NextGen Civil Procedure · 24-Minute Integrated Question Set
Integrated Set 1: Counseling and Drafting — The Riverbend Solar Microgrid Dispute
Read the client intake facts below and complete all five mixed-form counseling and drafting questions.
Fact Pattern
Six months ago, Claire Sato, an agricultural consultant then domiciled in State A, hired Suncrest Energy Systems Inc. ("Suncrest") to design and install a $140,000 commercial solar microgrid at Claire's Riverbend produce warehouse in State A. Suncrest is incorporated in State C and maintains its corporate headquarters and executive offices—where its senior officers direct and control all company operations—in State B. Suncrest also operates a regional panel-assembly plant in State A, and its sales team actively solicited agricultural buyers across State A, installing twelve similar microgrids in State A over the past two years.
During the Riverbend installation, Suncrest subcontracted the high-voltage inverter wiring to Kestrel Electrical LLC ("Kestrel"), a limited liability company organized in State C with two members: one individual domiciled in State C and one individual domiciled in State A. Two weeks after commissioning, an uninsulated inverter splice shorted out, destroying the warehouse battery bank ($110,000 in replacement costs) and shutting down Claire's cold-storage rooms ($40,000 in lost cold-storage rental revenue). Claire filed a diversity complaint in the United States District Court for the District of State A against Suncrest alone, seeking $150,000 under State A negligence and contract law. A private process server over age eighteen who was not a party served Suncrest's managing agent in State A.
Two months after filing the complaint, Claire accepted a permanent position and moved her domicile to State B. Suncrest then moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (arguing Claire's move to State B destroyed diversity), lack of personal jurisdiction (arguing its State A assembly plant does not make it at home in State A), and improper service (citing a State A statute requiring summonses to be served solely by a county sheriff). Assume State A's long-arm statute reaches the full extent of constitutional due process, and a separate State A statute caps consequential lost-revenue damages on commercial installation claims at $25,000.
Claire comes to your law office seeking counseling on Suncrest's motions, whether she must or may add Kestrel as a defendant, how discovery and sanctions disputes should be handled, and help drafting her opposition to a later summary judgment motion and an internal relation-back memorandum.
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Question 1 of 5Select One of Four
Counseling — Diversity Timing and Specific Personal Jurisdiction
During the client counseling meeting, Claire asks whether Suncrest's motions to dismiss for lack of diversity jurisdiction and lack of personal jurisdiction are likely to succeed. Which advice is MOST accurate? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) is determined at the time the complaint is filed. When Claire filed suit, she was domiciled in State A and Suncrest was a citizen of State C (its state of incorporation) and State B (its nerve-center principal place of business), so complete diversity existed and Claire's later relocation to State B does not divest the federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction. On personal jurisdiction, Suncrest is correct that operating a regional assembly plant in State A does not render it essentially at home there for general personal jurisdiction, which paradigmatically lies only in its incorporation state and principal place of business. However, State A has specific personal jurisdiction because Suncrest purposefully availed itself of State A by soliciting buyers and installing twelve microgrids there, Claire's claim arises directly out of Suncrest's State A installation, and litigating where the warehouse damage occurred is constitutionally fair.
Question 2 of 5Select Two of Six
Counseling — Rule 14 Impleader, Rule 19, and Supplemental Jurisdiction
Suppose the district court denies Suncrest's threshold motions, and Suncrest serves an answer followed within ten days by a third-party complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) against Kestrel Electrical LLC seeking contractual indemnity for the inverter wiring. Claire asks whether Kestrel is a required party under Rule 19 that must be joined for the case to proceed, and whether Claire can amend her complaint to assert a direct $60,000 state-law negligence claim against Kestrel. Which TWO legal points should you explain to Claire? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under established federal joinder doctrine, joint tortfeasors and co-wrongdoers are merely permissive parties under Rule 20 and are not required parties under Rule 19(a), so Kestrel's absence as a direct defendant does not require dismissing Claire's lawsuit. Meanwhile, Suncrest properly impleaded Kestrel without leave within fourteen days of serving its original answer under Rule 14(a), and Suncrest's derivative indemnity claim against Kestrel falls within supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) restricts only plaintiffs, not defendant third-party plaintiffs. By contrast, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), in an action founded solely on diversity, the court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim by a plaintiff against a person made a party under Rule 14 whenever doing so would be inconsistent with either complete diversity or the over-$75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. Here, Kestrel shares State A citizenship with Claire because an LLC takes the citizenship of every member, and Claire's $60,000 direct claim also fails to exceed $75,000.
