Five select-one-of-four questions and five select-two-of-six questions (~1.8 minutes per item) under general United States federal civil procedure law.
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Question 1 of 10Select One of Four
Jurisdiction and Venue — Federal-Question Jurisdiction and Removal
Harborview Clinic files a state-law breach-of-contract and negligence complaint in State A state court against Ridgeway Billing Corp., alleging that Ridgeway miscalculated routine patient copayments. Both Harborview and Ridgeway are citizens of State A. Ridgeway files an answer raising a federal statutory preemption defense and asserting a federal antitrust counterclaim against Harborview. Ridgeway also files a notice removing the case to federal district court on federal-question grounds, and Harborview timely moves to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. How should the federal district court rule on Harborview's motion to remand? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which requires the federal issue to appear on the face of the plaintiff's own properly pleaded claim. An anticipated or pleaded federal defense (including federal preemption) does not confer federal-question jurisdiction, and a defendant's federal counterclaim cannot establish federal-question jurisdiction either. Because Harborview's complaint pleads only ordinary state-law contract and negligence claims and both parties are citizens of State A, federal subject-matter jurisdiction is absent and the court must remand the case to state court. Note also that under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), the thirty-day clock to remove begins upon formal service of process (or waiver), not upon receipt of an unserved courtesy copy, and a motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time before final judgment.
Question 2 of 10Select Two of Six
Jurisdiction and Venue — Diversity Aggregation and Supplemental Jurisdiction
Nora and Owen, who are both domiciled in State A, join as co-plaintiffs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 in a federal diversity complaint against Coldwater Heating Corp., which is incorporated and has its headquarters in State B, after a boiler malfunction damaged their adjacent storefronts. Nora demands $115,000 in damages against Coldwater, and Owen demands $45,000 against Coldwater. In the same complaint, Nora also joins Apex Valve LLC—whose sole member is domiciled in State C—as a second defendant under Rule 20, asserting a related $35,000 state-law negligence claim against Apex. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1367, which TWO conclusions regarding federal subject-matter jurisdiction are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and Supreme Court precedent interpreting it, when complete diversity exists and at least one plaintiff in a Rule 20 action satisfies the over-$75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement, supplemental jurisdiction extends to a co-plaintiff's related claim for $75,000 or less because claims by Rule 20 plaintiffs are not excluded by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). By contrast, in an action founded solely on diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) explicitly bars supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24 whenever exercising jurisdiction would be inconsistent with either complete diversity or the over-$75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. Consequently, Nora's $35,000 claim against Rule 20 defendant Apex Valve LLC lacks supplemental jurisdiction even though complete diversity is satisfied. In addition, a single plaintiff cannot aggregate claims (even if transactionally related) against separate defendants unless they are jointly liable, and multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct property claims cannot aggregate them when no single plaintiff exceeds $75,000.
Question 3 of 10Select One of Four
Jurisdiction and Venue — Forum-Selection Clauses Designating a State Court
Harbor Timber LLC, a citizen of State A, and Cascade Millwork Inc., a citizen of State B, sign a commercial lumber supply contract containing a valid, mandatory forum-selection clause designating the state trial court in Pine County, State B, as the exclusive forum for all disputes arising under the contract. After a shipment of lumber is rejected at Harbor Timber's warehouse in State A, Harbor Timber sues Cascade Millwork in the United States District Court for the District of State A, where statutory venue is otherwise proper because a substantial part of the events occurred there. Cascade Millwork moves to enforce the forum-selection clause. How should the federal district court in State A proceed? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
A valid contractual forum-selection clause does not make statutory venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 improper, so a defendant cannot use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to challenge venue when statutory venue is otherwise proper. Instead, when a valid forum-selection clause designates another federal district court, the federal court enforces it through a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Because 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) permits transfers only between federal district courts and cannot transfer an action to a state or foreign court, a valid forum-selection clause designating a state court must be enforced through a dismissal for forum non conveniens under the modified balancing framework, which gives no weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum or private-interest factors.
