NextGen Real Property · Standalone Multiple Choice
Standalone Multiple-Choice Set (10 Items)
Five select-one-of-four questions and five select-two-of-six questions (~1.8 minutes per item) under general United States real property law.
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Question 1 of 10Select One of Four
Ownership — Contingent Remainders vs. Vested Remainders Subject to Divestment
Grantor executes and delivers two separate deeds for two vacant residential lots in the town of Birchwood. The first deed conveys Oak Lot "to Brother Leo for life, then to Niece Maya if Niece Maya earns a nursing license." The second deed conveys Pine Lot "to Sister Carla for life, then to Nephew Devon, but if Nephew Devon ever sells timber from Pine Lot, then to Charity Hospital." At the time of delivery, Brother Leo and Sister Carla are alive, Niece Maya is enrolled in nursing school and has not yet earned a license, and Nephew Devon has never sold timber. Under common-law future-interest classification rules, what interests do Niece Maya and Nephew Devon hold immediately after delivery? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under the common-law classification rule (Gray's rule), whether a remainder is contingent or vested subject to complete divestment does not turn simply on whether conditional words appear before or after the grantee's name. Instead, a remainder is contingent whenever the conditional language is written inside the remainder's own gift clause or description of the taker—whether before or after the taker's name—so Niece Maya's remainder ("to Niece Maya if Niece Maya earns a nursing license") is a contingent remainder subject to a condition precedent. By contrast, Nephew Devon's remainder ("then to Nephew Devon") is an unconditional grant to an ascertained living person, followed by a separate divesting clause ("but if Nephew Devon ever sells timber from Pine Lot, then to Charity Hospital"), so Nephew Devon holds a vested remainder subject to complete divestment and Charity Hospital holds a shifting executory interest.
Question 2 of 10Select Two of Six
Ownership — Restraints on Alienation (Fee Simple and Legal Life Estates)
Owner executes two separate deeds conveying adjacent parcels in the town of Alder Creek. First, Owner conveys Birch Cottage "to Cousin Sam for life, provided that any attempt by Cousin Sam to transfer, lease, or encumber the life estate shall be completely void and of no legal effect." Second, Owner conveys Pine Lot "to Niece Tara in fee simple, provided that Niece Tara shall never sell, gift, or transfer Pine Lot to anyone, and if Tara attempts to do so, title shall automatically revert to Owner." Assume the jurisdiction applies traditional common-law rules on restraints on alienation. Which TWO legal conclusions are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under traditional property law, disabling restraints—clauses declaring that any attempted transfer is void—are unenforceable on any legal estate, whether a fee simple or a legal life estate (disabling restraints are valid only on equitable interests in a spendthrift trust). While reasonable forfeiture or promissory restraints may stand on a legal life estate, the disabling restraint on Cousin Sam's legal life estate is void. Likewise, any total or absolute restraint on the alienation of a fee simple—whether disabling, forfeiture, or promissory—is void as against public policy, so the total forfeiture restraint on Niece Tara's fee simple is also void (whereas reasonable, partial, time-limited forfeiture or promissory restraints on a fee simple may be upheld).
Question 3 of 10Select One of Four
Ownership — Co-Tenant Rights, Carrying Charges, Repairs, and Improvements
Sisters Nadia and Tessa inherited a vacant mountain cabin as equal tenants in common, and neither sister occupies the cabin or excludes the other. Without consulting Tessa or obtaining any prior agreement or giving advance notice, Nadia pays $4,000 in mandatory county property taxes to prevent a tax sale, hires a roofer for $3,000 to make necessary repairs stopping an active roof leak, and spends $10,000 to build an attached sunroom that increases the cabin's market value by $6,000. Nadia immediately files an independent lawsuit against Tessa—without seeking partition or an accounting for rents—demanding that Tessa reimburse half of all three outlays now. Under the majority common-law rule, what may Nadia compel Tessa to pay in this independent lawsuit? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
A co-tenant who pays more than a pro-rata share of mandatory carrying charges—such as property taxes and mortgage payments needed to preserve the common title—has an affirmative right to compel contribution from fellow co-tenants (subject in some states to an offset if the paying co-tenant enjoys sole occupancy, which does not apply here because the cabin is vacant). By contrast, under the majority common-law rule, a co-tenant who makes unilateral necessary repairs without an agreement cannot bring an independent affirmative lawsuit for contribution during the co-tenancy; instead, the repairing co-tenant receives a credit at partition or in an accounting for third-party rents (while a minority rule permits affirmative contribution only after advance notice, which Nadia did not give). Finally, a co-tenant can never force contribution for discretionary improvements and instead receives only the value added by the improvement upon partition.
