NextGen Business Associations · Standalone Multiple Choice
Standalone Multiple-Choice Set (10 Items)
Five select-one-of-four questions and five select-two-of-six questions (~1.8 minutes per item) under general United States business associations law.
Checked: 0 of 10 · Score: 0 / 10
Question 1 of 10Select One of Four
Agency and Authority — Equal Dignities and Termination of Actual Authority
Art Collector Hannah orally asks Purchasing Agent Mateo to buy a $2,400 vintage ceramic vase (goods) on Hannah's behalf from Horizon Gallery, and Mateo agrees to do so. Neither Hannah nor Mateo signs a written agency agreement. Before Mateo signs the purchase contract with Horizon Gallery, Hannah dies unexpectedly while traveling in another state, and neither Mateo nor Horizon Gallery receives notice of Hannah's death until the next day. That afternoon, Mateo signs a written contract in Hannah's name to purchase the vase for $2,400. Under the Restatement (Third) of Agency, is Hannah's estate bound on the contract? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Restatement (Third) of Agency section 3.02 and comment b, oral authorization suffices for most contracts covered by the Statute of Frauds, including Uniform Commercial Code sales of goods priced at $500 or more; the equal-dignities rule generally requires written authority only for conveyances of interests in land (or leases over one year) or where a statute expressly mandates a writing. In addition, although traditional common law (Restatement (Second) of Agency section 120) terminated an agent's actual authority automatically upon the principal's death without notice, Restatement (Third) of Agency section 3.07(2) provides that an individual principal's death terminates actual authority only when the agent has notice of the death. Because Mateo had valid oral authority and had no notice of Hannah's death when signing, Hannah's estate is bound. An ordinary purchasing agency is not an irrevocable power coupled with an interest.
Question 2 of 10Select Two of Six
Agency and Authority — Undisclosed Principals, Ratification, and Election
Without revealing that Principal owns the business, Principal hires Agent as a purchasing clerk for Principal's boutique hardware shop and secretly instructs Agent never to buy hand tools on credit, even though purchasing clerks at hardware shops customarily buy inventory on 30-day trade credit. Ignoring the secret limit, Agent buys $3,000 of wood chisels on 30-day credit from Wholesaler, signing the contract solely in Agent's own name while Wholesaler believes Agent owns the shop. Separately, Agent buys an unauthorized $900 display rack in Agent's own name while intending to act on Principal's account; after learning all material facts, Principal keeps and uses the display rack in the shop. Under the Restatement (Third) of Agency, which TWO statements are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Restatement (Third) of Agency section 2.06(2)—which replaced the Restatement (Second)'s narrower general-manager rule—an undisclosed principal is bound without actual authority when the principal secretly instructs an agent to reduce the agent's authority below what a third party would reasonably believe the agent holds if the principal had been disclosed. Apparent authority never applies to an undisclosed principal because the third party does not know a principal exists. Under Restatement (Third) of Agency section 6.03, both the undisclosed principal and the agent become parties to the contract, and under section 6.09 neither is discharged by a judgment against the other until the judgment is satisfied (whereas the traditional election rule under Restatement (Second) section 210 applied only to undisclosed principals and required the third party to elect before taking judgment once the principal's identity was learned). Finally, under Restatement (Third) of Agency section 4.03, an undisclosed principal may ratify an unauthorized act so long as the actor acted or purported to act on the principal's behalf, unlike Restatement (Second) section 85.
Question 3 of 10Select One of Four
Vicarious Liability of a Principal — Scope of Employment and Independent Contractors
Metro Parcel Inc. employs Driver as a full-time delivery driver on an assigned morning route. Midway through the route, Driver drives two blocks off the street to buy coffee at a drive-through window and negligently strikes Cyclist in a crosswalk before returning to the route. Separately, Metro Parcel Inc. hires Independent Courier, who owns a private cargo van and controls all delivery hours and routes, to complete an overflow weekend delivery. Metro Parcel Inc. never checks Independent Courier's driving record and therefore fails to discover that Independent Courier's commercial driver's license was suspended after three recent reckless-driving convictions. While speeding on the weekend delivery, Independent Courier rear-ends Motorist. Which statement accurately describes Metro Parcel Inc.'s tort liability? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under respondeat superior (Restatement (Third) of Agency section 7.07), an employer is vicariously liable for an employee's torts committed within the scope of employment; a minor, temporary two-block detour for coffee during an assigned route remains within the scope of employment rather than constituting a substantial frolic. By contrast, a hirer is generally not vicariously liable for the physical torts of an independent contractor over whose physical manner and means of work the hirer lacks control (unless a nondelegable duty, inherently dangerous activity, or apparent agency applies, which routine parcel van delivery is not). However, under Restatement (Third) of Agency section 7.05, a principal is directly liable for its own negligence in selecting or supervising an independent contractor, and failing to run a basic license check that would have revealed a suspended commercial license supports direct liability to Motorist.