Question 3 of 5Select One of Four
Counseling — Erie Doctrine and Federal Rules Enabling Act Analysis
Claire asks how the federal district court should resolve two State A laws invoked by Suncrest: (1) the State A statute requiring civil summonses to be served solely by a county sheriff rather than a private nonparty adult, and (2) the State A statute capping consequential lost-revenue damages on commercial installation claims at $25,000. Which counseling advice is MOST accurate under the Erie doctrine? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under the Erie doctrine and Hanna v. Plumer, when a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directly collides with a state rule, the Federal Rule governs so long as it arguably regulates procedure and does not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right under the Rules Enabling Act (28 U.S.C. § 2072). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2) expressly authorizes any person who is at least eighteen years old and not a party to serve a summons and complaint, directly displacing State A's county-sheriff-only service requirement (and Rule 4(h)(1)(B) authorizes delivery to a managing agent). By contrast, no Federal Rule governs the measure of recoverable damages, and state damages caps are substantive rules of law whose disregard would encourage forum shopping and produce inequitable administration of the laws; thus, State A's $25,000 cap on consequential lost-revenue damages applies in diversity (leaving Claire's $110,000 battery-bank replacement claim plus $25,000 in capped lost revenue, which still exceeds $75,000).
Question 4 of 5Short Written Response
Counseling — Rule 37(e) Electronically Stored Information and Rule 11 Limits
During discovery, Suncrest's project manager realizes that a routine thirty-day server auto-purge deleted two weeks of installation diagnostic logs after Claire sent a formal litigation demand letter, although there is no evidence that Suncrest intended to hide evidence. Separately, Suncrest's attorney serves Claire's counsel with a Rule 11 sanctions motion accusing Claire's Rule 34 document requests of being overly broad and files that Rule 11 motion with the district court the very next morning without waiting. Draft a concise four-to-six sentence counseling explanation advising Claire on (a) whether the court may give an adverse-inference instruction or enter default judgment under Rule 37(e) for the lost logs, and (b) two independent reasons why Suncrest's Rule 11 motion must be denied.
Model Response
Because Suncrest negligently failed to pause its automatic purge after receiving your litigation demand letter, the court may order curative measures under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) to address any prejudice caused by the lost diagnostic logs. However, the court cannot impose severe sanctions such as an adverse-inference jury instruction or a default judgment unless it finds that Suncrest acted with the specific intent to deprive you of using those logs in this lawsuit, which the current facts do not show. Regarding Suncrest's Rule 11 motion targeting your Rule 34 document requests, the court must deny that motion for two independent reasons. First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(d) completely excludes disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37 from Rule 11's scope. Second, Suncrest violated Rule 11(c)(2)'s mandatory twenty-one-day safe-harbor rule by filing its sanctions motion the very next morning after serving it rather than waiting twenty-one days to allow withdrawal or correction.
Key Points
Explains that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), negligent failure to preserve electronically stored information after litigation is anticipated supports only proportional curative measures for prejudice.
Explains that severe sanctions such as an adverse-inference instruction or default judgment require a finding that Suncrest acted with intent to deprive Claire of the information's use.
Identifies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(d), which expressly excludes disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37 from Rule 11.
Identifies Suncrest's violation of Rule 11(c)(2)'s mandatory twenty-one-day safe-harbor period by filing the motion the next morning instead of waiting twenty-one days after service.