Question 4 of 10Select Two of Six
Ownership — Lease Assignments, Privity of Estate, and Privity of Contract
Landlord leases a commercial studio in the town of Pinehaven to Tenant Maya for a twenty-four-month term at $1,600 per month under a written lease containing no restriction on transfers. Six months into the lease, Tenant Maya executes a written agreement transferring "all of Tenant Maya's remaining eighteen months under the lease" to Assignee Leo. Assignee Leo signs no express assumption agreement promising Landlord to perform the lease covenants. Assignee Leo moves in and pays rent directly to Landlord for four months. During the fifth month, Assignee Leo walks out and abandons the studio without reassigning the lease to anyone else, and neither Tenant Maya nor Assignee Leo pays rent for the final fourteen months. Landlord does not accept a surrender and sues both Tenant Maya and Assignee Leo for unpaid rent. Which TWO legal statements are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Because Tenant Maya transferred the entire remaining eighteen-month lease term rather than retaining any portion, the transfer was an assignment rather than a sublease. An assignment places the assignee in privity of estate with the landlord, making the assignee directly liable for rent and other covenants running with the land while the assignee holds the leasehold estate—and simply abandoning physical possession without reassigning the lease to another person leaves the assignee in privity of estate and liable for accruing rent (though a subsequent valid reassignment would end a non-assuming assignee's privity of estate). Meanwhile, the original tenant remains liable in privity of contract for the entire lease term unless the landlord grants an express novation, which did not happen here.
Question 5 of 10Select One of Four
Ownership — Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act of 1866
Owner owns and lives in one ground-floor unit of a three-unit residential triplex in the town of Meadowbrook and owns no other rental property. Without hiring a real estate broker, Owner posts an online advertisement to rent the vacant second-floor apartment stating: "Quiet building—no families with children under age twelve." Separately, Owner rejects an otherwise qualified African American applicant who tours the vacant third-floor apartment solely because of the applicant's race. Under the federal Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. section 1982), which statement accurately describes Owner's liability? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under the federal Fair Housing Act, the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption shields an owner-occupant of a building with four or fewer residential units from certain rental discrimination claims, and another exemption shields qualifying single-family homes sold or rented by an owner without a broker. However, under 42 U.S.C. section 3603(b), neither the Mrs. Murphy exemption nor the single-family exemption ever permits discriminatory advertising or statements indicating a preference or limitation based on a protected characteristic such as familial status (42 U.S.C. section 3604(c)). (Only separate statutory exemptions—such as qualifying housing for older persons under section 3607(b) from familial-status rules, or qualifying noncommercial religious organizations and private clubs under section 3607(a)—permit stating those respective occupancy limits, and neither applies to Owner.) In addition, 42 U.S.C. section 1982 (from the Civil Rights Act of 1866) prohibits all racial discrimination in the sale or lease of real property with no exemptions whatsoever.
