Part A: Redrafted Estate-Planning Clauses
Clause 1 (Spendthrift Protection, Material Purpose & Statutory Exceptions): "To the fullest extent permitted by Linden Code §§ 33-502 and 33-503, each beneficiary's interest in trust income and principal is held subject to a spendthrift trust and may not be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred, assigned, or attached by creditors prior to actual distribution, subject only to mandatory statutory exceptions for (a) child, spouse, or former spouse support orders, (b) judgment creditors who provided services protecting the beneficiary's trust interest, and (c) enforceable state or federal government claims. Pursuant to Linden Code § 33-411(c), the Settlor expressly declares that this spendthrift restraint is a material purpose of the trust. Nothing in this instrument limits the Court's equitable-deviation authority under Linden Code § 33-412(a)."
Drafter's Note: The template restrained only involuntary creditor attachment—omitting voluntary assignment and thus invalidating the clause under § 33-502(a)—while unlawfully purporting to bar § 33-503(b) exception creditors, strip mandatory § 33-412(a) judicial deviation authority, and omit § 33-411(c)'s material-purpose designation; the redraft restrains both voluntary and involuntary transfer under § 33-502, preserves statutory exceptions and judicial power, and expressly makes spendthrift protection a material purpose blocking early termination.
Clause 2 (Pour-Over Will & Tangible Personal Property Memorandum): "I devise my entire residuary probate estate to the Trustee of the Nadia Bennett Trust, to be held, administered, and distributed according to the terms of that trust as existing at my death, including any valid written amendments executed after this Will pursuant to Linden Code § 32-511. In addition, pursuant to Linden Code § 32-513, my Executor shall distribute items of my tangible personal property (excluding money, stocks, intangible securities, and real property) not otherwise specifically devised herein in accordance with any written statement or list signed by me or in my handwriting that describes the items and recipients with reasonable certainty, whether prepared before or after execution of this Will."
Drafter's Note: Under § 32-511 (UTATA), post-will trust amendments validly govern poured-over assets without will re-execution, correcting the template's contrary restriction; under § 32-513, a separate memorandum may dispose only of tangible personal property (removing cash, brokerage stocks, and the Maplewood cabin) and must be signed or handwritten with reasonable certainty.
Clause 3 (Owen's Sub-Trust, Nongeneral Power & Perpetuities Savings): "Upon my death, Owen's share shall be held in trust for Owen for life. Upon Owen's death, the remaining principal shall pass to such of Owen's children—and in no event to Owen, Owen's estate, Owen's spouse, Owen's creditors, or the creditors of Owen's estate—as Owen appoints by a valid Will that makes explicit, specific reference to this nongeneral power of appointment pursuant to Linden Code § 32-608. In default of valid appointment, the principal shall pass to Owen's children who reach age 25; provided, however, that notwithstanding any other provision, every unvested interest in this trust shall vest (with age contingencies reduced to age 21 if necessary to preserve validity) no later than twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last survivor of Owen, my descendants, and Owen's descendants living at my death, and if any interest has not vested by that twenty-one (21) year cutoff, the trust shall terminate and the remaining principal shall be distributed outright, per stirpes, to Owen's then-living descendants (or, if none, to my then-living descendants)."
Drafter's Note: The template wrongly created a general power exercisable by a blanket residuary clause instead of Nadia's desired nongeneral power limited to Owen's children with an explicit-reference mandate under § 32-608; because nephew Owen is not a descendant of Nadia or Owen, naming Owen himself among the measuring lives living at Nadia's death (when her revocable trust becomes irrevocable) and adding an explicit termination distribution gift-over (plus age-21 reduction) prevents the open age-25 class gift from failing under common-law RAP.
Clause 4 (Enforceable No-Contest Clause): "Except as otherwise provided by Linden Code § 32-517, if any beneficiary directly or indirectly contests the validity of this Trust or seeks to set aside its dispositive provisions without probable cause, that beneficiary's entire interest shall be forfeited and pass as if the contesting beneficiary had predeceased me without issue. Nothing in this clause shall apply to any proceeding supported by probable cause, any good-faith petition for judicial construction or accounting, or any action alleging trustee self-dealing or breach of fiduciary duty."