Explanation
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), when electronically stored information is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it once litigation was reasonably anticipated, the court may order curative measures no greater than necessary to cure prejudice, but may impose severe sanctions—such as an adverse-inference instruction, dismissal, or default judgment—only upon finding that the party acted with intent to deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation. As for Suncrest's sanctions motion, Rule 11(d) expressly makes Rule 11 inapplicable to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37, and Rule 11(c)(2) separately requires a party moving for sanctions to serve the motion and wait twenty-one days under the safe-harbor rule before filing it with the court.
Question 5 of 5Short Written Response
Drafting — Summary Judgment Opposition and Rule 15(c) Relation-Back Note
Later in the case, Suncrest moves for summary judgment on Claire's negligence claim, submitting a sworn field-engineer affidavit stating that the inverter wiring complied with all industry standards. Claire possesses a signed inspection report from an independent electrical inspector identifying bare, uninsulated splices and a sworn deposition transcript in which Suncrest's installer admits leaving two splices uncapped, yet Claire suggests saving time by submitting a brief that merely quotes her unverified complaint. Separately, Claire asks whether an amended complaint changing the named installer on an added claim to a corporate subsidiary, "Suncrest Grid Services LLC," relates back past the expired statute of limitations when the subsidiary's general counsel received actual notice of the original lawsuit forty days after filing and knew the subsidiary had performed part of the work. Draft: (a) two or three sentences for Claire's summary judgment opposition brief explaining why summary judgment must be denied (and why quoting the complaint alone would fail); and (b) two or three sentences for an internal file note analyzing relation back under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
Model Response
(a) Summary Judgment Opposition Paragraph: Although Defendant Suncrest has offered a field-engineer affidavit asserting compliance with industry standards, Plaintiff Claire Sato does not rest on her pleadings and instead points to specific record materials showing a genuine dispute of material fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c): the independent electrical inspector's signed report documenting bare, uninsulated splices and the sworn deposition testimony of Suncrest's own installer admitting that two splices were left uncapped. Viewing this record evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the nonmoving party, a reasonable jury could find that Suncrest breached its duty of care, requiring denial of summary judgment.
(b) Internal Relation-Back File Note: Because the claim against Suncrest Grid Services LLC arises out of the exact same Riverbend microgrid installation set out in the original complaint, the amendment will relate back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C) if within the ninety-day Rule 4(m) period from original filing the subsidiary received notice such that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits and knew or should have known it would have been named but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity. Here, the subsidiary's general counsel received actual notice of the suit forty days after filing—well within the ninety-day period—and knew the subsidiary performed part of the installation. However, under Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., knowing it performed part of the work does not alone satisfy Rule 15(c)(1)(C): Claire must establish that the subsidiary knew or should have known it was omitted because of an identity mistake rather than a deliberate choice to sue only parent Suncrest Energy Systems Inc.—and if that knowledge is shown, relation back succeeds regardless of whether Claire was diligent in identifying the subsidiary earlier.
Key Points
Opposition paragraph explains that under Rule 56, a nonmovant cannot rely on bare, unverified complaint allegations once the movant submits supporting affidavits, and must instead cite specific record materials.
Opposition paragraph cites the independent inspector's report and the installer's sworn deposition testimony viewed favorably to Claire to show a genuine dispute of material fact for a reasonable jury.
Internal note identifies all requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C): same transaction or occurrence, notice within the ninety-day Rule 4(m) period from original filing without prejudice in defending on the merits, and actual or constructive knowledge of a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.
Internal note applies the forty-day actual notice to the subsidiary's general counsel, explains that knowing it performed part of the work does not alone prove knowledge of an identity mistake over a deliberate choice, and notes that relation back turns on the new party's knowledge rather than the plaintiff's diligence.
Explanation
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Celotex/Anderson, once a moving defendant submits evidentiary support negating breach, the nonmoving plaintiff cannot rest on bare, unverified complaint allegations, but must cite specific record materials—such as deposition transcripts, affidavits, or documents—establishing a genuine dispute of material fact viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C) and Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., an amendment changing a party relates back to the original filing date if the claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence and, within the ninety-day Rule 4(m) period from original filing (plus any court-granted extension), the newly named party received such notice that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits and knew or should have known it would have been sued but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity—an inquiry focused on the new party's knowledge rather than the plaintiff's diligence.