Question 6 of 10Select Two of Six
Rights — Commercial Easements in Gross and Irrevocable Licenses by Estoppel
Landowner grants Utility Company a valid written easement in gross to install and maintain underground fiber-optic lines across Landowner's pasture. That same month, Landowner orally tells Neighbor, "You are welcome to build a permanent paved turnaround on the edge of my driveway so your delivery vans can turn around safely." Relying reasonably on Landowner's oral permission, Neighbor spends $12,000 pouring a concrete turnaround on Landowner's strip. Two years later, Utility Company sells its regional network and assigns its fiber-optic easement in gross to Telecom Corporation, and Landowner sends Neighbor a letter revoking Neighbor's permission and demanding that Neighbor stop using the turnaround. Which TWO legal conclusions are correct under general United States real property law? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
An easement in gross benefits a holder personally or commercially rather than benefitting a dominant parcel of land. Under both the traditional rule (Restatement (First) of Property sections 489–491) and the modern rule (Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes section 4.6), a commercial easement in gross—such as a utility line or pipeline easement—is freely transferable, so Utility Company's assignment to Telecom Corporation is valid. As to Neighbor, an informal oral permission to use another's land creates a license that is ordinarily revocable at will; however, when a licensee reasonably relies on a license by making substantial permanent improvements (here, spending $12,000 on a concrete turnaround), the license becomes irrevocable by estoppel (often called an easement by estoppel) for as long as the nature of the reliance requires. Neighbor did not acquire a prescriptive easement because Neighbor's use was permissive rather than hostile and lacked the full statutory period.
Question 7 of 10Select One of Four
Rights — Real Covenants vs. Equitable Servitudes (Horizontal Privity)
Neighbors Aria and Ben own adjoining commercial lots in fee simple along Hawthorne Lane, having acquired their lots independently from unrelated prior owners. In a signed, recorded written contract supported by consideration, Aria promises "for Aria and Aria's heirs and assigns, for the benefit of Ben's lot, never to operate a nightclub on Aria's lot." One year later, Aria sells Aria's lot in fee simple to Buyer Chen, whose deed makes no reference to the promise, although Chen reads the recorded agreement in a title search before closing. Buyer Chen promptly opens a noisy nightclub on the lot. Ben files an action at law against Buyer Chen seeking solely money damages (and not an injunction) under a real covenant theory. May Ben recover money damages at law from Buyer Chen? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
For the burden of a promise to run with the land at law as a real covenant (enforced by money damages), the claimant must establish six requirements: (1) a writing satisfying the Statute of Frauds, (2) intent that the promise bind successors, (3) touch and concern the land, (4) horizontal privity between the original promisor and promisee, (5) strict vertical privity between the original promisor and the successor, and (6) notice to a subsequent purchaser. Horizontal privity requires that the original covenanting parties shared a mutual or successive property relationship at the time they made the promise—such as grantor and grantee, landlord and tenant, or holders of an easement—rather than merely being adjoining neighbors who contracted independently. Because Aria and Ben lacked horizontal privity, the burden cannot run at law to support money damages against Buyer Chen, even though Chen had notice and strict vertical privity. However, an equitable servitude (enforced by injunction) does not require horizontal or vertical privity, so Ben could seek an injunction against Chen.
Question 8 of 10Select Two of Six
Sales Contracts — Part Performance & Marketable Title (Adverse Possession and Visible Easements)
Seller and Buyer orally agree that Buyer will purchase Seller's vacant suburban lot for $120,000, with closing in sixty days, without signing any written contract. Over the next month, with Seller's knowledge, Buyer pays Seller $40,000 toward the price, takes physical possession of the lot, and builds a $25,000 permanent brick workshop on the lot. Before closing, Buyer's title report reveals two facts: first, a visible, recorded electric utility easement runs along the rear boundary providing electrical service directly to the lot; second, Seller's sole claim to a twenty-foot-wide side strip of the lot rests on completed adverse possession that ripened twelve years ago (two years past the ten-year statutory period), with no quiet-title judgment or release deed from the prior record owner. Which TWO legal conclusions are correct under general United States real property law? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under the Statute of Frauds, a contract to sell land generally requires a signed writing; however, in equity, the part performance doctrine allows a court to order specific performance when a buyer performs acts unequivocally pointing to the contract—typically at least two of payment, possession, and substantial permanent improvements (all three are present here), though part performance unlocks equitable specific performance only and never legal money damages. On marketable title, every land sale contract implies a covenant to deliver title reasonably free from doubt or litigation risk at closing. Under the majority rule, title resting on adverse possession—even after the full statutory period has expired—is unmarketable unless quieted of record by court decree or released by the record owner, because a buyer cannot be forced to rely on off-record witness testimony. By contrast, under the majority rule, a visible or known beneficial easement (such as utility lines servicing the property) generally does not render title unmarketable, unlike burdensome private easements that diminish value.
