Exam Note

Background. On the exam through February 2028, the law for this subject is supplied in the task. Starting July 2028, Family Law is a NextGen UBE recall subject.

Tasks

1. Marriage, Capacity, and Annulment

Right to Marry and Ceremonial Marriage

Rule: Marriage is a fundamental Fourteenth Amendment right, so direct, substantial interference—including bans based on race or sex—triggers strict scrutiny, whereas reasonable licensing and age rules are valid. Ceremonial marriage requires capacity, mutual consent, a license, and authorized solemnization.

Source (unverified): U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Loving v. Virginia; Zablocki v. Redhail; Obergefell v. Hodges; UMDA §§ 201–206.
Elements
  • Capacity: legal age, competence, unmarried, no prohibited kinship.
  • Consent: present intent to marry without fraud or duress.
  • Formalities: license and officiant; filing errors rarely void good-faith marriages.
Invented Example

Couple marries with Linden license; officiant files certificate late; marriage stays valid.

Usual Traps
  • States cannot deny marriage licenses for unpaid child support.
  • Modest fees and waiting periods remain valid regulations.

Common-Law Marriage and Recognition

Rule: In the minority of states recognizing common-law marriage, capacity, present agreement to be spouses, cohabitation, and holding out create a valid marriage. Under conflict-of-laws rules (not Full Faith and Credit), a marriage valid where contracted is valid everywhere unless violating strong public policy of the state with the most significant relationship.

Source (unverified): UMDA § 211 (Alternative A preserves; Alternative B abolishes); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(2).
Elements
  • Capacity to marry.
  • Present agreement (per verba de praesenti), not a future engagement.
  • Cohabitation and public holding out as spouses.
Invented Example

Jordan and Morgan validly form common-law marriage in State X; State Y recognizes it.

Usual Traps
  • Seven years of cohabitation alone never forms a common-law marriage.
  • Ending a common-law marriage still requires a formal divorce.

Void vs. Voidable Marriages and Putative Spouses

Rule: At common law, void marriages (bigamy, incest) are invalid from inception without a decree and open to collateral or post-death attack (though UMDA § 208(b)(4) requires challenging § 207 prohibited marriages before either spouse dies); voidable marriages (nonage, duress, temporary incapacity, essential fraud) remain valid until annulled during life and can be ratified. Putative spouses who cohabit in good faith get marital rights until discovering the impediment.

Source (unverified): UMDA §§ 207–209 (90-day limit in § 208(b) for incapacity/fraud/duress).
Elements
  • Void: bigamy or incest; under UMDA § 207(b), impediment removal plus cohabitation validates it.
  • Voidable: requires direct annulment; ratified by cohabiting after discovery.
  • Essential Fraud: procreation or concealed sterilization, not wealth.
Invented Example

Sam lies about debt in Oakridge; financial fraud requires divorce, not annulment.

Usual Traps
  • Children of annulled marriages remain marital children with full rights.
  • A minority of states reject putative spouse protection.
↑Top

2. Premarital, Postmarital, and Separation Agreements

Premarital and Postmarital Agreements

Rule: Under the UPAA, a signed written premarital agreement takes effect at marriage without consideration and binds unless involuntary OR unconscionable when executed without fair financial disclosure (absent written waiver or actual or reasonable constructive knowledge). Common law and the UPMAA also weigh access to counsel and unconscionability at enforcement. Postmarital agreements during an intact marriage require a signed writing, cannot bind child terms, need mutual promises or consideration in non-UPMAA states (marriage is past consideration; UPMAA § 6 needs none), and face fiduciary disclosure and fairness scrutiny. Child support and custody limits are void.

Source (unverified): UPAA §§ 2–4, 6; UPMAA §§ 6, 9; Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution ch. 7 (§§ 7.06, 7.08).
Elements
  • Signed writing by both spouses.
  • Voluntary execution without last-minute coercion.
  • Fair disclosure, written waiver, or actual/constructive knowledge (plus fiduciary fairness postmaritally).
  • Public-assistance override for spousal support waivers.
Invented Example

Linden waiver presented two hours pre-wedding without counsel or schedules: involuntary.

Usual Traps
  • Under UPAA, nondisclosure voids an agreement only if unconscionable at signing.
  • Lacking counsel weighs on voluntariness but is no automatic UPAA bar.