Question 4 of 10Select Two of Six
Pretrial Procedures — Preliminary Injunctions and Temporary Restraining Orders
Cobalt Analytics Inc. files a federal trade-secret complaint against a former engineer and simultaneously submits an unsworn motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order barring the engineer from attending an industry conference the next morning. Cobalt's attorney provides no notice to the engineer, attaches no affidavit or verified complaint, and includes no written certification explaining any efforts made to give notice or why notice should not be required. The motion asks the judge to keep the ex parte restraining order in effect for thirty days without requiring Cobalt to post security. Which TWO statements accurately describe the governing federal rules? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), a court may issue a temporary restraining order without notice to the adverse party only if specific facts in an affidavit or verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury will result before the adverse party can be heard in opposition, and the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why notice should not be required. Even when those strict prerequisites are met, an ex parte temporary restraining order expires within at most fourteen days unless before expiration the court, for good cause, extends it for a like period (up to fourteen more days) or the adverse party consents to a longer extension, and Rule 65(c) requires the movant to give security to cover wrongful-restraint costs. Furthermore, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), orders granting, modifying, or denying preliminary or permanent injunctions are immediately appealable, whereas ordinary temporary restraining orders are not appealable unless extended past the twenty-eight-day limit without the adverse party's consent.
Question 5 of 10Select One of Four
Pretrial Procedures — Amendments as a Matter of Course
On Day 1, Horizon Logistics Inc. files a federal complaint asserting a breach-of-contract claim (which requires a responsive pleading) against Meridian Packaging Corp. and serves the summons and complaint on Day 4. On Day 18, Meridian serves a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court denies Meridian's motion on Day 48, and Meridian serves its answer on Day 58. On Day 68—ten days after Meridian served its answer and fifty days after Meridian served its Rule 12(b)(6) motion—Horizon files an amended complaint without Meridian's written consent or leave of court to add a new claim. May Horizon amend its complaint as a matter of course on Day 68? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within twenty-one days after serving it, or—if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required—within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading or twenty-one days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. Because Meridian served a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on Day 18, that motion triggered Horizon's twenty-one-day window to amend as a matter of course, which expired on Day 39; Meridian's subsequent answer on Day 58 did not restart or reopen the window. After the twenty-one-day period expires, Horizon may still amend under Rule 15(a)(2) with Meridian's written consent or leave of court, which must be freely given when justice so requires absent undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, or futility.
Question 6 of 10Select Two of Six
Pretrial Procedures — Initial Disclosures, Nonparty Discovery, and Prior Statements
In a federal warehouse-fire lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks discovery from Defendant and from Nonparty Repair Co., which serviced the warehouse furnace before the fire. In its automatic initial disclosures, Defendant omits its commercial liability insurance policy on the ground that the policy does not support Defendant's defenses, and Defendant omits the identity of an eyewitness whom Defendant plans to call at trial solely for impeachment. Meanwhile, Plaintiff serves written interrogatories under Rule 33 on Nonparty Repair Co., and a former Repair Co. technician asks Defendant's attorney for a copy of the signed statement the technician previously gave Defendant's investigator about the fire. Which TWO statements accurately apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A), automatic initial disclosures cover witnesses and documents or electronically stored information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment; however, Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) separately mandates disclosure of any insurance agreement under which an insurer may be liable to satisfy or indemnify a judgment even though it does not support the disclosing party's claims or defenses. On discovery devices, written interrogatories under Rule 33 and requests for admission under Rule 36 may be directed only to parties, never to nonparties; by contrast, under Rule 34(c), a nonparty may be compelled to produce documents or electronically stored information or to permit an inspection through a Rule 45 subpoena, with or without a deposition. Finally, under Rule 26(b)(3)(C), any party or nonparty is entitled on request—without showing substantial need or undue hardship—to obtain a copy of their own previous statement about the action or its subject matter.
Question 7 of 10Select One of Four
Preserving the Right to a Jury Trial — Seventh Amendment and Jury Demand Timing
Riverstone Properties LLC sues Commercial Tenant in federal district court seeking both an equitable injunction prohibiting unauthorized structural alterations and $120,000 in compensatory damages for breach of the lease's maintenance covenant. Commercial Tenant serves its answer on May 1, and neither party serves a written jury demand within the following fourteen days. On May 26, Riverstone obtains leave of court to amend its complaint solely to add an alternative legal theory of negligent waste resting on the exact same factual allegations, and immediately serves a written demand for a jury trial on all claims. How should the district court rule on Riverstone's jury demand? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under the Seventh Amendment and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), a party preserves the right to a jury trial on legal claims seeking damages by serving a written demand no later than fourteen days after service of the last pleading directed to the jury-triable issue (here, Commercial Tenant's May 1 answer). Failing to serve a timely demand waives the jury-trial right, and amending a pleading merely to add a new legal theory without introducing new factual issues does not revive the waived fourteen-day period. Note that if a party had made a timely demand in a mixed action involving both legal damages claims and an equitable injunction sharing common factual issues, the Seventh Amendment would require trying the legal claims to the jury first so that the jury's factual findings bind the judge's equitable rulings.