Question 4 of 10Select Two of Six
General Partnerships — Formation, Partnership Property, and Partner Liability
Claire and Devon orally agree to operate a custom woodworking shop under the name Timberline Crafts and split net profits evenly. To raise startup funds, they sign a loan agreement with Lender under which Lender advances $30,000 in exchange for 20 percent of monthly net profits until the $30,000 principal plus interest is repaid, with no voting rights or management role in the business. Separately, Claire uses Claire's own personal savings to purchase a cargo van titled solely in Claire's individual name; Claire regularly drives the van to deliver Timberline Crafts furniture. Later, Timberline Crafts defaults on a $15,000 lumber invoice from Mill Co., which obtains a judgment solely against Timberline Crafts while the partnership still holds $4,000 in its business checking account. Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, which TWO statements are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Revised Uniform Partnership Act section 202(c)(3)(i) and (v), receiving a share of business profits does not trigger a statutory presumption of partnership when received in payment of a debt or as interest on a loan, even if the payment varies with business profits; because Lender also holds no co-management control under section 202(a), Lender is a creditor rather than a partner. Under Revised Uniform Partnership Act section 204(d), property acquired in the name of an individual partner without partnership funds and without an indication of partnership capacity in the instrument of title is presumed to be separate property even if used for partnership purposes (whereas section 204(a) makes partnership-titled property partnership property and section 204(c) presumes property bought with partnership funds is partnership property). In addition, although general partners are jointly and severally liable for all partnership obligations under section 306(a), a judgment against the partnership alone is not a judgment against a partner: under section 307(c) and (d), Mill Co. must both obtain a personal judgment against Claire and exhaust Timberline Crafts's $4,000 in partnership assets (or meet a statutory exception) before executing against Claire's personal assets.
Question 5 of 10Select One of Four
General Partnerships — Winding-Up Distribution and Capital Shortfalls
Alina, Bram, and Cora form an equal general partnership with no agreement altering default financial rules. Alina contributes $40,000 in cash, Bram contributes $10,000 in cash, and Cora contributes only services (starting with a $0 capital account). After two years of breaking even with no undistributed profits, the partners agree to dissolve and wind up the partnership. Following liquidation of all assets, the partnership holds $38,000 in cash, owes $12,000 to an outside equipment supplier, and owes $6,000 to Bram on a separate loan Bram made to the partnership. Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, how must the partnership settle its debts, capital accounts, and shortfall upon winding up? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under Revised Uniform Partnership Act section 807(a) and (b), partnership assets first pay all partnership creditors, including both outside creditors ($12,000) and partner-creditors ($6,000 loan to Bram), leaving $20,000 in cash ($38,000 minus $18,000). Next, all liquidating profits and losses—including any capital shortfall—are credited or charged to the partners' capital accounts according to their profit-and-loss sharing ratio, which defaults to equal shares under section 401(b). Because total capital accounts equal $50,000 ($40,000 for Alina, $10,000 for Bram, and $0 for Cora) and only $20,000 in cash remains, the partnership suffered a $30,000 liquidation loss. Charging that $30,000 loss equally ($10,000 each) leaves Alina with a positive balance of $30,000, Bram with $0, and Cora with a negative balance of $10,000. Under section 807(b), Cora must contribute $10,000 in cash to cover Cora's negative balance (even though Cora was a service-only partner), and Alina receives $30,000 ($20,000 remaining partnership cash plus Cora's $10,000 contribution).