Separation Agreements, Merger, and Incorporation

Rule: Written separation agreements bind on property and spousal support unless unconscionable, while child terms stay subject to best-interests review. Under traditional law, merged agreements are enforceable by contempt with court-modifiable support (property stays final); incorporated-only agreements are enforceable by both contempt and contract remedies with support modifiable only by consent. Under UMDA § 306(e)–(f), decree terms are enforceable by contempt and contract, and maintenance is modifiable unless expressly barred.

Source (unverified): UMDA § 306(a)–(f); Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 7.09.
Elements
  • Traditional Merged: contempt enforcement; modifiable support; property final.
  • Traditional Incorporated-Only: contempt and contract remedies; nonmodifiable without consent.
  • UMDA § 306(e)–(f): abolishes merger distinction; modifiable unless agreement expressly precludes.
Invented Example

Traditional Cedar decree incorporates unmerged alimony agreement: contempt applies; modification needs consent.

Usual Traps
  • Parents cannot contractually make child support or custody nonmodifiable.
  • Incorporated-but-unmerged terms remain enforceable by contempt; only unincorporated agreements lack contempt.
↑Top

3. Divorce, Grounds, and Jurisdiction

No-Fault and Fault Grounds

Rule: All states allow unilateral no-fault divorce (irretrievable breakdown, irreconcilable differences, or living apart) without consent and despite petitioner's unilateral fault. Fault grounds (adultery, cruelty, desertion) have defenses (condonation, connivance, collusion, recrimination), which never bar no-fault divorce.

Source (unverified): UMDA §§ 302, 303(e), 305.
Elements
  • No-Fault: irretrievable breakdown with no reasonable reconciliation prospect.
  • Recrimination: mutual fault by both spouses barring a fault divorce (not unilateral fault).
  • Condonation / Connivance / Collusion: forgiving known fault, consenting to, or fabricating fault.
Invented Example

A forgives adultery and cohabits in Maple: condonation bars adultery decree, not no-fault.

Usual Traps
  • Proving petitioner's fault never blocks a no-fault divorce.
  • Living apart usually requires separate residences with intent to end marriage.

Domicile, Residency, and Divisible Divorce

Rule: Divorce subject-matter jurisdiction requires one spouse's domicile in the forum, and reasonable durational residency rules are constitutional. Under divisible divorce, an ex parte decree valid for marital status receives Full Faith and Credit, but support or out-of-state property orders require personal jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse.

Source (unverified): Williams v. North Carolina; Sosna v. Iowa; Estin v. Estin; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt; U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 & amend. XIV.
Elements
  • Domicile: presence plus intent to remain indefinitely.
  • Status Only: ex parte notice suffices to dissolve marriage.
  • Financial Orders: support and out-of-state property require personal jurisdiction.
Invented Example

A establishes State Y domicile/residency, serves B by mail: divorce valid, alimony void.

Usual Traps
  • Ex parte divorce does not bar a later alimony suit where personal jurisdiction exists.
  • A defaulting spouse may still collaterally attack sham domicile.

Bilateral Divorce and Full Faith and Credit

Rule: When both spouses participate in a sister-state divorce—or the defendant appears and has an opportunity to contest domicile—the decree is res judicata and immune from collateral attack on domicile in every other state under Full Faith and Credit.

Source (unverified): Sherrer v. Sherrer; U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
Elements
  • Defendant appears generally or answers.
  • Opportunity to contest domicile existed.
  • Collateral attack on domicile is barred nationwide.
Invented Example

A files in State Z; B answers without contesting domicile, barring Oakridge attack.

Usual Traps
  • Mailed notice followed by default is not bilateral participation.
  • Foreign divorces rest on comity; mail-order decrees without domicile fail.
↑Top

4. Property Division at Divorce

Equitable Distribution vs. Community Property

Rule: Under equitable distribution (majority dual-classification rule), courts divide marital property fairly—not necessarily 50/50—based on duration, financial and homemaker contributions, age, health, and earning power (a minority and 1973 UMDA § 307 Alt. A use hotchpot division of all property). Under community property (minority; 1973 UMDA § 307 Alt. B), marital-labor assets divide 50/50.

Source (unverified): UMDA § 307 (1970 & 1973 Alts. A & B); Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution ch. 4 (§§ 4.03, 4.09).
Elements
  • Classify: separate vs. marital assets and debts.
  • Value: fair market value at statutory cutoff date.
  • Distribute: equitably regardless of title.
Invented Example

In Linden, A earns marital wages into a sole account while B keeps house: stays marital.

