake meeting, Nora says, 'I only agreed to be the lookout for a burglary of an empty building—I never knew Tariq carried a revolver or wanted anyone shot.' Which statement gives Nora the MOST accurate legal advice regarding accomplice liability for the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
At common law (the default rule on general bar questions), an accomplice who aids a target crime is also liable for any collateral offense committed by the principal that is a natural and probable (foreseeable) consequence of the aided crime. By contrast, Model Penal Code section 2.06(3) and a substantial modern trend reject natural-and-probable-consequences liability and limit accomplice liability to offenses that the accomplice had the purpose to promote or facilitate (while keeping felony-murder accomplice liability distinct when death results from an inherently dangerous felony). Driving away after Tariq had already entered the pharmacy does not constitute an effective withdrawal because Nora failed to neutralize her aid or warn authorities before the crime occurred.
Question 2 of 5Select Two of Six
Counseling — Vehicle Search Incident to Arrest & Miranda Physical Fruits
Nora asks whether the prosecution can introduce at trial either the handwritten alarm-code note found in Nora's closed center console or the spare pharmacy key recovered from the public diner dumpster. Which TWO legal points should you explain to Nora? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Arizona v. Gant, police may search a vehicle's passenger compartment incident to an occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the cabin OR it is reasonable to believe evidence of the crime of arrest is inside the vehicle. Here, Nora was handcuffed inside a locked patrol cruiser, and Officer Grant arrested Nora solely for driving on a suspended license—a traffic offense for which no physical evidence would reasonably be inside the center console—so the note must be suppressed from the prosecution's case-in-chief. By contrast, under United States v. Patane, nontestimonial physical fruits (the spare key in a public dumpster) are not suppressed based on a voluntary statement taken in violation of Miranda rules. An unlawful arrest or search suppresses tainted evidence rather than defeating personal jurisdiction, and unlawfully seized Fourth Amendment evidence may still impeach a testifying defendant's direct testimony or reasonably suggested cross-examination.
Question 3 of 5Select One of Four
Counseling — Station-House Interrogation (Edwards) vs. Post-Indictment Elicitation (Massiah)
Nora asks whether the prosecution may introduce Nora's signed station-house confession to Sergeant Ruiz and Nora's later admission to the undercover officer in the jail pod during the prosecution's case-in-chief. Which advice is MOST accurate? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Edwards v. Arizona, once a suspect in custody unambiguously invokes the Miranda right to counsel, all police-initiated interrogation must stop until counsel is present or the suspect reinitiates communication; Arizona v. Roberson extends that bar across any offense and binds unaware officers, and Maryland v. Shatzer terminates the presumption only after a 14-day break in Miranda custody. Because Sergeant Ruiz questioned Nora three hours later without counsel or reinitiation, Ruiz's lack of knowledge and fresh Miranda warnings do not validate Nora's subsequent waiver. Separately, once formal adversarial judicial proceedings begin (here, upon indictment), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches and bars police—including undercover agents placed in a jail pod—from deliberately eliciting incriminating statements regarding the indicted offense without defense counsel or a valid waiver (Massiah v. United States). The Illinois v. Perkins undercover exception applies only to Miranda prior to formal charges, not to post-indictment Sixth Amendment deliberate elicitation.
Question 4 of 5Short Written Response
Counseling — Impeachment Limits at Trial
Nora asks: 'If the judge suppresses the center-console alarm-code note and my station-house confession to Sergeant Ruiz, can the prosecutor still bring them up at trial if I decide not to testify and instead call Tariq's sister to testify that I was home sleeping all night—or what if I testify myself?' Write a clear 3-to-5 sentence counseling explanation advising Nora on both possibilities.
Model Response
If you choose not to testify and instead call Tariq's sister as an alibi witness, the prosecution cannot use either the unlawfully seized alarm-code note from your car or your Edwards-defective station-house confession to impeach her testimony, because both Fourth Amendment and Miranda/Edwards impeachment exceptions apply strictly to a testifying defendant and never extend to other defense witnesses. However, if you take the stand yourself and testify on direct examination—or answer proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by your direct testimony—in a way that contradicts those suppressed items, the prosecution may use both the alarm-code note and your voluntary station-house statement to Sergeant Ruiz to impeach your credibility. Only an involuntary confession coerced in violation of Due Process—through physical force, threats, or severe psychological or legal coercion overbearing your free will under the totality of the circumstances—is barred for all purposes, including impeachment. Therefore, testifying in your own defense carries significant impeachment risk that calling an independent defense witness does not trigger.
Key Points
Explains that if Nora does not testify and calls Tariq's sister as a defense witness, the prosecution cannot use either the Fourth Amendment-suppressed alarm-code note (James v. Illinois) or Nora's Edwards-defective station-house confession (Harris v. New York / Oregon v. Hass) to impeach the sister.
