Five select-one-of-four questions and five select-two-of-six questions (~1.8 minutes per item) under general United States contract law and Uniform Commercial Code Article 2.
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Question 1 of 10Select One of Four
Which Law Governs — Goods Severed from Realty (UCC Section 2-107)
Orchard Owner enters into two separate written agreements in the town of Pinehollow. Under the first agreement, Fruit Buyer will pay $18,000 to pick and remove this season's ripening cherries directly from Orchard Owner's trees. Under the second agreement, Salvage Contractor will pay $6,000 to dismantle and haul away an unused wooden storage barn standing on Orchard Owner's back pasture. Under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 2, which body of law governs these two agreements? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-107(2), a contract for the sale apart from the land of growing crops, timber to be cut, or other things attached to realty capable of severance without material harm is a contract for the sale of goods regardless of whether the buyer or the seller severs them. Accordingly, the cherry-crop agreement is governed by Article 2 even though Fruit Buyer will harvest the cherries. By contrast, under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-107(1), a contract for the sale of minerals or a structure (or its materials) to be removed from realty is a contract for the sale of goods only if they are to be severed by the seller. Because Salvage Contractor (the buyer) will dismantle and remove the barn, the barn agreement is governed by real-property common law rather than Article 2.
Question 2 of 10Select Two of Six
Formation — Battle of Forms & Firm Offers (UCC Sections 2-104, 2-205, and 2-207)
Bistro Owner, who runs a neighborhood diner and does not deal in kitchen machinery, mails a signed purchase order to Espresso Supply Co., a commercial equipment dealer, offering $9,000 for a two-group espresso machine and saying nothing about dispute resolution. Espresso Supply replies with a signed acknowledgment confirming the $9,000 price and model without making acceptance conditional on assent to new terms, but adds a clause requiring arbitration in a distant county. Bistro Owner never responds to the arbitration clause. Separately, Espresso Supply fills out and signs a preprinted quote form provided by National Cafe Chain's purchasing office; the form includes a clause stating that Espresso Supply's $8,500 price offer will remain open for 45 days. Espresso Supply signs at the bottom of the form, but does not separately sign the firm-offer clause. Under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 2, which TWO statements are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207(1), Espresso Supply's definite and seasonable acknowledgment formed a contract with Bistro Owner even though it included an additional arbitration term, because it was not expressly conditional on Bistro Owner's assent. Under Section 2-104(1) and Official Comment 2, 'merchant' covers not only a person who deals in goods of the kind, but also any person in business who by occupation holds out knowledge or skill peculiar to normal business practices such as answering commercial mail and reading forms. Accordingly, Bistro Owner—as a commercial diner operator—is a merchant under Section 2-207(2) even though Bistro Owner does not deal in kitchen machinery (the narrower goods-of-the-kind standard governs rules such as the implied warranty of merchantability under Section 2-314, infringement under Section 2-312(3), and entrustment under Section 2-403(2)). Between merchants under Section 2-207(2)(b), an additional term does not enter the contract if it materially alters it; requiring arbitration in a distant county imposes surprise and hardship and therefore stays out without needing express assent or objection. Regarding National Cafe Chain's quote form, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-205 permits a merchant's signed written firm offer to stay irrevocable without consideration for up to three months, not merely 30 days, but expressly requires that any firm-offer assurance appearing on a form supplied by the offeree be separately signed by the offeror. Signing only at the bottom of the offeree's form does not satisfy that separate-signature safeguard.
On Monday, Homeowner hands Roofing Contractor a signed written offer to pay $7,500 to strip and replace the hail-damaged roof on Homeowner's single-family house, stating that the offer will remain open until Friday at 5:00 p.m. Roofing Contractor pays nothing for the Friday deadline. On Tuesday morning, Roofing Contractor learns from a reliable roofing-supply driver who just delivered shingles to Homeowner's house that Homeowner signed a binding contract with a competing roofer, whose crew is already tearing off the old roof. On Tuesday afternoon, Roofing Contractor mails a properly stamped and addressed written acceptance to Homeowner. On Wednesday morning, Homeowner's written revocation arrives at Roofing Contractor's office, and on Thursday morning Roofing Contractor's acceptance reaches Homeowner. Under general United States contract law, did a contract form between Homeowner and Roofing Contractor? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
At common law, an ordinary promise to hold an offer open until Friday without consideration is not an option contract and may be revoked before acceptance. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 43, an offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeror takes definite action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract and the offeree acquires reliable information to that effect. Because Roofing Contractor reliably learned on Tuesday morning that Homeowner had already contracted with a competing roofer who was tearing off the single roof, the offer was indirectly revoked before Roofing Contractor mailed the acceptance on Tuesday afternoon. Consequently, the mailbox rule does not save Tuesday afternoon's dispatch.
