Five select-one-of-four questions and five select-two-of-six questions (~1.8 minutes per item) under general United States criminal law and constitutional criminal protections.
Checked: 0 of 10 · Score: 0 / 10
Question 1 of 10Select One of Four
General Principles — Voluntary Act & Omission Liability
While driving lawfully on a clear afternoon, Driver suffers a sudden, unforeseeable epileptic seizure—the first in Driver's life—loses consciousness, and veers onto a sidewalk, knocking Pedestrian unconscious. Seeing Pedestrian bleeding on the sidewalk, Bystander carries Pedestrian behind a locked garden shed so passersby will not notice Pedestrian or call an ambulance, and then walks away hoping Pedestrian will die. Pedestrian dies from untreated blood loss. Which statement accurately describes the criminal liability of Driver and Bystander? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Criminal liability requires either a voluntary physical act or an omission to perform an act that the defendant has a legal duty and physical capacity to perform. Movements made while unconscious during an unforeseeable first seizure are not voluntary acts, so Driver committed no crime. By contrast, although an ordinary stranger generally owes no duty to rescue, Bystander created a legal duty to act by voluntarily taking charge of Pedestrian and moving Pedestrian out of public view behind a locked shed, thereby isolating Pedestrian from other potential aid. Failing to summon help with the intent that Pedestrian die therefore supports homicide liability.
Question 2 of 10Select Two of Six
General Principles — Mistake of Fact & Voluntary Intoxication
After drinking heavily by choice at a tavern, Owen picks up a winter coat from a shared coat rack, honestly but unreasonably believing the coat is Owen's own identical jacket even though another patron's name is stitched inside the collar. Owen walks out into a crowded apartment courtyard and, too drunk to notice nearby neighbors looking out from open balconies, fires a rifle straight into the air to celebrate. A falling bullet strikes and kills Neighbor. Under common-law and Model Penal Code principles, which TWO statements are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
At common law, an honest mistake of fact—even if unreasonable—is a defense to a specific-intent crime such as larceny if it negates the specific intent to permanently deprive another of property; similarly, under Model Penal Code section 2.04(1), any honest mistake of fact negates purpose, knowledge, or recklessness (leaving at most negligence or strict liability). By contrast, voluntary intoxication at common law is a defense only to specific-intent crimes (reducing premeditated first-degree murder only to second-degree murder, never to manslaughter) and never excuses general-intent or depraved-heart malice killings. Under Model Penal Code section 2.08, self-induced intoxication may negate purpose or knowledge, but is barred as a defense to recklessness because the actor is treated as aware of risks that would have been perceived if sober.
Question 3 of 10Select One of Four
Statutory Crimes — Felony Murder Limitations & Agency Theory
Vance and Carter agree to commit an unarmed daytime theft of unlocked bicycles from a store's open courtyard (a non-violent grand larceny). After they wheel two bicycles onto the sidewalk, Carter runs away; Vance independently punches a pursuing security guard in the jaw, knocking the guard into the street where a passing delivery truck kills the guard. Separately that evening, armed robber Pike holds up a jewelry shop while Pike's accomplice driver, Diaz, waits outside in a running car; the shop clerk grabs a licensed handgun behind the counter and shoots Pike dead. Under majority common-law felony-murder rules, which conclusion is MOST accurate? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under the majority common-law agency theory of felony murder, felons are liable for felony murder only when a felon or co-felon personally commits the lethal act; when a resisting victim or police officer fires the fatal shot killing a co-felon, the surviving accomplice (Diaz) is not guilty of felony murder (unlike under the minority proximate-cause theory). Carter is not guilty of felony murder because non-violent larceny is not an inherently dangerous predicate felony. Finally, Vance cannot use the felony battery itself as a felony-murder predicate because under the merger doctrine, assault and battery merge into the resulting homicide rather than serving as independent predicates.