Explains that if Nora testifies at trial, the prosecution may use both the unlawfully seized alarm-code note (United States v. Havens) and the voluntary Miranda/Edwards-defective station-house statement (Harris v. New York) to impeach Nora's direct testimony or reasonably suggested cross-examination.
Notes that an involuntary confession coerced in violation of Due Process—by physical force, threats, or severe psychological or legal coercion overbearing free will—is barred for all purposes including impeachment (Mincey v. Arizona).
Advises Nora clearly on the practical strategic difference between testifying personally and relying on another defense witness.
Explanation
Under United States v. Havens and Harris v. New York, if Nora chooses to testify at trial and gives direct testimony (or answers proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by direct testimony) contradicting the suppressed evidence, the prosecution may introduce both the Fourth Amendment-suppressed alarm-code note and the voluntary Miranda/Edwards-defective confession to impeach Nora's credibility; only an involuntary confession coerced in violation of Due Process through official physical, psychological, or legal coercion overbearing free will under the totality of the circumstances is barred even for impeachment (Mincey v. Arizona). However, if Nora does not testify and instead calls Tariq's sister as a defense witness, the prosecution may not use either the unlawfully seized center-console note (James v. Illinois) or Nora's Edwards-defective station-house confession (Harris v. New York / Oregon v. Hass, which permit impeaching only the testifying defendant) to impeach the sister's alibi testimony.
Question 5 of 5Short Written Response
Drafting — Motion-to-Suppress Argument Paragraphs
Draft two concise paragraphs for Nora's pretrial Motion to Suppress: (a) a two-to-three sentence argument explaining why the alarm-code note seized from Nora's closed center console must be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment; and (b) a two-to-three sentence argument explaining why Nora's station-house confession to Sergeant Ruiz must be suppressed under Miranda v. Arizona and Edwards v. Arizona.
Model Response
(a) Suppression of the Center-Console Alarm-Code Note: Under Arizona v. Gant, police may search a vehicle's passenger compartment incident to an occupant's lawful arrest only if the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the interior, or if it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Here, Officer Grant arrested Nora Reyes solely for driving on a suspended license and secured Nora in handcuffs inside a locked patrol cruiser before searching the closed center console. Because Nora could not reach the console and no physical evidence of a suspended-license offense could reasonably be expected inside it, the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment and the alarm-code note must be suppressed.
(b) Suppression of the Station-House Statement: Under Edwards v. Arizona, once a suspect in custody unambiguously invokes the right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, all police-initiated interrogation must cease until counsel is made available or the suspect personally reinitiates communication; Arizona v. Roberson extends this bar to any offense and binds unaware officers, and Maryland v. Shatzer terminates it only after a fourteen-day break in Miranda custody. Ms. Reyes unambiguously invoked counsel by telling Detective Sato, 'I want a lawyer before I answer any questions,' remained in continuous custody, and never initiated further conversation. Sergeant Ruiz's resumption of custodial interrogation three hours later—even with fresh Miranda warnings and without personal knowledge of the earlier request—violated Edwards and Roberson and requires suppression of the resulting statement from the prosecution's case-in-chief.
Key Points
Paragraph (a) states both prongs of Arizona v. Gant (unsecured within reaching distance OR reasonable to believe evidence of the crime of arrest is inside the vehicle).
Paragraph (a) applies facts showing Nora was handcuffed inside a locked patrol cruiser and arrested solely for driving on a suspended license, requiring suppression of the alarm-code note.
Paragraph (b) states the Edwards v. Arizona, Arizona v. Roberson, and Maryland v. Shatzer rules (unambiguous counsel invocation stops all police-initiated interrogation across any offense—binding unaware officers—until counsel attends, suspect reinitiates, or a 14-day break in Miranda custody occurs).
Paragraph (b) applies facts showing Nora clearly requested counsel, never reinitiated, and Sergeant Ruiz's lack of knowledge and fresh warnings three hours later do not cure the violation.
Explanation
A strong suppression motion pairs each controlling constitutional rule directly with the record facts. Paragraph (a) applies Arizona v. Gant's two prongs—showing Nora was handcuffed inside a locked patrol cruiser and no evidence of driving on a suspended license could reasonably be found in the closed center console. Paragraph (b) applies Edwards v. Arizona, Arizona v. Roberson, and Maryland v. Shatzer—showing Nora unambiguously requested counsel, remained in continuous custody without a 14-day break or reinitiation, and could not be re-approached three hours later by Sergeant Ruiz regardless of Ruiz's lack of knowledge or fresh warnings.