Question 4 of 10Select Two of Six
Defenses — Adjudicated Incompetence & Statute of Frauds Main-Purpose Rule
Consider two separate transactions in the town of Brookhaven. First, Arthur, whose property has been placed under a court-ordered guardianship following a judicial adjudication of mental incompetence, signs a written agreement to purchase an expensive antique grandfather clock from a dealer who has no knowledge of the guardianship. Second, General Contractor orally promises Crane Service that General Contractor will personally guarantee Subcontractor's $4,000 crane-operator service fee if Subcontractor fails to pay, because Subcontractor cannot otherwise obtain crane service and General Contractor needs the steel beams hoisted immediately to earn an early-completion bonus on the main building project. Under general United States contract law, which TWO conclusions are accurate? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 13, a person has no capacity to incur contractual duties if that person's property is under guardianship by reason of an adjudication of mental illness or defect; any purported contract made by such a person is void, not merely voidable (though the estate may owe reasonable value for necessaries). By contrast, an unadjudicated mental illness makes a contract voidable under Section 15. On the second transaction, a promise to answer for the debt of another normally falls within the suretyship Statute of Frauds, but under the main-purpose (leading-object) rule in Restatement Section 116, no writing is required when the promisor's main purpose is to obtain an economic advantage for the promisor itself—here, earning the early-completion bonus. Because the crane-operator agreement is a services contract, Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201 does not apply.
Question 5 of 10Select One of Four
Content and Meaning — Parol Evidence Rule (Contemporaneous Oral Agreements & Ambiguity)
Landlord and Bakery Owner negotiate a three-year commercial bakery lease. At the signing table, immediately before both parties sign the written lease, Landlord orally promises, 'We will also let your delivery vans park overnight in the rear loading bay at no extra charge.' The signed lease sets monthly rent at $3,200, describes the leased kitchen suite, includes an integration clause stating that the document is the 'complete and exclusive statement of all lease terms,' and omits any mention of van parking. Separately, the lease obligates Bakery Owner to clean the 'front display awning,' and the parties later disagree on whether that phrase covers only the fabric canopy or also the attached steel sign frame. Bakery Owner seeks to testify about both the oral parking promise made at signing and prior conversations showing what both parties meant by 'front display awning.' How should the court rule under the parol evidence rule? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts Sections 213 and 216 (which govern this commercial real-property lease; UCC Article 2 applies only to transactions in goods, not real-property leases), a binding completely integrated agreement discharges not only prior agreements within its scope, but also contemporaneous oral agreements made at the time of signing, even if those agreements are consistent with the writing. Because the written lease is completely integrated and covers the parties' full lease obligations, Bakery Owner cannot introduce the contemporaneous oral parking promise. However, under Restatement Section 214(c), extrinsic evidence remains admissible to interpret and resolve the meaning of an ambiguous contract term, so Bakery Owner may offer prior conversations to clarify what 'front display awning' meant.
Question 6 of 10Select Two of Six
Performance — Risk of Loss & Warranty Disclaimers (UCC Sections 2-312, 2-316, and 2-509)
Machinery Dealer, a merchant selling woodworking equipment, contracts in writing to sell a used commercial wood-planer to Cabinetmaker for $12,000, shipping 'F.O.B. Machinery Dealer's loading dock' via an independent freight carrier. The written contract contains a conspicuous bold-capital clause stating 'ALL GOODS SOLD AS IS,' and also contains a typed line reading 'Equipped with a freshly rebuilt 5-horsepower motor.' The contract says nothing about title. Machinery Dealer delivers a conforming wood-planer (to which Machinery Dealer holds valid title) to the independent carrier at Machinery Dealer's loading dock. Halfway to Cabinetmaker's workshop, an unforeseeable landslide destroys the carrier's truck and the planer. Under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 2, which TWO statements are legally accurate? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-509(1)(a), when a contract authorizes or requires the seller to ship the goods by carrier without requiring delivery at a particular destination—such as 'F.O.B. (free on board) Machinery Dealer's loading dock'—the agreement is a shipment contract, and risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the carrier. The merchant-receipt rule in Section 2-509(3) applies only when goods are not shipped by carrier, and Section 2-613 casualty avoidance applies only before risk of loss passes to the buyer. On warranties, a conspicuous 'as is' clause excludes implied warranties of merchantability and fitness under Section 2-316(3)(a), but under Section 2-316(1) an 'as is' clause cannot negate an express warranty (the typed 5-horsepower motor statement), and under Section 2-312(2) the warranty of title is not an implied warranty under Section 2-316 and cannot be disclaimed by 'as is' language.