Question 9 of 10Select One of Four
Mortgages and Foreclosure — Intermediate Theory & Assumption Suretyship
Borrower owns a commercial warehouse in a jurisdiction that follows the intermediate theory of mortgages. Borrower executes a promissory note and mortgage on the warehouse to Bank. Two years later, Borrower sells the warehouse to Buyer, and Buyer expressly assumes the mortgage in writing. Later, without Borrower's knowledge or consent, Bank and Buyer sign a written loan modification increasing the interest rate by two percentage points and extending the maturity date by five years. Buyer subsequently defaults on the modified loan. Which statement accurately describes Bank's right to title and possession under the intermediate theory and the effect of the unconsented modification on Borrower's personal liability? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
States follow one of three mortgage theories: under the majority lien theory, the current owner retains title and possession until foreclosure is completed; under the minority title theory, the lender holds legal title from the moment the mortgage is executed; and under the minority intermediate theory, the current owner of the mortgaged property (initially Borrower, and after Borrower's deed, Buyer) keeps legal title and possession until default, at which point title and the right to possession shift to the lender. When mortgaged property is transferred, a buyer taking "subject to" incurs no personal liability, whereas a buyer who expressly "assumes" the mortgage becomes primarily personally liable on the debt while the original borrower remains secondarily liable as a surety. If the lender and assuming buyer materially modify the loan (such as increasing the interest rate or extending maturity) without the original borrower's consent, traditional common law completely discharges the original borrower as surety, while the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages section 5.3 discharges the borrower to the extent of prejudice (and completely if the interest rate or principal amount increases).
Question 10 of 10Select Two of Six
Titles — Recording Acts, Wild Deeds, and Shelter Rule
Owner conveys Cedarbrook Lot in fee simple to Buyer 1 on Monday for $200,000, and Buyer 1 does not record the deed. On Wednesday, Owner conveys the same Cedarbrook Lot to Buyer 2 for $210,000; Buyer 2 pays value and has no actual, record, or inquiry notice of Buyer 1's deed. On Thursday morning, Buyer 1 sells Cedarbrook Lot to Sub-buyer, who immediately records the deed from Buyer 1 on Thursday afternoon. On Friday morning, Buyer 2 records Buyer 2's Wednesday deed from Owner. One month later, Buyer 2 conveys Cedarbrook Lot as a gift to Nephew by recorded deed; Nephew knows all about Buyer 1's Monday purchase. The jurisdiction's recording statute provides: "A conveyance of an interest in land shall not be valid against any subsequent purchaser for value, without notice thereof, unless the conveyance is recorded." Which TWO legal conclusions are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
On recording-act wording, "without notice" alone signals a notice statute; "first recorded" alone signals a race statute; and both "without notice" and "first recorded" together signal a race-notice statute. Under this pure notice statute, Buyer 2 prevailed over Buyer 1 immediately upon taking the deed on Wednesday for value and without notice, regardless of whether Buyer 2 recorded before Sub-buyer or Buyer 1. Furthermore, Sub-buyer's Thursday recording could not defeat Buyer 2 for two reasons: notice is tested on Wednesday when Buyer 2 took the conveyance, and a deed recorded from an unrecorded grantor (Buyer 1) is a wild deed sitting outside the chain of title. Finally, under the shelter rule, a transferee taking from a bona fide purchaser steps into the bona fide purchaser's protected priority even if the transferee is a donee who has actual notice of the earlier unrecorded deed—so Nephew prevails over Buyer 1 and Sub-buyer.