Question 6 of 10Select Two of Six
Formation and Promoters — Defective Incorporation and Pre-Incorporation Contracts
Two unrelated corporate formation disputes arise in a jurisdiction that follows the Model Business Corporation Act and the Restatement (Third) of Agency. First, Organizer properly signs articles of incorporation for Meadowlark Bakery, Inc. and delivers them to a professional courier to file that morning; honestly believing the courier filed the articles on time, Organizer signs a flour supply contract that afternoon in the name of Meadowlark Bakery, Inc., though the courier actually did not file the articles until the following day. Second, before any articles are drafted for a separate startup, Promoter signs an office-equipment lease on behalf of "Summit Analytics, Inc., a corporation to be formed," without any clause releasing Promoter upon incorporation. One week later, Summit Analytics, Inc. is properly incorporated, and its board passes a resolution expressly adopting the equipment lease. Which TWO statements are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Model Business Corporation Act section 2.04, personal liability for pre-incorporation transactions attaches only to persons who act knowing that there was no incorporation. Because Organizer honestly believed the courier had filed the articles that morning, Organizer is not personally liable under section 2.04 (and in minority common-law states, good-faith de facto corporation or corporation by estoppel would likewise shield Organizer on a contract claim). By contrast, under Restatement (Third) of Agency section 6.04 (and Model Business Corporation Act section 2.04 when a promoter signs knowing incorporation has not yet occurred), Promoter remains personally liable on the pre-incorporation equipment lease even after Summit Analytics, Inc. incorporates and adopts it, unless the lessor entered a subsequent novation or agreed in the lease to look solely to the corporation. In addition, under Restatement (Third) of Agency section 4.04 comment c, a nonexistent entity lacks capacity to ratify retroactively, so Summit Analytics, Inc. became bound by corporate adoption rather than ratification.
Question 7 of 10Select One of Four
Corporate Management and Control — Director Elections and Special Board Meetings
At the annual shareholders' meeting of Northstar Freight Corp. (governed by the Model Business Corporation Act, with no charter or bylaw voting modifications and no cumulative voting), 700 of the 1,000 outstanding voting shares are present, establishing a quorum. Three candidates run for two open seats on the board of directors and receive 290 votes (Candidate A), 230 votes (Candidate B), and 180 votes (Candidate C). The following week, all five directors attend a special board meeting held without prior written notice. At the beginning of the meeting, Director Vega objects to the lack of notice, remains through the entire meeting, and votes in favor of a resolution approving a new warehouse lease, which passes 5 to 0. What is the legal effect of the director election and the board resolution? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Unless modified by the articles of incorporation or bylaws, directors are elected by a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote at a meeting at which a quorum is present (Model Business Corporation Act section 7.28(a); Delaware General Corporation Law section 216(3)). Because 700 of 1,000 shares formed a quorum, the two candidates with the highest vote totals (Candidate A with 290 votes and Candidate B with 230 votes) are elected even though neither received a majority of the 700 shares present. As to the special board meeting, special meetings require notice unless waived. Under Model Business Corporation Act section 8.23(b), a director who attends a meeting waives any notice objection unless the director objects at the beginning of the meeting (or promptly upon arrival) and does not thereafter vote for or assent to action taken at the meeting. By voting in favor of the warehouse lease resolution, Director Vega waived the notice defect, and because all five directors attended and voted yes, the resolution is valid.
Question 8 of 10Select Two of Six
Limited Liability Companies — Governance, Agency Authority, and Transfers
Three founders—Gavin, Hollis, and Iris—form Crestline Printing LLC in a state that has enacted the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA). Their filed articles of organization state only the company's name and registered office, while their signed written operating agreement designates Hollis as sole manager and prohibits non-managing members from signing contracts. No Statement of Authority is filed, and Gavin has never dealt with Paper Supplier before. Without consulting Hollis, Gavin signs a $5,000 paper supply contract with Paper Supplier on behalf of Crestline Printing LLC. Separately, Iris assigns Iris's entire transferable interest in Crestline Printing LLC to Buyer without Gavin's or Hollis's consent. Under the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, which TWO statements are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act section 407(a), a limited liability company is member-managed by default unless its operating agreement expressly provides that it is manager-managed (unlike the older 1996 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act section 203(a)(6), which required manager-management election in the articles of organization). Moreover, Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act section 301(a) abolished statutory apparent authority in limited liability companies, providing that a member is not an agent of the company solely by reason of being a member. Under sections 301(b), 302, and 407, Crestline Printing LLC is bound only by actual authority, common-law apparent authority, or a filed Statement of Authority—none of which Gavin had when dealing with Paper Supplier for the first time. Separately, under section 502, transferring an interest in a limited liability company conveys only the economic right to receive distributions and confers no management or voting rights unless the remaining members consent to admit the transferee as a member.