Consider two separate incidents in the town of Cedarbrook: first, a part-time pharmacy cashier takes 200 dollars in cash from the store's register drawer during a shift and puts it in a personal backpack; second, an acquaintance sends a homeowner a message demanding 500 dollars by Friday or the acquaintance will publish embarrassing private photographs in next week's neighborhood newsletter, and the homeowner wires the money out of fear of reputational harm. Under traditional common-law and modern statutory distinctions, which TWO statements are accurate? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
A low-level sales clerk or cashier operating a store register has only mere custody—not lawful possession—of the money inside the register, so pocketing cash from the drawer is a trespassory taking constituting larceny rather than embezzlement. Modern statutory extortion (often called blackmail) consists of obtaining or seeking property through threats of future physical harm, economic harm, reputational exposure, or criminal accusation, distinguishing it from robbery's requirement of immediate force or threat of immediate physical harm in the victim's presence; at common law, extortion was the corrupt collection of an unlawful fee by a public official under color of office. Obtaining only temporary possession of property by fraud is larceny by trick rather than false pretenses (which requires passing title), and walking through an already wide-open door is not a common-law breaking for burglary.
Police pull over a sedan driven by Owner after watching the car swerve across a highway center line, while Passenger rides in the front passenger seat. Inside the locked trunk—to which only Owner holds the key—officers discover a duffel bag holding 50 individually heat-sealed packets of cocaine, a digital gram scale, and 3,200 dollars in small bills. Owner's breath test measures a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.11 percent, above the state's 0.08 percent statutory per se limit, even though Owner honestly and reasonably believed two drinks earlier in the evening had kept Owner below the limit. Which legal conclusion is MOST accurate? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Constructive possession requires knowledge of the contraband's presence and illicit nature plus the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over it, which is satisfied here because Owner drove the car and held the sole key to the locked trunk; Passenger's mere proximity as a rider without control is insufficient. Possession with intent to distribute (trafficking) adds specific intent to distribute, which may be inferred circumstantially from the 50 individually sealed packets, digital scale, and large amount of cash, and simple possession is a lesser-included offense. Finally, per se impaired driving at or above 0.08 percent blood-alcohol concentration is generally a strict-liability or general-intent offense to which an honest or reasonable mistake regarding one's blood-alcohol level is no defense.
Lena asks Marco to help steal a painting from a private gallery. Unknown to Lena, Marco is an undercover police officer who secretly intends only to arrest Lena and never intends to commit the theft; Marco nevertheless drives Lena to the gallery alley and hands Lena a crowbar, and officers immediately arrest Lena before she touches the building. In a separate case, Wren lends lockpicks to Mason so Mason can break into an empty office at night to steal tax records; Wren has no idea Mason is carrying a handgun, and Mason unexpectedly shoots and kills a night janitor inside. Which TWO statements are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under the common-law rule (the default rule for general bar questions) and federal law, conspiracy is bilateral and requires at least two guilty minds who genuinely agree, so agreeing solely with a feigning undercover officer like Marco does not form a conspiracy. By contrast, Model Penal Code section 5.03(1) adopts a unilateral rule under which one party's genuine agreement—paired with an overt act for non-first- or second-degree felonies—suffices for conspiracy even if the other party is feigning. Factual impossibility is never a defense to attempt, attempted felony murder cannot exist because attempt requires specific intent to kill, and Model Penal Code section 2.06(3) rejects the common-law natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine for accomplices, limiting accomplice liability to crimes the accomplice had the purpose to promote (while keeping felony-murder accomplice rules distinct).
Police receive an uncorroborated anonymous tip that Resident grows illegal mushrooms in a greenhouse. Without a warrant, an officer walks onto Resident's fenced backyard patio attached to the house, inspects garbage inside a closed bin sitting beside the back door, and brings a trained narcotics dog onto Resident's front porch, where the dog alerts at the front door. Later that evening, a patrol officer pulls over Resident's car for failing to signal a lane change, issues a written warning within six minutes, and then holds Resident at the roadside for fifteen additional minutes without any independent reasonable suspicion so a drug dog can walk around the car. Which statement is MOST accurate under the Fourth Amendment? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Florida v. Jardines, bringing a trained drug-sniffing dog onto a home's front porch—part of the home's protected curtilage—to conduct a warrantless search exceeds the implied social license to knock and violates the Fourth Amendment. In addition, under Rodriguez v. United States, although an officer with an objective traffic violation may conduct a pretextual stop (Whren v. United States), the officer may not prolong the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the traffic-based mission in order to conduct a dog sniff absent independent reasonable suspicion. Finally, while garbage left out at the curb for collection carries no reasonable expectation of privacy, a closed bin inside the home's curtilage beside the back door remains protected.
