Fact Pattern
Morgan and Taylor lived together in Oakridge, State A, for six years of marriage and raised their five-year-old child, Child, there since birth. Taylor's parents, Grandparents, live nearby in Oakridge and cared for Child two afternoons a week while both parents worked. Morgan has never lived in, worked in, or owned property in State B.
Four months ago, Taylor accepted a permanent job transfer to State B, leased an apartment there intending to stay indefinitely, and brought Child to live in State B with Morgan's temporary written agreement for a trial semester. Last week, after satisfying State B's 90-day durational residency statute, Taylor filed an action in State B court seeking: (1) a divorce, (2) a division of the couple's Oakridge marital bank account and spousal support from Morgan, and (3) sole initial physical custody of Child. Morgan was personally served with the State B summons at Morgan's home in State A and chose not to appear or file an answer in State B. State B entered a default decree granting the divorce, awarding Taylor $1,500 monthly spousal support and half the Oakridge account, and awarding Taylor sole custody of Child.
Yesterday, Taylor returned briefly to Oakridge with Child to pack household furniture. Morgan filed suit in State A court asking State A to: (a) vacate State B's entire decree and (b) determine initial custody of Child. Separately, Grandparents intervened in the State A action to petition under State A's third-party visitation statute for court-ordered monthly weekend visitation over Taylor's objection—even though Taylor is a fit parent who believes weekend visits disrupt Child's adjustment in State B. Assume both State A and State B have enacted the UCCJEA and UIFSA.
Call of the Question
Under general United States family law and federal and uniform statutes, how should the State A court rule on: (1) the validity of State B's divorce and financial orders, (2) subject-matter jurisdiction over Child's initial custody determination, (3) Taylor's proposed permanent relocation with Child if State A exercises custody jurisdiction, and (4) Grandparents' request for court-ordered visitation?
Model Answer (IRAC)
1. Divisible Divorce: Validity of State B's Divorce and Financial Orders
Issue: Must State A recognize State B's default divorce decree, and are State B's spousal-support and property-division awards valid?
Rule: Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a sister state has subject-matter jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage if at least one spouse is domiciled in the forum state (physical presence plus intent to remain indefinitely) and reasonable durational residency requirements are satisfied. However, under the divisible-divorce doctrine and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, an ex parte divorce court lacking personal jurisdiction over a nonresident spouse cannot enter binding orders for spousal support, child support, or division of out-of-state property. Unlike a bilateral divorce where the defendant appears, a non-appearing defendant is not precluded from contesting lack of personal jurisdiction.
Application: Taylor moved permanently to State B with intent to stay, satisfying domicile, and met State B's 90-day residency requirement; Morgan received valid service in State A. Thus, State B had jurisdiction to end the marriage ex parte, and State A must give Full Faith and Credit to the marital status portion of the decree. However, Morgan never lived in, owned property in, consented to, or had minimum contacts with State B, and Morgan did not appear. Because State B lacked personal jurisdiction over Morgan (and in rem jurisdiction over a State A bank account), its awards of $1,500 monthly spousal support and half of the Oakridge account violate Due Process and are void.
Conclusion: State A must recognize the divorce terminating the marriage, but must refuse to enforce State B's spousal-support and property-division orders for lack of personal jurisdiction.
2. Initial Child Custody Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA and PKPA
Issue: Did State B have subject-matter jurisdiction to award initial custody of Child, or does State A have exclusive initial home-state jurisdiction?
Rule: Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA §§ 201, 207–208) and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), a court has initial custody jurisdiction only if it is the child's "home state"—where the child lived with a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before filing—or was the child's home state within six months before filing and a parent continues to live there. Significant-connection jurisdiction applies only if no home state exists (or the home state declines jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum under § 207 or for unjustifiable conduct under § 208) AND both: (1) the child and at least one parent have a significant connection with the state other than mere physical presence, and (2) substantial evidence is available in the state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships. Under the UCCJEA, personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state parent is not required for custody status determinations, and temporary emergency jurisdiction applies only if the child is abandoned or threatened with abuse.
Application: Child lived in State A from birth until moving to State B four months ago. Because Child had lived in State B for only four months—short of the six-month threshold—State B was not Child's home state when Taylor filed. Instead, State A remained Child's home state because Child had lived in State A within six months before filing and Morgan still resides in State A. Nor did State A decline jurisdiction, and no emergency abuse or abandonment occurred. Therefore, State B lacked UCCJEA subject-matter jurisdiction, and its custody order is not entitled to Full Faith and Credit under the PKPA.
Conclusion: State A holds exclusive initial home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and PKPA and should decline to recognize State B's custody award.
3. Best Interests of the Child and Interstate Relocation
Issue: How should State A evaluate custody and Taylor's desire to keep Child permanently in State B?