Question 9 of 10Select One of Four
Fiduciary Duties — Corporate Conflicting-Interest Cleansing Quorum
Apexia Packaging Corp. has a four-member board of directors consisting of Directors Morales, Novak, Patel, and Quinn. Morales, Novak, and Patel co-own a warehouse company that proposes to lease storage space to Apexia Packaging Corp. for $80,000 per year; Director Quinn has no financial interest in the warehouse company and is completely independent. At a duly noticed board meeting attended by all four directors, Morales, Novak, and Patel disclose all material facts about their ownership and remain in the meeting room while Director Quinn votes in favor of the lease and the three conflicted directors abstain. Which statement accurately compares the quorum and board-cleansing effect of Director Quinn's vote under current Delaware General Corporation Law section 144 and Model Business Corporation Act section 8.62? (Select one.)
Select one option.
Explanation
Under current Delaware General Corporation Law section 144(d)(1) (amended effective March 2025), common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a board meeting. However, under current section 144(a)(1), board-level cleansing requires authorization in good faith and without gross negligence by a majority of the disinterested directors—provided that if a majority of the board's directors are not disinterested (here, three of four directors are conflicted), approval or recommendation must come from a board committee consisting of at least two disinterested directors. Consequently, Director Quinn's lone vote at a full board meeting cannot cleanse the lease under Delaware law (so the transaction requires an informed, uncoerced affirmative vote of a majority of votes cast by disinterested stockholders under section 144(a)(2) or proof of fairness as to the corporation and its stockholders under section 144(a)(3)). Similarly, under Model Business Corporation Act section 8.62(a) and (c), conflicted directors do not count toward the cleansing quorum, and both the cleansing quorum and approval require a majority (and at least two) of all qualified directors deliberating and voting outside the conflicted directors' presence.
Question 10 of 10Select Two of Six
Liability Rules — Partnership Liability, LLC Shield, and Veil Piercing
Three liability disputes arise under modern uniform business statutes and corporate veil-piercing doctrine. First, Incoming Partner joins an existing general partnership governed by the Revised Uniform Partnership Act by contributing $25,000 in cash one month after an existing partner negligently injured a customer on a partnership delivery; firm assets later prove insufficient to pay the resulting tort judgment. Second, Sole Member forms a single-member LLC governed by the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act with adequate initial capital and a separate business bank account, but never holds formal annual member meetings or keeps minute books; an unpaid supplier sues Sole Member personally on an LLC supply contract. Third, Sole Shareholder incorporates a courier company with $50 in initial capital and no liability insurance, never opens a corporate bank account, and deposits all customer checks into Sole Shareholder's personal checking account used to pay household groceries; an employee courier later injures Pedestrian in a collision. Which TWO statements are correct? (Select two.)
Select two options.
Explanation
Under Revised Uniform Partnership Act section 306(b), a person admitted as a partner into an existing general partnership is not personally liable for any partnership obligation incurred before admission, although the incoming partner's capital contribution to the firm remains exposed to partnership creditors. In addition, under sections 307(c) and (d), a judgment against a partnership alone is not a judgment against a partner, and a creditor must obtain a personal judgment against a partner and exhaust partnership assets (absent a statutory exception) before executing on personal assets. For the LLC, Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act section 304(a) shields members from LLC obligations, and section 304(b) provides that failure to observe formalities such as annual meetings or minute books is not a ground for imposing personal liability on members. Finally, courts may pierce the corporate veil to reach an active shareholder where unity of interest (commingling funds, ignoring corporate separateness, and gross undercapitalization at formation) would otherwise sanction fraud or injustice—and courts pierce more readily for involuntary tort victims like Pedestrian than for voluntary contract creditors.