Drafter's Note: Under § 32-517, no-contest clauses are unenforceable when probable cause exists and cannot bar construction petitions or fiduciary-breach claims; carving out those statutory and public-policy protections ensures the clause remains valid against bad-faith contests.
Part B: Persuasive Brief Section — Motion for Summary Judgment
ARGUMENT
Beneficiary Nadia Bennett Is Entitled to Summary Judgment Because Trustee Thomas Bennett Committed an Unrebutted Conflict-of-Interest Sale to His Spouse's Company and Failed to Diversify Trust Investments, Warranting Disgorgement, Surcharge, Removal, and Fee Forfeiture.
I. Thomas Breached the Duty of Loyalty Under Linden Code § 33-802(c) by Selling Trust Real Estate to His Wife's Company Without Disclosure, Consent, or Rebuttal of the Conflict Presumption.
Under Linden Code § 33-802, a trustee owes an undivided duty of loyalty to administer the trust solely in the beneficiaries' interests. While direct self-dealing for the trustee's own personal account is irrebuttably voidable under § 33-802(b) absent trust authorization, court approval, or beneficiary consent, a sale of trust property to a trustee's spouse or an entity owned by the trustee's spouse triggers a rebuttable presumption of conflict under § 33-802(c) (whereas traditional common law treats spousal sales as irrebuttably voidable). In In re Trust of Halvorsen, 20 Linden 175, the Linden Supreme Court held that bare assertions of good faith and payment of an independent appraisal's fair market value—without disclosure, independent safeguards, and affirmative proof that the transaction was unaffected by the conflict—fail as a matter of law to rebut § 33-802(c)'s presumption. Under §§ 33-802(b), 33-1002, and 33-1012(a)–(b), (e), once the property is resold to an innocent third-party bona fide purchaser (BFP), equitable rescission in specie is cut off, leaving beneficiaries entitled to monetary disgorgement of any resale profit against the trustee.
Here, the material facts are undisputed. The Bennett Memorial Trust neither authorizes self-dealing nor excuses notice, Thomas obtained neither court approval nor beneficiary consent, and Nadia never knew of the June Year 8 sale. Thomas nonetheless sold the Oakridge apartment parcel for $400,000 to Crestline Holdings LLC—a company 100% owned by his wife, Miriam Bennett—which resold the parcel six months later for $485,000, capturing an $85,000 gain. Thomas offers no evidence showing the transaction was unaffected by conflict; his sole defense—that Crestline paid appraised fair market value in good faith—fails as a matter of law to rebut § 33-802(c)'s presumption under Halvorsen. Because Crestline's subsequent resale to a third-party BFP cuts off in-specie rescission under §§ 33-802(b) and 33-1012(a)–(b), (e) (and neither Crestline nor the third-party buyer is joined), Nadia is entitled to summary judgment requiring Thomas personally under § 33-1002 to disgorge the $85,000 resale profit.
II. Thomas Violated the Prudent Investor Diversification Mandate Under Linden Code § 33-902 and Must Be Surcharged $140,000 and Removed.
Under Linden Code § 33-902 (the Uniform Prudent Investor Act), a trustee must invest prudently across the total portfolio and must diversify trust investments unless special circumstances justify concentration. As Halvorsen confirms, concentrating 70% of a trust's liquid reserves in a single speculative venture without special trust authorization breaches § 33-902 as a matter of law. In August Year 8, without professional advice or any special trust purpose, Thomas placed $210,000 (70%) of the trust's $300,000 liquid cash reserve into one unproved, closely held biotech startup, causing a $140,000 principal loss when the startup entered bankruptcy. Under § 33-1002, Thomas is personally liable to restore the $140,000 lost principal plus lost reasonable investment return.
Finally, because Thomas committed two serious, independent breaches of trust—unconsented spousal self-dealing and reckless non-diversification—this Court should remove Thomas as trustee under Linden Code § 33-706 and deny or forfeit his trustee compensation under § 33-1001.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Nadia Bennett respectfully requests that the Court grant summary judgment ordering disgorgement of the $85,000 resale profit, surcharging Thomas Bennett $140,000 plus lost reasonable return, removing him as trustee, and denying his trustee fees.