Usual Traps
  • "Equitable" means fair, not automatically 50/50.
  • Marital wages placed in a sole account stay marital.

Marital vs. Separate Property and Appreciation

Rule: In dual-classification states, separate property covers premarital assets, individual gifts or inheritances, and traceable exchanges; marital property covers other assets acquired during marriage. Passive market appreciation on separate property (encumbered or unencumbered) stays separate to the extent allocable to the separate interest (wholly separate absent marital funds/labor); active appreciation and marital mortgage paydowns create a marital share (pro rata passive appreciation under source-of-funds: marital principal paydown over FMV at marriage under ALI § 4.05 when debt remains unpaid), untraceable commingled funds become marital, and joint titling presumes a gift.

Source (unverified): Original UMDA § 307 (1970); Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution ch. 4 (§§ 4.03–4.05).
Elements
  • Separate: premarital assets, sole gifts, inheritances.
  • Source of Funds: marital mortgage paydown earns pro rata appreciation plus remodel value.
  • Transmutation: joint titling presumes a marital gift.
Invented Example

Spouse A bought an Oakridge home premaritally, paid $60,000 mortgage principal with marital wages, and Spouse B remodeled. Premarital equity stays separate; paydown, pro rata appreciation, and remodel are marital.

Usual Traps
  • Marital mortgage payments create a marital share without retitling.
  • Lost marital wages in tort settlements are marital; pain and suffering are separate.

Pensions, Professional Degrees, and Fault

Rule: Vested and unvested pensions earned during marriage are divisible marital property, and enterprise business goodwill is marital. Majority courts hold a professional degree or license is not marital property (historically a minority, notably New York under O'Brien prior to 2015 statutory abrogation, valued enhanced earning capacity), awarding reimbursement alimony instead. Non-economic fault is excluded under the UMDA, while economic dissipation is weighed.

Source (unverified): In re Marriage of Graham; O'Brien v. O'Brien; UMDA § 307; Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution ch. 4 (§§ 4.07–4.08).
Elements
  • Pensions: marital share equals married service years over total service years.
  • Degrees: not marital property (majority), so courts award reimbursement support.
  • Dissipation: wasting marital funds near divorce shifts the split.
Invented Example

A funds B's Linden medical degree; B files at graduation. A gets reimbursement support.

Usual Traps
  • Unvested pensions earned during marriage remain marital property.
  • Adultery alone is excluded, but spending marital funds on an affair is dissipation.
↑Top

5. Spousal Support

Types and Eligibility for Spousal Support

Rule: Under strict UMDA § 308(a), maintenance requires lacking sufficient property for reasonable needs and inability to achieve self-support through work (or caring for a young or disabled child), applying gender-neutral factors. Majority non-UMDA states also award restitutionary reimbursement alimony without proving inability to be self-supporting, alongside permanent, rehabilitative, or lump-sum awards.

Source (unverified): UMDA § 308; Orr v. Orr; Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution §§ 5.02–5.05.
Elements
  • Permanent: long marriages lacking realistic self-support.
  • Rehabilitative: temporary schooling or job-training support.
  • Reimbursement / Lump-Sum: fixed, nonmodifiable awards.
Invented Example

Cedar spouse paused nursing for childcare: gets two-year rehabilitative support.

Usual Traps
  • Alimony laws favoring wives only violate Equal Protection (Orr v. Orr).
  • Many states let marital fault reduce or bar alimony even when ignoring fault in property division.

Modification and Termination

Rule: Majority states permit modifying periodic spousal support prospectively upon a substantial, continuing change in circumstances (UMDA § 316(a) requires change making terms unconscionable) absent bad-faith income cuts. Periodic support ends automatically on either spouse's death or recipient's remarriage, and many states reduce or end it on marriage-like cohabitation altering financial need.

Source (unverified): UMDA § 316(a)–(b); Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution §§ 5.07–5.08.
Elements
  • Substantial Change: involuntary layoff, disability, or good-faith retirement.
  • Automatic End: payor's death, payee's death, or payee's remarriage.
  • Nonmodifiable: lump-sum and reimbursement awards survive remarriage and death.
Invented Example

Payor quits engineering in Linden to dodge alimony; bad-faith cut bars reduction.

