Fact Pattern
Founder, Investor, and Engineer agreed to form a corporation, Oakridge Robotics, Inc., to manufacture automated warehouse sensors. Before articles of incorporation were filed, Founder—acting as promoter—signed a two-year office lease with Landlord in the name of "Oakridge Robotics, Inc., a corporation to be formed." The lease contained no clause releasing Founder upon incorporation. Two weeks later, compliant articles of incorporation were filed with the state. At its organizational meeting, the board of directors—consisting of Founder (40% shareholder), Investor (35%), and Engineer (25%)—did not pass a resolution mentioning the lease, but Oakridge Robotics moved into the office and paid two months' rent to Landlord before later falling behind on rent.
Six months later, at a properly noticed board meeting attended by all three directors, Founder proposed that Oakridge Robotics buy 500 specialized sensor housings from Parts Co. at $120 per unit, which was 20% above the prevailing market price of $100 per unit. Founder secretly owned 100% of Parts Co. and did not mention that ownership to Investor or Engineer. Founder and Engineer voted in favor of the Parts Co. contract; Investor voted against it, believing the price seemed high.
Meanwhile, while representing Oakridge Robotics at an industry conference in nearby Maplewood, Engineer was approached by Maplewood City Officials seeking a vendor to supply automated warehouse sensors for a municipal depot. Engineer did not tell Founder or Investor about the Maplewood opportunity. Instead, Engineer privately formed a separate business and took the Maplewood sensor contract, later claiming that Oakridge Robotics lacked enough spare cash at the time to finance the municipal bid.
Upon discovering both Founder's ownership of Parts Co. and Engineer's Maplewood contract, Investor immediately filed a lawsuit in Investor's own name seeking personal monetary damages against Founder and Engineer, without making any written demand on the board.
Call of the Question
Under general United States corporate law: (1) Who is liable to Landlord on the office lease? (2) Did Founder breach a fiduciary duty in the Parts Co. sensor deal, and is the contract enforceable? (3) Did Engineer breach a fiduciary duty by taking the Maplewood municipal contract? (4) Was Investor's lawsuit properly brought as a direct action without board demand?
Model Answer (IRAC)
1. Pre-Incorporation Lease: Promoter Liability and Corporate Adoption
Issue: Are Founder and Oakridge Robotics, Inc. liable to Landlord on the pre-incorporation office lease?
Rule: A promoter who executes a pre-incorporation contract on behalf of a corporation not yet formed is personally liable on the contract even after the corporation comes into existence, unless the third party agreed at signing to look solely to the corporation or later enters a novation releasing the promoter. Because a nonexistent principal cannot have an agent or technically ratify a prior act, the newly formed corporation is not automatically bound upon incorporation; rather, it becomes liable only if it adopts the contract expressly by board resolution or impliedly by knowingly accepting its benefits.
Application: Here, Founder signed the lease before articles of incorporation were filed, and the lease contained no disclaimer of promoter liability. Nor did Landlord ever execute a novation releasing Founder after incorporation. Therefore, Founder remains personally liable on the lease. As for Oakridge Robotics, although the board passed no formal resolution adopting the lease, the corporation moved into the office space and paid two months' rent with knowledge of the lease, which constitutes implied adoption by accepting the contract's benefits.
Conclusion: Both Founder (as promoter without a novation) and Oakridge Robotics, Inc. (through implied adoption) are liable to Landlord on the lease.
2. Founder's Conflicting-Interest Transaction With Parts Co.
Issue: Did Founder breach the duty of loyalty in the Parts Co. contract, and can the corporation void the transaction or recover damages?
Rule: Directors owe the corporation a duty of loyalty requiring them to place corporate interests ahead of personal gain. Under both the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA §§ 8.60–8.63) and current Delaware law (8 Del. C. § 144, as amended effective March 2025), a director's conflicting-interest (self-dealing) transaction is voidable and unprotected by the business judgment rule unless cleansed by one of three safe harbors: (1) full disclosure of all material facts regarding the conflict and the transaction followed by approval by disinterested directors (under DGCL § 144(d)(1), interested directors count toward quorum, and under § 144(a)(1) approval must be in good faith and without gross negligence by a majority of disinterested directors—provided that if a majority of the board is not disinterested, approval or recommendation must come from a board committee of at least two disinterested directors; under MBCA § 8.62(a) and (c), conflicted directors do not count toward the cleansing quorum and approval requires a majority, and at least two, of all qualified directors deliberating and voting outside the conflicted director's presence); (2) full disclosure and approval by disinterested shareholders (under DGCL § 144(a)(2), an informed, uncoerced majority of votes cast by disinterested stockholders); or (3) proof by the interested director that the transaction was entirely fair to the corporation (and its stockholders) in both process and price (DGCL § 144(a)(3)).
