Fact Pattern
In Year 1, Casey married Alex in a ceremonial wedding in Cedar, State A, believing in good faith that Alex's prior marriage had already ended by divorce. Unknown to Casey, Alex's prior divorce decree was not signed and entered until six months after the Year 1 wedding. Casey and Alex continued living together in State A as spouses for four more years, during which their child, Child A, was born. In Year 5, Casey discovered the six-month overlap for the first time and filed for divorce in State A. Alex argues their marriage was void from the start so Casey has no spousal property or support rights. Assume State A follows the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA).
Before meeting Casey, Alex had a nonmarital infant, Child B, with Lee in State A. Alex never lived with Lee or Child B, never visited Child B, paid no support, and never registered on State A's putative-father registry despite knowing of Child B's birth. Two years later, Lee's new spouse petitioned to adopt Child B. Alex objected, claiming an absolute biological right to veto the adoption.
Meanwhile, in the Year 5 State A divorce action involving Child A, State A entered a valid child support order requiring Alex—an experienced architect earning $120,000 per year—to pay $1,800 monthly under State A's guidelines (under which support runs until age 21). After falling $5,400 behind on payments, Alex quit the architecture firm to take a $25,000 part-time tutoring job specifically to reduce support. Casey and Child A later moved permanently to State B (where child support ends at age 18), while Alex remained domiciled in State A. Casey registered the State A order in State B, and Alex then moved in State B court to forgive the $5,400 arrears, lower future monthly support based on Alex's $25,000 income, and cap support at age 18. Assume both states have enacted UIFSA.
Call of the Question
Under general United States family law and federal and uniform statutes, how should the courts rule on: (1) the validity of Casey and Alex's marriage and Casey's marital rights, (2) Alex's objection to the stepparent adoption of Child B, (3) Alex's motions to forgive the $5,400 arrears and reduce future child support based on the tutoring job, and (4) State B's authority under UIFSA to modify the State A support order or shorten its duration?
Model Answer (IRAC)
1. Bigamy, Removal of Impediment, and Putative Spouse Doctrine
Issue: Is Casey and Alex's marriage void for bigamy, or does Casey hold marital property and support rights?
Rule: A marriage entered while one spouse has an undissolved prior marriage is bigamous and void at inception. However, under UMDA § 207(b), if the prior marriage is later dissolved and the parties continue to cohabit after removal of the impediment, the marriage becomes valid as of the date the impediment was removed. Even in states without automatic validation, the putative spouse doctrine grants marital property and support rights to a person who cohabited in good-faith belief in a valid marriage until learning of the impediment (though a minority of states reject putative-spouse protection).
Application: Because Alex's prior divorce was not final until six months after the Year 1 wedding, the marriage was initially bigamous and void. However, once the prior divorce decree was entered six months later, the impediment was removed, and Casey and Alex continued cohabiting in State A for four more years. Under UMDA § 207(b), their marriage became legally valid upon entry of Alex's prior divorce. Furthermore, Casey cohabited in complete good faith without knowing of the overlap until Year 5, so even prior to validation (or in a non-UMDA state recognizing putative spouses), Casey held putative-spouse rights—and Child A is unquestionably a marital child.
Conclusion: Alex's void-marriage defense fails; Casey and Alex have a valid marriage from the date the prior divorce became final, entitling Casey to seek property division and spousal support.
2. Unwed Father's Constitutional Rights in Adoption
Issue: Does Alex have a constitutional right to veto the stepparent adoption of Child B?
Rule: Under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause (Stanley v. Illinois, Quilloin v. Walcott, Lehr v. Robertson) and the Equal Protection Clause (Caban v. Mohammed, invalidating gender-based adoption-consent disparities under intermediate scrutiny), an unwed biological father acquires a constitutionally protected parental interest—including notice, a hearing, and equal adoption-consent rights—only when he "grasps the opportunity" to develop a parent-child relationship by assuming custodial, personal, and financial responsibility in rearing the child (or, for a newborn, promptly coming forward and complying with putative-father registry rules). Conversely, an unwed father who knows of the child's birth but fails to seek custody, assume parental responsibility, or register on a putative-father registry has no constitutional veto over an adoption (and termination of an unfit parent's rights otherwise requires clear and convincing evidence under Santosky v. Kramer).
Application: Here, Alex knew of Child B's birth in State A for two years yet never lived with Child B, never visited, paid zero child support, and failed to sign State A's putative-father registry. Unlike a father who actively parented or diligently pursued custody, Alex took no steps to grasp the opportunity of parenthood. Under Lehr and Quilloin v. Walcott, biology alone without commitment confers no due process veto over Lee's spouse adopting Child B.
Conclusion: Alex's constitutional objection fails, and the court may approve the stepparent adoption if it serves Child B's best interests and satisfies statutory abandonment/consent rules.