Usual Traps
  • Cohabitation ends support only if statute, decree, or changed economic need triggers termination.
  • Lump-sum alimony paid in installments stays nonmodifiable and survives remarriage.
↑Top

6. Child Support and Interstate Enforcement

Guidelines, Imputed Income, and Arrears

Rule: Both parents owe child support under federally mandated guidelines (rebuttable presumption requiring written findings to deviate). Support is prospectively modifiable on a substantial change in circumstances (UMDA § 316(a): unconscionability) with income imputed for bad-faith underemployment, while the Bradley Amendment bars retroactively modifying arrears. Under UMDA § 316(c), child support survives the obligor parent's death as an estate claim unless agreed otherwise.

Source (unverified): 42 U.S.C. § 667; Bradley Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(C); UMDA §§ 309, 316(a), (c).
Elements
  • Models: Income Shares or Percentage of Income.
  • Bradley Amendment: unpaid installments become final judgments; no retroactive forgiveness.
  • Duration & Death: ends at majority (18, or 19 in high school), emancipation, or child's marriage, unless disabled; survives obligor's death under UMDA § 316(c).
Invented Example

Obligor waits eight months after Maple layoff to move: support drops prospectively from filing; $6,400 arrears stay.

Usual Traps
  • Parents cannot trade away child support for visitation waivers.
  • Denied visitation never excuses nonpayment of support.

UIFSA Long-Arm and Continuing Jurisdiction

Rule: UIFSA grants long-arm personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent via in-state service, consent, living with the child in-state, residing in-state and providing prenatal support, causing the child's residence by acts/directives, conceiving intercourse in-state, putative-father registry assertion, or another constitutional basis. Under UIFSA and FFCCSOA, the issuing state keeps CEJ over child support while the obligor, individual obligee, or child remains unless all file consents in a record in the issuing tribunal for a state where the child resides or a party has personal jurisdiction; other states with jurisdiction over the obligor, employer, or assets may enforce only, and issuing law governs duration. The issuing state keeps permanent CEJ over spousal support (§ 211).

Source (unverified): UIFSA §§ 201, 205, 211, 603–604, 611, 613; FFCCSOA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B; Kulko v. Superior Court.
Elements
  • Personal Jurisdiction: always required over obligor (prenatal checks without prior residence fail).
  • CEJ Retention: ends when all leave (or file consents in issuing tribunal for an eligible state).
  • After All Leave: modify in respondent's state (§ 611), unless all live in the same new state (§ 613).
Invented Example

State A sets support to 21; Child moves to B (18), Obligor stays in A: B enforces only, A's duration controls.

Usual Traps
  • Sending a child to visit gives no personal jurisdiction there (Kulko).
  • After all leave, petitioner cannot modify at home absent consent or shared new residence.
↑Top

7. Child Custody, Visitation, and Jurisdiction

Best Interests, Joint Custody, and Relocation

Rule: Legal custody (major decisions) and physical custody (residence) turn on the child's best interests, weighing parental wishes, mature child preferences, sibling ties, stability, health, and domestic abuse, while barring race or gender preferences. Joint legal custody requires cooperation; relocation burdens split between requiring the moving parent to show best interests and permitting good-faith moves absent detriment.

Source (unverified): UMDA § 402; Palmore v. Sidoti; Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution §§ 2.08–2.09, 2.17.
Elements
  • Best Interests: primary caregiver, stability, and fostering contact with the other parent.
  • Equal Protection: racial bias cannot decide custody (Palmore).
  • Relocation: good-faith reason and preserved parenting time.
Invented Example

In Linden, A cites teasing from B's interracial remarriage; Palmore bars relying on racial bias.

Usual Traps
  • The maternal "tender years" presumption is abolished.
  • Private lifestyle or religion matters only if it harms the child.

Modification of Custody

Rule: Under the majority rule, custody modifies on a post-decree substantial change in circumstances serving best interests. Under UMDA § 409(a), no custody-modification motion may be filed within two years of any custody decree unless affidavits show serious endangerment. Under UMDA § 409(b), the court retains the prior custodian unless the custodian agrees, the child integrated with consent, or serious endangerment outweighs disruption harm.