Application: Founder had a direct conflicting interest because Founder owned 100% of Parts Co., the counterparty selling sensors to Oakridge Robotics. None of the cleansing safe harbors applies. First, Founder failed to disclose ownership of Parts Co. to Investor or Engineer, defeating informed board approval—and even if Founder had disclosed, only one of two disinterested directors (Engineer) voted yes while Investor voted no, failing both DGCL's disinterested majority and MBCA § 8.62's two-qualified-director and deliberation requirements (and Founder's own conflicted vote cannot cleanse the deal). Second, no disinterested shareholder ratification occurred. Third, Founder cannot prove entire fairness: the process lacked candor and arm's-length bargaining, and the $120 price exceeded market value ($100) by 20%.
Conclusion: Founder breached the duty of loyalty; the Parts Co. contract is voidable by Oakridge Robotics, and Founder is liable for the corporation's overpayment losses or secret profits.
3. Engineer's Usurpation of a Corporate Opportunity
Issue: Did Engineer breach the duty of loyalty by taking the Maplewood municipal sensor contract, despite claiming Oakridge Robotics lacked spare cash?
Rule: Under the corporate opportunity doctrine, a director or officer may not usurp a business opportunity that belongs to the corporation. Under Delaware's Guth/Broz four-factor test, courts weigh whether (1) the corporation is financially able to exploit the opportunity, (2) the opportunity is within the corporation's line of business, (3) the corporation has an interest or tangible expectancy in it, and (4) taking it places the fiduciary in a position inimical to corporate duties; formal presentation to the board is a safe harbor rather than mandatory when the corporation is genuinely financially unable to take the opportunity (though mere low cash reserves without inability to obtain credit or financing do not establish incapacity). By contrast, under the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.05 approach (adopted in several states), a fiduciary must always disclose the opportunity to the board and obtain a disinterested rejection, and cannot assert financial inability if they failed to present it (while MBCA § 8.70 is a permissive safe harbor for advance disclaimers).
Application: Supplying automated warehouse sensors to the Maplewood municipal depot fell squarely within Oakridge Robotics's core line of business, placed Engineer in direct competition with the corporation, and came to Engineer specifically while representing Oakridge Robotics at a trade conference. Engineer never disclosed the opportunity to Founder or Investor. Under the ALI § 5.05 approach, Engineer's failure to present the opportunity to the board bars any financial-inability defense outright. Even under Delaware's Guth/Broz framework (where board presentation is a safe harbor rather than an absolute precondition), Engineer's claim that Oakridge Robotics lacked "enough spare cash" fails because tight cash reserves alone do not prove the corporation was incapable of obtaining financing or credit to bid on the municipal contract.
Conclusion: Engineer usurped a corporate opportunity in breach of the duty of loyalty and must account to Oakridge Robotics through a constructive trust or profit disgorgement.
4. Investor's Standing: Direct vs. Derivative Suit and Demand Rules
Issue: Was Investor permitted to bring a direct suit for personal damages without making a written demand on the board?
Rule: Under general corporate law (and Delaware's Tooley test), a direct suit redresses an injury suffered personally by the shareholder independent of corporate injury (such as denial of voting or inspection rights), with recovery paid to the shareholder. By contrast, a claim for fiduciary breach, self-dealing, or usurpation of a corporate opportunity belongs to the corporation and must be brought as a derivative suit, with recovery going to the corporation. A derivative plaintiff must satisfy contemporaneous ownership and fair representation, and address pre-suit demand: under the MBCA's universal-demand rule (§ 7.42), the shareholder must make a written demand on the corporation and wait 90 days before suing unless the corporation earlier rejects the demand or waiting 90 days would cause irreparable injury to the corporation. Under Delaware's Zuckerberg standard, demand futility is evaluated claim-by-claim and director-by-director, and demand is excused on a claim only if at least half of the board (here, at least two of three directors) is disabled on that specific claim because they received a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct, face a substantial likelihood of liability on that claim, or lack independence from someone who did.
