Written for study. Not legal advice.

Written Assignment

You are an associate at a Linden criminal defense firm representing Devon Park. Read the three Case File documents and the supplied State of Linden Library below, then draft an objective internal memorandum answering the questions posed in Partner Martin Delgado’s Task Memorandum.

Task Instructions

Write a structured objective memorandum evaluating Devon Park’s pretrial motions to suppress: (1) the boxed laptop seized from the shared living-room coat closet based on roommate Maya Lin’s consent under Linden Code § 19-405(a)–(b) and State v. Mercer; (2) the pawn-shop receipt seized from Devon Park’s bedroom nightstand drawer under the protective-sweep rule (§ 19-405(c)) and the inevitable-discovery rule (Linden Code § 19-408); and (3) Devon Park’s station-house confession under Linden Code § 19-512 and State v. Alvarez. Apply only the supplied State of Linden law in the Library.

Part 1: Case File

Document 1 of 3 · Law Office Memorandum

Task Memorandum

To: Associate
From: Martin Delgado, Partner
Re: State v. Devon Park — Pretrial Suppression Evaluation (File No. LC-209)
Date: November 12

Our client, Devon Park, is charged in the State of Linden with felony receiving stolen property arising from a break-in at Northgate Electronics last month. Police recovered three items that the State plans to offer at trial: (a) a sealed Northgate Electronics laptop box found inside the shared living-room coat closet of Devon’s apartment; (b) a handwritten pawn-shop receipt found inside a closed nightstand drawer in Devon’s private bedroom; and (c) Devon’s recorded station-house statement admitting that Devon bought two laptops knowing they were stolen from Northgate Electronics.

Ahead of Friday’s suppression hearing, Devon needs a candid, objective assessment of which items we are likely to suppress and which items will likely be admitted. Please organize your memorandum under three clear headings:

  1. Whether roommate Maya Lin’s signed consent validly authorized police to search both the shared living-room coat closet and Devon’s separate bedroom under Linden Code § 19-405(a)–(b) and State v. Mercer;
  2. Whether Officer Cho’s search of the bedroom nightstand drawer can be upheld as a protective sweep under Linden Code § 19-405(c) or saved by inevitable discovery under Linden Code § 19-408; and
  3. Whether Devon’s station-house admission must be suppressed based on Devon’s initial statement at 8:15 p.m. or Detective Hollis’s false statement at 10:20 p.m. under Linden Code § 19-512 and State v. Alvarez.

Ground every conclusion in the attached Police Incident Report, Client Interview and Stipulations, and our State of Linden Library.

Document 2 of 3 · Police Incident Report Summary

Arrest, Apartment Search, and Station-House Log (Officer Cho & Detective Hollis)

On November 2 at 7:30 p.m., Detective Hollis and Officer Cho arrived at 418 Linden Court, Apartment 2B, holding a valid arrest warrant for Devon Park based on probable cause for receiving stolen property. Devon Park and Maya Lin share Apartment 2B on a joint lease with a shared kitchen, shared living room, shared hallway coat closet, and two separate bedrooms on opposite ends of the back hallway.

When Detective Hollis knocked, Devon opened the front door and stepped into the foyer. After Detective Hollis announced the arrest warrant, Devon stated loudly, “You can arrest me, but you do not have permission to search this apartment.” Officers lawfully arrested Devon inside the foyer at 7:35 p.m., placed handcuffs on Devon, and escorted Devon downstairs to sit locked inside Officer Cho’s patrol car. Immediately after arresting Devon in the foyer, Officer Cho opened the unlocked hallway coat closet three feet from the foyer door to check whether anyone was hiding inside, saw a sealed Northgate Electronics laptop box on the floor, and left it untouched while walking down the back hallway. Without any report or indication that anyone else was in the apartment, Officer Cho walked into Devon’s separate bedroom at the end of the hall, opened the closed wooden drawer of Devon’s bedside nightstand, and seized a handwritten pawn-shop receipt listing a laptop serial number.

At 7:48 p.m., while Devon remained locked in the patrol car outside, Maya Lin walked into the building carrying groceries. Detective Hollis informed Maya that Devon had been arrested and asked if Maya would consent to a search of the apartment. Maya stated, “I never go into Devon’s bedroom—we keep our own bedrooms completely private—so I am only comfortable consenting to the shared living room, kitchen, and hallway closet.” Maya voluntarily signed a written consent form covering those shared spaces. Detective Hollis then opened the shared living-room coat closet and seized the sealed Northgate Electronics laptop box.

At the police station at 8:15 p.m., Detective Hollis read Devon full warnings of the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Devon stated clearly, “I understand my rights, and I don’t want to talk about the laptops right now.” Devon did not ask for a lawyer. Detective Hollis immediately ended the interview, returned Devon to a holding cell, and gave Devon dinner and water. At 10:20 p.m.—two hours and five minutes later—Detective Hollis brought Devon back to the interview room, read fresh warnings, and asked if Devon wanted to talk. Before Devon answered, Detective Hollis said falsely, “Your roommate Maya already gave a statement telling us you brought the stolen Northgate laptops home yesterday.” Relying on that claim, Devon signed a waiver and admitted buying two laptops from an acquaintance while knowing they were stolen from Northgate Electronics. The 10:20 p.m. session lasted twelve minutes.