Harbor View Bistro LLC sues Out-of-State Roasters Inc. in federal district court for breach of a coffee-roasting contract. Out-of-State Roasters files no pre-answer Rule 12 motion and instead serves an answer on June 1 that denies liability but omits lack of personal jurisdiction. Twelve days later, on June 13, Out-of-State Roasters serves an amended answer as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1)(A) adding the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). Assume alternatively that personal jurisdiction is established, the pleadings close, and Out-of-State Roasters moves for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), attaching two sworn shipping affidavits and signed delivery receipts that the district court considers rather than excluding. Which TWO statements accurately apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) and 12(h)(1), threshold defenses listed in Rule 12(b)(2) through 12(b)(5) are permanently waived if omitted from a pre-answer Rule 12 motion, or—if no pre-answer Rule 12 motion was made—if omitted from both the responsive pleading and any amendment allowed as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1) within twenty-one days after serving the answer. Because Out-of-State Roasters filed no pre-answer Rule 12 motion and added Rule 12(b)(2) in a timely Rule 15(a)(1) amendment twelve days after its answer, the defense was preserved. By contrast, defenses under Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) may be raised through trial, though they are forfeited if raised for the first time after trial on appeal, whereas lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is never waived. Finally, under Rule 12(c) and 12(d), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings only after the pleadings close, and if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Question 9 of 10Select One of Four
Judgments — Setting Aside Default Judgment and Void Judgments Under Rule 60(b)
In February of Year 1, a federal district court enters a $95,000 final default judgment against Silverpine Machining LLC after Plaintiff attempted service solely by publishing a two-line notice in a small local newspaper, even though Plaintiff already had Silverpine's current corporate headquarters address and registered agent address in its contract file. Twenty-two months later, Silverpine learns of the default judgment when Plaintiff garnishes Silverpine's bank account, and Silverpine moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) to vacate the final default judgment as void for constitutionally defective notice. How should the district court rule on Silverpine's motion? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), a court may set aside an entry of default for good cause, whereas a final default judgment may be set aside only under Rule 60(b). Under Rule 60(b) and 60(c)(1), motions based on mistake or excusable neglect (Rule 60(b)(1)), newly discovered evidence (Rule 60(b)(2)), or opposing-party fraud or misconduct (Rule 60(b)(3)) must be filed within a reasonable time and no more than one year after judgment. However, motions under Rule 60(b)(4) (void judgment), Rule 60(b)(5) (satisfied, released, reversed, or inequitable prospective judgment), and Rule 60(b)(6) (other extraordinary reasons) are not subject to the one-year cap, though every Rule 60(b) motion—including a Rule 60(b)(4) motion—must still be made within a reasonable time under Rule 60(c)(1) (evaluated where notice was defective from when the movant learned of the judgment or enforcement). Because due process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties when their addresses are known or reasonably ascertainable, Plaintiff's reliance on publication alone rendered the resulting default judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4), and Silverpine's prompt motion upon first learning of the judgment via bank garnishment is timely.
Question 10 of 10Select Two of Six
Appealability and Review — Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), and Standards of Review
Developer sues General Contractor and Structural Engineer in federal district court. The district court grants summary judgment dismissing all claims against Structural Engineer, leaving Developer's claims against General Contractor pending for trial, and does not make an express determination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) that there is no just reason for delay. Separately, on a pretrial statutory-interpretation dispute between Developer and General Contractor, the district judge issues a written order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) certifying that the ruling involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Which TWO statements accurately describe federal appellate jurisdiction and review? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, federal courts of appeals generally review only final decisions that dispose of all claims against all parties. When a court resolves claims against fewer than all parties, Rule 54(b) permits entry of an immediately appealable final judgment only if the district court expressly determines there is no just reason for delay; without that express determination, the partial summary judgment cannot be appealed until final judgment. For a discretionary interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), two steps are required: first, the district judge must certify the controlling legal question, substantial ground for difference of opinion, and material advancement; second, the court of appeals must grant permission upon an application filed within ten days after entry of the order. On appeal, questions of law are reviewed de novo, bench-trial factual findings are reviewed for clear error, jury factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and discretionary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion; additionally, timely Rule 50(b), 52(b), 59, or 28-day Rule 60 motions toll the thirty-day appellate notice deadline under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4).