Rule: Initial custody determinations turn on the best interests of the child, weighing parental wishes, continuity of home, school, and community, primary caregiving history, sibling and extended-family ties, and each parent's willingness to foster the child's relationship with the other parent. When one parent seeks to relocate out of state, jurisdictions split: some require the relocating parent to prove the move serves the child's best interests (evaluating good-faith career reasons and feasibility of preserving noncustodial visitation), while others permit a good-faith relocation unless the non-moving parent shows detriment to the child.
Application: Here, both parents worked and raised Child in Oakridge for five years, where Child has established community ties and extended family. Taylor's relocation to State B rests on a good-faith permanent job transfer rather than an effort to frustrate Morgan's parenting time, and Morgan initially consented to a trial semester. On the other hand, permanently moving Child out of State A disrupts Child's long-term Oakridge home and limits frequent weekly contact with Morgan. State A must weigh the benefits of Taylor's career stability against the disruption of Morgan's relationship and evaluate whether liberal school-break parenting time and virtual contact can preserve Child's bond with Morgan.
Conclusion: State A will determine custody and relocation under the best-interests standard, weighing Taylor's good-faith job transfer against Child's Oakridge stability and Morgan's parenting time (applying the forum's relocation burden).
4. Grandparents' Request for Court-Ordered Visitation
Issue: May State A award Grandparents monthly weekend visitation over the objection of Taylor, a fit parent?
Rule: Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and Troxel v. Granville, fit parents have a fundamental constitutional liberty interest in directing the care, custody, and control of their children. Fit parents are presumed to act in their children's best interests, so a court must accord "special weight" to a fit parent's decision limiting or denying third-party visitation and may not override that decision based solely on a judge's independent view of the child's best interests.
Application: Taylor is concededly a fit parent, and Taylor's concern that monthly weekend grandparent visits disrupt Child's transition in State B is a reasonable parenting judgment (moreover, Taylor has not severed all contact, and Grandparents may still visit during Morgan's parenting time). Under Troxel, State A cannot grant Grandparents independent weekend visitation over Taylor's objection merely because Grandparents previously babysat Child twice a week or because a judge thinks extra visits would benefit Child, without overcoming the constitutional presumption favoring fit parents and giving Taylor's decision special weight (and while Troxel left open whether federal Due Process requires harm or unfitness, many states additionally require proof of parental unfitness or significant harm under state statutory or constitutional law).
Conclusion: State A must deny Grandparents' petition for court-ordered visitation over Taylor's fit-parent objection.
Points-Based Grading Guide
Total Possible: 20 Points
Issue 1: Divisible Divorce Jurisdiction (6 Points)
- 1 pt States that divorce status jurisdiction requires one spouse's domicile (presence plus intent to remain) and reasonable residency.
- 1 pt Applies domicile and 90-day residency to Taylor, concluding State B's divorce status decree gets Full Faith and Credit.
- 1 pt States the divisible-divorce / Due Process rule requiring personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse for support or out-of-state property.
- 1 pt Notes Morgan's lack of minimum contacts, appearance, or State B property.
- 1 pt Distinguishes bilateral appearance (Sherrer) from default after out-of-state service.
- 1 pt Concludes State B's alimony and bank-account orders are void and unenforceable.
Issue 2: UCCJEA & PKPA Custody Jurisdiction (6 Points)
- 1 pt States the UCCJEA/PKPA 6-month home-state priority rule for initial custody jurisdiction.
- 1 pt Explains that State B is not the home state because Child lived there only four months.
- 1 pt Identifies State A as the home state (lived there within 6 months prior and Morgan still resides in State A).
- 1 pt Notes significant-connection and emergency jurisdiction do not apply (State A did not decline; no abuse/abandonment).
- 1 pt Notes personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state parent is unnecessary for UCCJEA custody jurisdiction.
- 1 pt Concludes State A has exclusive initial custody jurisdiction and State B's custody decree is invalid.
Issue 3: Best Interests & Relocation (4 Points)
- 1 pt States the best-interests factors (stability, primary care, family ties, fostering contact).
- 1 pt Identifies the jurisdictional split on relocation burdens (moving parent proves best interests vs. good-faith move absent detriment).
- 1 pt Weighs Taylor's good-faith job transfer and trial consent against Child's Oakridge ties and Morgan's parenting time.
- 1 pt Concludes State A must balance stability with preserving Morgan's relationship under the applicable relocation standard.
Issue 4: Grandparent Visitation (4 Points)
- 1 pt Identifies a fit parent's fundamental substantive due process right under Troxel v. Granville.
- 1 pt States that courts must give "special weight" to a fit parent's decision and cannot override it on bare best-interests disagreement.
- 1 pt Applies facts: Taylor is fit, objects for reasonable transition reasons, and Grandparents' prior babysitting does not override fitness.
- 1 pt Concludes Grandparents' petition must be denied.