3. Child Support Arrears (Bradley Amendment) and Imputed Income
Issue: On the merits, may a court forgive Alex's $5,400 child support arrears or reduce future support based on Alex's $25,000 tutoring income?
Rule: Under the federal Bradley Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(C)), every unpaid child support installment becomes a final judgment when due and may never be retroactively modified or forgiven. As to prospective modification, child support may be lowered only upon a substantial, continuing, good-faith change in circumstances; when an obligor voluntarily quits or takes a lower-paying job in bad faith to reduce support, the court may impute the obligor's prior earning capacity under state guidelines.
Application: First, the $5,400 in unpaid support had already accrued before Alex moved to modify, so the Bradley Amendment strictly prohibits forgiving or reducing those past-due arrears. Second, Alex quit a $120,000 architecture job for a $25,000 part-time job specifically to reduce child support. Because that income drop is voluntary and in bad faith, a court with modification jurisdiction should impute Alex's $120,000 earning capacity and deny any downward modification.
Conclusion: Neither the $5,400 arrears nor future monthly support may be reduced based on Alex's voluntary bad-faith income reduction.
4. UIFSA Continuing Exclusive Jurisdiction (CEJ) and Duration Choice of Law
Issue: Does the State B court have jurisdiction under UIFSA to modify State A's support order or shorten its duration from age 21 to age 18?
Rule: Under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA §§ 205(b)(1), 611(a)(2)) and the federal Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA), the state that validly issued a child support order retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) to modify it as long as the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child continues to reside in the issuing state, unless all individual parties file consents in a record in the issuing tribunal permitting another state where the child resides or an individual party is subject to personal jurisdiction to assume modification jurisdiction. Registration in a second state allows enforcement only, not modification. Moreover, under UIFSA § 611(c)–(d), the issuing state's law always governs the duration of the child support obligation.
Application: State A validly issued the child support order, and Alex (the obligor) remains domiciled in State A. Although Casey and Child A moved to State B and registered the order there for enforcement, neither Casey nor Alex filed consents in a record in State A's issuing tribunal for State B to assume modification jurisdiction (Alex's filing of a modification motion in State B court is not a consent filed in State A). Consequently, State A retains CEJ, and State B lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the support amount—it may only enforce the order. Furthermore, even if all parties later left State A and State B acquired modification power, State A's age-21 duration rule would still govern and could not be shortened to State B's age-18 limit.
Conclusion: State B lacks UIFSA jurisdiction to modify State A's order or shorten support to age 18; State B may only enforce the $1,800 order and collect the $5,400 arrears.
Points-Based Grading Guide
Total Possible: 20 Points
Issue 1: Bigamy, Impediment Removal, & Putative Spouse (5 Points)
- 1 pt Identifies the initial marriage as bigamous and void while Alex's prior marriage remained undissolved.
- 1 pt States UMDA § 207(b): removal of impediment plus continued cohabitation validates the marriage as of removal.
- 1 pt States the putative spouse doctrine (good-faith belief gives spousal property/support rights, noting minority split).
- 1 pt Applies facts: prior divorce finalized 6 months later, couple cohabited 4 more years, and Casey acted in good faith.
- 1 pt Concludes the marriage is valid (and Child A is marital), giving Casey property and support rights.
Issue 2: Unwed Father's Adoption Rights (4 Points)
- 1 pt States the due process rule from Stanley/Lehr: an unwed father gets veto/notice protection only by grasping the opportunity to parent.
- 1 pt Notes the significance of putative-father registry compliance and active financial/personal support.
- 1 pt Applies facts: Alex knew of Child B for two years, never visited, paid no support, and did not register.
- 1 pt Concludes Alex has no constitutional right to veto the stepparent adoption.
Issue 3: Arrears & Imputed Income (5 Points)
- 1 pt Cites the federal Bradley Amendment barring retroactive modification or forgiveness of accrued child support arrears.
- 1 pt Applies the Bradley Amendment to forbid erasing the $5,400 in past-due support.
- 1 pt States the prospective modification standard (substantial change in circumstances) and imputed-income rule for bad-faith underemployment.
- 1 pt Applies facts: Alex quit a $120,000 architect job for a $25,000 job specifically to reduce support.
- 1 pt Concludes $120,000 earning capacity should be imputed and downward modification denied.
Issue 4: UIFSA CEJ & Choice of Law (6 Points)
- 1 pt States the UIFSA/FFCCSOA continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) rule.
- 1 pt Identifies that State A keeps CEJ because Alex (obligor) still resides in State A and all parties have not filed consents in a record in State A's issuing tribunal.
- 1 pt Distinguishes registration for enforcement (permitted in State B) from authority to modify (barred in State B).
- 1 pt States UIFSA's choice-of-law rule: the original issuing state's law governs support duration.
- 1 pt Applies duration rule: State B cannot shorten support from State A's age 21 to State B's age 18.
- 1 pt Concludes State B must dismiss Alex's modification requests and enforce the State A order.