Question 7 of 10Select One of Four
Breach and Discharge — Anticipatory Repudiation by Fully Performed Party (Restatement Section 253)
Contractor signs a written agreement to paint and restore Innkeeper's historic wooden lodge for $24,000, payable in two equal installments of $12,000 due on October 1 and November 1 after completion. Contractor completes 100 percent of the painting and restoration work satisfactorily on September 10, and Innkeeper inspects and approves the finished lodge. On September 15, Innkeeper sends Contractor a signed letter stating, 'Our summer occupancy was terrible, and we will definitely not pay either the October 1 or November 1 installment.' On September 18, Contractor files a breach-of-contract lawsuit seeking an immediate judgment for the entire $24,000. Under general United States contract law, may Contractor obtain immediate judgment on September 18 for the $24,000? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 253 (comments c and d), although an anticipatory repudiation ordinarily gives the injured party an immediate claim for damages for total breach, an exception applies when the injured party has already completely performed all of its own duties under the contract and the breaching party's only remaining obligation is to pay money at a future date or in installments. Without a contractual acceleration clause, the fully performed party cannot accelerate future money payments upon an anticipatory repudiation and must wait until each payment becomes due to sue for that installment.
Question 8 of 10Select Two of Six
Breach and Discharge — Mutual Rescission & Modification Statute of Frauds
Consider two separate agreements. In the first agreement, Landscape Architect and Resort sign a valid written contract in March under which Landscape Architect will design garden plans in July for $14,000, payable upon delivery of the plans. In April, before either party performs any part of the contract, both parties speak by telephone and orally agree to cancel the entire contract and release each other from all obligations. In the second agreement, Bakery and Grain Mill, both merchants, sign a written contract for the sale of 2,000 pounds of organic pastry flour at $1.00 per pound ($2,000 total). Before shipment, they agree orally in good faith to increase the order to 2,500 pounds for a modified total price of $2,500, without signing any writing or sending a confirmation of the change. Which TWO statements are legally correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts Sections 283 and 148, when a bilateral contract remains executory on both sides, the parties may mutually rescind it orally without any separate consideration (unless the rescission requires re-transferring an interest in land), because each party's surrender of its remaining rights supplies consideration for the other's surrender. Only when one party has already fully performed does an attempted discharge require new consideration or a substitute doctrine. On the flour contract, while Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-209(1) dispenses with consideration for good-faith modifications, Section 2-209(3) mandates that the Statute of Frauds (Section 2-201) be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions ($500 or more). Because the modified $2,500 goods contract rests on an oral agreement for an increased quantity, it is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds absent a written confirmation or another Section 2-201 exception.
Question 9 of 10Select One of Four
Remedies — Full-Performance Cap on Restitution (Restatement Section 373)
Builder signs a fixed-price written contract to remodel Homeowner's basement into a studio apartment for $20,000, payable in full upon completion. Because lumber and skilled electrical labor prices climb sharply during the project, Builder spends $26,000 completing the work, and an appraiser confirms the completed remodeling increased the fair market value of Homeowner's home by $28,000. Builder finishes 100 percent of the contract specifications on time, and Homeowner wrongfully refuses to pay anything. Builder sues Homeowner seeking $28,000 in restitution rather than $20,000 in contract damages. Under general United States contract law, how much may Builder recover? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 373(1), an injured party who has partially performed before the other party's total breach may generally elect restitution of the reasonable value of the benefit conferred, even if that market value exceeds the contract rate on a losing contract. However, Restatement Section 373(2) establishes an essential limitation: the injured party has no right to restitution if the injured party has already performed all of its duties under the contract and no performance by the other party remains due other than payment of a definite sum of money. Because Builder finished 100 percent of the remodel and Homeowner owed only the fixed $20,000 payment, Builder is limited to the $20,000 contract price.
Question 10 of 10Select Two of Six
Third Parties — Creditor Beneficiaries, Gratuitous Assignments & Pre-Notice Payment
Developer owes Electrician $15,000 for completed wiring work on an earlier building. In a new written agreement, Developer hires General Contractor to oversee a shopping-center remodel and, as part of the contract price, General Contractor promises Developer to pay Developer's $15,000 debt directly to Electrician. Separately, Electrician owes nothing to Niece, but orally tells Niece as a birthday gift, 'You may have the $4,000 invoice that Cafe Owner currently owes me for last month's lighting repairs.' Before Niece notifies Cafe Owner or relies on the statement, Electrician sends Niece a written note stating that Electrician is revoking the gift and keeping the $4,000 payment. Meanwhile, Cafe Owner—having received no notice of any assignment—pays Electrician $4,000 directly. Under general United States contract law, which TWO statements are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts Sections 302 and 310, when a promisee (Developer) obtains a promise from a promisor (General Contractor) to satisfy a pre-existing debt owed to a third party (Electrician), that third party is an intended creditor beneficiary who may sue either the promisor or the promisee until obtaining one full satisfaction of the $15,000 debt (absent a novation discharging Developer). Regarding the $4,000 invoice, under Restatement Section 332, an oral gratuitous assignment is revocable by notice to the assignee unless the assignee has already collected, obtained a judgment or novation, or foreseeably and materially relied on it; moreover, under Restatement Section 336, an obligor (Cafe Owner) who pays the assignor before receiving notification of an assignment is completely discharged.