Source (unverified): UMDA §§ 407(b), 409(a)–(b).
Elements
  • Majority rule: substantial change plus best interests.
  • UMDA § 409(a): two-year bar on any custody-modification motion absent serious endangerment.
  • UMDA § 409(b): retain custodian absent agreement, consensual integration, or serious endangerment.
Invented Example

Six months post-decree in Oakridge, Parent moves to modify over apartment size; absent serious endangerment, UMDA two-year bar dismisses.

Usual Traps
  • Visitation times modify on best interests, but restricting visitation under UMDA § 407(b) requires serious endangerment.
  • Out-of-state relocation generally qualifies as a substantial change in circumstances.

Parental Rights and Third-Party Visitation

Rule: Fit parents hold a fundamental due process right to direct the care, custody, and control of their children. Under Troxel v. Granville, courts must give "special weight" to a fit parent's objection to grandparent or third-party visitation and cannot override it on a bare best-interests disagreement; against a nonparent in custody disputes, a fit parent prevails absent unfitness or extraordinary circumstances.

Source (unverified): U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Troxel v. Granville; Meyer v. Nebraska; Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
Elements
  • Constitutional presumption that fit parents act in their child's best interests.
  • Special weight owed to a fit parent's visitation limits.
  • Nonparent needs unfitness, abandonment, or extraordinary circumstances to win initial custody.
Invented Example

Fit Parent A limits Grandparent visits to monthly; ordering weekly visits on mere preference violates Troxel.

Usual Traps
  • Troxel invalidated overbroad application, not all grandparent-visitation statutes facially.
  • Never apply bare best-interests balancing between a fit parent and third party.

UCCJEA and PKPA Custody Jurisdiction

Rule: Under the UCCJEA and PKPA, initial custody jurisdiction belongs first to the home state (lived there six consecutive months before filing, or since birth if younger, or within six months prior if a parent remains), without personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent. Significant-connection jurisdiction applies only if no home state exists or declines (§§ 207–208) AND both significant connection (beyond physical presence) and substantial evidence exist. Issuing state keeps CEJ until its court determines neither the child, nor the child and one parent, has a significant connection and substantial evidence ends, or all leave. UCCJEA covers TPR and guardianships (§ 102(4)) but excludes adoptions (§ 103).

Source (unverified): UCCJEA §§ 102(4), 103, 201–202, 204, 207–208; PKPA, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
Elements
  • Home-State Priority: six consecutive months; significant-connection is backup only.
  • CEJ Loss: issuing court finds neither child nor child-and-parent keeps connection and substantial evidence ends, OR all leave.
  • Unjustifiable Conduct: courts decline jurisdiction from parental abduction.
Invented Example

Child lived four years in State A; Parent A moved to State B two months ago and filed there. State A stays home state because Parent B remains; State B lacks jurisdiction.

Usual Traps
  • UCCJEA custody needs no personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent.
  • Emergency jurisdiction is temporary and cannot replace a home-state decree.
↑Top

8. Parentage, Guardianships, Adoption & ICWA

Parentage, ART, VAPs & Unwed Fathers

Rule: A child born during marriage is rebuttably presumed both spouses' child regardless of sex, though states may make the presumption conclusive against an unwed biological father in an intact marriage (Michael H.). Nonmarital-child discrimination triggers intermediate scrutiny. A signed Voluntary Acknowledgment of Parentage (VAP) becomes a judgment after 60 days (challengeable later only for fraud, duress, or material mistake). Under UPA §§ 702–704, ART gamete donors are nonparents, while a spouse/partner consenting in a record (or by clear agreement/holding out) is a parent; validated gestational surrogacy is generally enforced, while genetic surrogacy is often restricted or unenforceable (In re Baby M). De facto parents who lived with, cared for, held out, and bonded with a child with a legal parent's consent gain parental standing (UPA § 609). Unwed fathers grasping opportunity via custodial, personal, and financial responsibility hold Due Process and Equal Protection (Caban) notice and consent rights.

Source (unverified): Michael H. v. Gerald D.; Clark v. Jeter; Pavan v. Smith; Stanley v. Illinois; Quilloin v. Walcott; Caban v. Mohammed; Lehr v. Robertson; In re Baby M; 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)–(D); UPA §§ 204, 301–309, 609, 702–704.
Elements
  • Grasping Opportunity: custodial, personal, and financial responsibility (visits alone fail, Quilloin).
  • VAP & ART: 60-day rescission; gamete donors nonparents; consenting ART partner is parent.
  • De Facto & Equal Protection: parent-consented caretaking grants standing; short nonmarital bars fail.
Invented Example

Unwed Father knowing of Linden birth pays nothing, never visits/registers; stepparent adoption needs no consent.