Application: Both the $20-per-unit overpayment to Parts Co. and the lost profits from the Maplewood sensor deal injured Oakridge Robotics directly and affected Investor only indirectly by reducing share value. Thus, Investor cannot sue directly for personal damages; the claims must be brought derivatively on the corporation's behalf (Investor satisfies contemporaneous ownership as an original 35% shareholder). Regarding pre-suit demand, in an MBCA universal-demand state Investor's suit will be dismissed for failing to make written demand and wait 90 days (neither early rejection nor irreparable injury from waiting is shown). In a Delaware demand-futility jurisdiction, demand is likewise not excused on either claim under Zuckerberg's claim-by-claim analysis: on the Parts Co. claim against Founder, only Founder (1 of 3 directors) received a personal benefit or faces substantial liability while Investor and Engineer (2 of 3, a disinterested majority) had no interest or knowledge; on the Maplewood claim against Engineer, only Engineer (1 of 3 directors) is conflicted while Founder and Investor (2 of 3) are disinterested. Two separate, undisclosed conflicts by different directors cannot be aggregated across claims to disable a board majority, absent particularized facts showing lack of independence.
Conclusion: Investor improperly filed a direct suit for personal damages; the claims must be brought derivatively, and pre-suit demand is required (and not excused) under both MBCA universal demand and Delaware's claim-by-claim demand-futility test.
Points-Based Grading Guide
Total Possible: 20 Points
Issue 1: Promoter Liability & Corporate Adoption (4 Points)
- 1 pt States the rule that a promoter remains personally liable on pre-incorporation contracts absent a disclaimer or novation.
- 1 pt Explains that a newly formed corporation is not automatically bound, but becomes bound by express or implied adoption.
- 1 pt Applies facts: moving into the office and paying two months' rent shows implied corporate adoption, while no novation released Founder.
- 1 pt Concludes both Founder and Oakridge Robotics are liable to Landlord.
Issue 2: Conflicting-Interest Transaction (5 Points)
- 1 pt Identifies Founder's 100% ownership of Parts Co. as a conflicting-interest self-dealing transaction removing BJR protection.
- 1 pt States the three cleansing safe harbors (disinterested directors after disclosure, disinterested shareholders after disclosure, or entire fairness).
- 1 pt Explains why board cleansing failed: Founder concealed ownership and did not obtain an informed disinterested majority vote (only 1 of 2 disinterested directors voted yes).
- 1 pt Applies entire fairness: secretive process plus a 20% above-market price ($120 vs. $100) fails fairness.
- 1 pt Concludes the contract is voidable and Founder is liable for damages/disgorgement.
Issue 3: Corporate Opportunity Doctrine (5 Points)
- 1 pt States the corporate opportunity tests (line of business, interest/expectancy, or discovered in corporate capacity) and the duty to disclose and seek board rejection.
- 1 pt Applies facts: automated warehouse sensors matched Oakridge Robotics's exact business and Engineer learned of it while representing the company.
- 1 pt Notes Engineer failed to disclose the Maplewood contract to the board.
- 1 pt Addresses the financial-ability split: Delaware (Broz) treats financial ability as a core factor with presentation as a safe harbor (but mere low spare cash without inability to obtain credit fails), while ALI § 5.05 bars raising financial inability without prior board presentation.
- 1 pt Concludes Engineer breached the duty of loyalty and owes disgorgement/constructive trust.
Issue 4: Direct vs. Derivative Suit & Demand (6 Points)
- 1 pt Distinguishes direct suits (personal shareholder injury/recovery) from derivative suits (corporate injury/recovery).
- 1 pt Concludes both the overpayment and lost contract injured the corporation, making a direct personal-damages suit improper.
- 1 pt Notes derivative standing requirements (contemporaneous ownership and adequate representation, both met by Investor).
- 1 pt States MBCA § 7.42 universal demand (written demand + 90-day wait unless earlier rejected or irreparable injury, barring Investor's suit).
- 1 pt Applies Delaware's Zuckerberg claim-by-claim, director-by-director demand-futility test: only 1 of 3 directors is conflicted on each separate claim, so unrelated conflicts cannot be aggregated to disable a board majority.
- 1 pt Concludes the claims must be brought derivatively and pre-suit demand is required under both MBCA universal demand and Delaware's claim-by-claim futility analysis.