Question 8 of 10Select Two of Six
Constitutional Protections — Home Arrests, Protective Sweeps & Consent
Police obtain a valid arrest warrant for Suspect based on probable cause for an armed robbery. Officers knock on the front door of the apartment Suspect shares equally with Partner, and both Suspect and Partner come to the front hallway. Suspect shouts, 'I do not consent to you searching anything!' Officers lawfully arrest Suspect inside the front foyer on the arrest warrant, handcuff Suspect, and remove Suspect to a patrol car parked outside. Officers then return to the doorway, and Partner voluntarily signs a written consent form allowing police to search the shared living room and kitchen. Meanwhile, while still inside the foyer arresting Suspect, one officer glanced into a hall coat closet three feet away, and another officer walked upstairs to open closed dresser drawers in a second-floor bedroom without any facts suggesting another person was inside the apartment. Which TWO statements are correct under the Fourth Amendment? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Maryland v. Buie, incident to a lawful in-home arrest, police may (1) automatically and without suspicion look inside closets and spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched, and (2) conduct a broader protective sweep beyond those adjoining spaces only with reasonable, articulable suspicion that the area harbors a person posing a danger to those on the scene (and limited to a cursory visual inspection of places where a person could hide, never closed dresser drawers). Separately, under Georgia v. Randolph and Fernandez v. California, a physically present objecting co-occupant defeats consent as against that objector, but once the objecting co-occupant is lawfully arrested and removed from the premises, the remaining co-occupant's voluntary consent to search shared areas is valid. An arrest warrant suffices to enter Suspect's own home (Payton v. New York), whereas a search warrant is required to arrest Suspect inside a third party's home (Steagald v. United States).
Police arrest Suspect for burglary and give proper Miranda warnings. Suspect signs a valid waiver and speaks voluntarily with detectives, who falsely tell Suspect that Suspect's friend already confessed—a factual lie that prompts Suspect to admit entering the store, without any physical force, threats, or promises of leniency. Separately, before trial, the court suppresses a stolen watch seized from Suspect's backpack during an unlawful warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment. At trial, Suspect does not testify, and Suspect's roommate testifies as a defense witness that Suspect never owned or possessed any luxury watches. Which statement is MOST accurate? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Frazier v. Cupp and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process voluntariness doctrine, mere factual deception by police (such as falsely claiming a confederate confessed) does not render a confession involuntary per se, though it is weighed as one factor in the totality of the circumstances; absent coercion overbearing free will, the waived confession is admissible. Regarding impeachment, although unlawfully seized Fourth Amendment evidence may impeach a testifying defendant's direct testimony or answers to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by direct examination (United States v. Havens), it may never be used to impeach other defense witnesses such as the roommate (James v. Illinois). Finally, an actually coerced confession obtained through physical brutality or threats violates Due Process and is inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment.
After a grand jury indicts Defendant for felony robbery, detectives show an eyewitness a fair six-person photographic array in the absence of Defendant's lawyer, and the eyewitness identifies Defendant. Before trial, the prosecution's lead detective keeps a police interview report in a precinct drawer showing that a credible store clerk saw a different person commit the robbery, and the prosecutor never learns of or discloses that report before the jury convicts Defendant. During jury selection at that trial, defense counsel uses peremptory challenges to strike four female prospective jurors solely because of their sex. Which TWO constitutional conclusions are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under United States v. Ash, a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a photographic array at any time (unlike a post-charge corporeal lineup or showup), and a fair photo array triggers no Due Process exclusion. Under Brady v. Maryland, prosecutors have an affirmative Due Process duty to disclose material exculpatory or impeachment evidence favorable to the defense—including evidence known only to police investigators—whenever there is a reasonable probability that disclosure would change the trial outcome. Under Batson v. Kentucky, Georgia v. McCollum (extending Batson to criminal defendants), and J.E.B. v. Alabama, neither the prosecution nor the defense may exercise peremptory strikes based on race or sex. Finally, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, Blakely v. Washington, and Erlinger v. United States, any fact—other than the bare fact of a prior conviction (unless admitted by the defendant)—increasing a statutory maximum sentence requires unanimous jury proof beyond a reasonable doubt.