Usual Traps
  • Biology alone gives an absent father no adoption veto, and an ART gamete donor owes no support.
  • Prompt action on learning of pregnancy preserves a father's claim.

Termination, Guardianships & Adoption

Rule: Due process forbids involuntarily terminating parental rights unless the state proves statutory unfitness (abandonment, abuse, chronic neglect) by at least clear and convincing evidence. Legal guardianships of minors (by parental consent/nomination or court appointment upon parental death, incapacity, abandonment, or unavailability, respecting fit-parent preference) grant care, custody, medical, and educational authority without terminating parentage or child-support duties, preserve residual rights, and remain modifiable when incapacity ends. Adoption requires living legal parents' (unless terminated or excused) and older adoptees' consent plus best interests, severing birth ties and creating adoptive rights. UCCJEA covers TPR and guardianships (§ 102(4)), excluding adoptions (§ 103).

Source (unverified): Santosky v. Kramer; U.S. Const. amend. XIV; UCCJEA §§ 102(4), 103; Uniform Adoption Act (1994) § 2-401, arts. 1 & 3–4.
Elements
  • Clear and Convincing: constitutional floor for involuntary termination.
  • Guardianship vs. Adoption: guardianship preserves parentage/support and stays modifiable; adoption permanently severs birth ties.
  • Consents & Stepparents: living parents and older adoptees (often 12 or 14) consent; stepparent adoption keeps custodial parent's ties while ending the other's.
Invented Example

A state terminates parental rights by preponderance of evidence; Santosky invalidates the order under Due Process.

Usual Traps
  • Best interests alone cannot terminate a fit parent's rights without unfitness.
  • Adoption ends biological-parent inheritance outside stepparent adoptions.

ICWA

Rule: In voluntary and involuntary foster-care, TPR, or adoptive cases involving an "Indian child" (unmarried minor who is a tribe member or eligible with a member biological parent), ICWA grants exclusive tribal jurisdiction on reservations or for tribal-court wards (§ 1911(a)), mandates presumptive transfer of off-reservation foster-care or TPR cases absent either parent's objection, good cause, or tribal declination (§ 1911(b)), sets placement preferences (§ 1915), and imposes voluntary-consent safeguards (§ 1913: writing before a judge, invalid before or within 10 days after birth, revocable anytime in foster care or before final TPR/adoption decree). Involuntary cases (§ 1912) require notice, active efforts, and qualified expert testimony supporting clear and convincing proof (foster care) or beyond a reasonable doubt (TPR).

Source (unverified): Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1923; Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield; Haaland v. Brackeen.
Elements
  • Covered Cases: voluntary/involuntary foster care, TPR, adoptions (not divorce custody).
  • Jurisdiction: exclusive on reservation or for tribal wards; off-reservation foster-care/TPR transfer absent parental veto.
  • Involuntary Burdens: clear & convincing (foster care) or beyond reasonable doubt (TPR), with qualified expert testimony.
Invented Example

Oakridge seeks termination over a tribe-eligible child with a member parent, requiring tribal notice, active efforts, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Usual Traps
  • ICWA never covers divorce custody disputes between parents.
  • Off-reservation birth cannot defeat exclusive tribal jurisdiction for reservation domiciliaries (Holyfield).

Protective Orders and Family Immunities

Rule: Civil protective orders—entered ex parte on immediate danger and extended after a noticed hearing—may exclude an abuser, bar contact, and award temporary custody and support, and VAWA requires nationwide Full Faith and Credit enforcement. Most states have abolished interspousal tort immunity and narrowed parent-child immunity to core parental discretion.

Source (unverified): Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 18 U.S.C. § 2265; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 895F–895G.
Elements
  • VAWA Full Faith and Credit: issuing-court jurisdiction plus notice and hearing opportunity.
  • No Registration Rule: police enforce out-of-state orders without prior registration.
  • Immunities: spouses sue for torts; children sue for negligent driving.
Invented Example

State A enters protective order after noticed hearing; State B enforces without local registration.

Usual Traps
  • Mutual orders fail VAWA absent cross-petitions and specific abuse findings.
  • Parental immunity survives only for reasonable supervision or discipline.
↑Top