Document 3 of 3 · Client Interview & Pretrial Stipulations

Interview with Devon Park & Prosecution Stipulations

Client Interview Notes (Devon Park):

Devon confirmed that Devon and Maya Lin maintain strictly separate bedrooms and never enter each other’s bedrooms without knocking and asking permission, though Devon’s bedroom door did not have a deadbolt and stood ajar when Devon walked to the front door. Devon also confirmed that both Devon and Maya routinely hang jackets and store boxes in the shared living-room coat closet. Regarding the station-house interview, Devon confirmed that Detective Hollis never raised a voice, never threatened Devon, never made any promise of bail or reduced charges, and stopped talking at 8:15 p.m. the moment Devon said Devon did not want to talk right then. Devon stated that the only reason Devon decided to confess at 10:20 p.m. was Detective Hollis’s false claim that Maya had already implicated Devon.

Joint Pretrial Hearing Stipulations:

1. Both parties stipulate that at 7:35 p.m., when Officer Cho searched Devon’s bedside nightstand drawer, no officer or prosecutor had begun preparing an affidavit or application for a search warrant for Apartment 2B, and no standardized apartment inventory was underway.

2. The State stipulates that Maya Lin never actually gave any statement implicating Devon prior to 10:20 p.m.

3. To justify the nightstand receipt, the prosecution relies solely on Maya’s consent, the protective-sweep doctrine, and inevitable discovery based on its argument that police had probable cause and could have sought a search warrant later that night.

Part 2: Library — Law of the State of Linden

Task Law Notice: The statutes and cases below are invented law written solely for this State of Linden performance task. Apply only these authorities in your memorandum; do not treat them as real-world law.

Library Authority 1 · Task Statute

Linden Co-Occupant Consent and Protective Sweep Act, Linden Code § 19-405

§ 19-405(a) Co-Occupant Consent After Removal: A co-occupant who possesses common authority over shared premises may validly consent to a warrantless search of those shared areas even if another co-occupant previously objected to a search, provided that the objecting co-occupant has been lawfully arrested and physically removed from the premises before the consent is given.

§ 19-405(b) Exclusive-Area Limit: A co-occupant’s consent does not authorize police to search a separate room or closed personal container over which the consenting co-occupant lacks actual or apparent common authority (defined as mutual use of the property and joint access or control for most purposes).

§ 19-405(c) Protective Sweeps Incident to Home Arrest: Incident to a lawful arrest inside a residence, officers may automatically conduct a quick visual check of closets and spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Any sweep extending beyond immediately adjoining spaces is lawful only if officers possess reasonable, articulable suspicion that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the scene. Every protective sweep is strictly limited to a cursory visual inspection of spaces large enough to conceal a human being.

Library Authority 2 · Linden Supreme Court (Task Case)

State v. Mercer

Issue: Whether a roommate’s post-removal consent authorized police to search an arrestee’s separate bedroom, and whether an officer’s opening of a closed desk drawer in that bedroom was justified as a protective sweep under Linden Code § 19-405.

Holding on § 19-405(a)–(b) (Co-Occupant Consent and Exclusive Areas): After the objecting tenant was lawfully arrested at the doorway and placed inside a patrol car outside, the remaining roommate’s voluntary written consent validly authorized officers to search the shared living room and shared hallway coat closet. However, because the remaining roommate told officers that she maintained her own separate bedroom and never entered the arrestee’s bedroom, officers lacked both actual and apparent authority to search the arrestee’s bedroom based on her consent, even though the bedroom door stood unlocked.

Holding on § 19-405(c) (Protective Sweep Boundaries): Looking inside a hallway closet located three feet from the foyer arrest site was lawful without additional suspicion as an immediately adjoining space. By contrast, walking down a back hallway into a separate bedroom without any articulable facts suggesting another person was present—and opening a closed desk drawer incapable of hiding a human being—exceeded § 19-405(c) and required suppression.

Library Authority 3 · Task Statutes & Linden Court of Appeals (Task Case)

Linden Code §§ 19-408 & 19-512 and State v. Alvarez

Linden Code § 19-408 (Inevitable Discovery Exception): Evidence obtained through an unlawful search must be excluded unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that an active, independent lawful investigation or standardized inventory procedure already underway at the time of the violation would inevitably have discovered the same item. Mere speculation that officers possessed probable cause and could have sought a search warrant later does not satisfy § 19-408.

Linden Code § 19-512 (Custodial Interrogation Invocations and Voluntariness):

  • (a) Right to Silence: When a suspect in custody unambiguously invokes the right to remain silent without requesting an attorney, officers must immediately cease questioning; officers may re-approach and question the suspect after a reasonable cooling-off period of at least two hours if they scrupulously honored the initial invocation and administer fresh warnings.
  • (b) Right to Counsel: When a suspect in custody unambiguously requests counsel, all police-initiated interrogation on any offense must cease until counsel is present, the suspect initiates further communication, or a fourteen-day break in custody occurs.
  • (c) Voluntariness: A confession is inadmissible for any purpose if police coercion overbore the suspect’s free will under the totality of the circumstances.

State v. Alvarez (Linden Ct. App.): Holding (1) under Linden Code § 19-408, the State failed to establish inevitable discovery where no officer had begun drafting a search warrant application prior to an unlawful bedroom drawer search; and (2) under § 19-512, a suspect’s statement, “I do not want to talk about this right now,” invoked only the right to silence rather than the right to counsel, permitting officers to re-approach two hours later with fresh warnings, and a detective’s single false factual claim that a witness had implicated the suspect did not render the resulting confession involuntary per se where the interview was brief and free of threats, physical abuse, or promises of leniency.

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