How this exam tests

Most questions turn on a few recurring distinctions, not obscure rules. Learn these first and watch for them in every part below.

Must versus may. The Rule 1.6(b) exceptions to confidentiality are permissive. The Rule 3.3 remedial duty is mandatory. Withdrawal is mandatory in some situations and permissive in others. An answer that says must when the rule says may is wrong, and so is the reverse.

Knows versus reasonably should know. Some duties need actual knowledge, which may be inferred from circumstances but is more than suspicion. Others apply when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know. Read the trigger before choosing.

Three levels of consent. Informed consent means adequate information and explanation about material risks and reasonably available alternatives. Confirmed in writing means the client's written consent, or a writing the lawyer promptly sends confirming oral consent; no client signature is needed. A writing signed by the client is the most demanding. Each rule picks one level.

Discipline, civil liability and disqualification are different questions. A rule violation can bring discipline but does not itself create a malpractice claim; it is only evidence of the standard of care. A conflict can disqualify. Ask which consequence the question is about.

Candor to a tribunal versus truthfulness to others. Rule 3.3 remedial measures override Rule 1.6. Rule 4.1(b) yields to Rule 1.6. The same facts can have opposite answers depending on whether the audience is a tribunal or a counterparty.

Finally, know who can be screened and under which rule; screening cures only what the specific rule says it cures.

Part I. Regulation of the Legal Profession (6 to 12 percent)

Admission, misconduct, supervision and independence.

Bar admission and its limits

A state may test character and fitness, but any ground for denial must rationally relate to fitness to practice, and due process applies. A state may not deny admission merely for political belief or group membership, even in a subversive group. It may ask about knowing membership with specific intent to further unlawful aims, and may deny admission to an applicant who refuses to answer relevant questions, unless the refusal is a good-faith Fifth Amendment claim. A state may not require residency (Privileges and Immunities Clause). Neither bar applicants nor lawyers acting in connection with a bar application may knowingly make a false statement of material fact.

Trap
  • Mere membership or belief is no ground for exclusion; knowing membership plus specific intent is a permitted subject of inquiry.

Cooperating with authorities; which state's rules apply

In an admission or disciplinary matter, an applicant or lawyer must not knowingly make a false statement of material fact, and, except as protected by Rule 1.6 or an openly asserted Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, must not fail to disclose a fact needed to correct a known misapprehension or knowingly fail to answer a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority.

A lawyer is subject to discipline wherever admitted, whatever the place of the conduct, and wherever the lawyer provides or offers legal services. For a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the tribunal's jurisdiction apply unless the tribunal's rules say otherwise. For other conduct, the rules where it occurred apply unless its predominant effect is elsewhere; a reasonable belief about predominant effect is a safe harbor.

Trap
  • For a pending tribunal matter, the tribunal's location generally controls, not the lawyer's home state.

Mandatory reporting of lawyer and judge misconduct

A lawyer who knows another lawyer has violated the Rules in a way raising a substantial question about honesty, trustworthiness or fitness must inform the appropriate authority. The same applies to a judge's violation raising a substantial question about fitness for office. Knowledge means actual knowledge, which may be inferred; suspicion is not enough. Rule 1.6 information and information gained in an approved lawyers assistance program are exempt.

Under Judicial Code Rule 2.15, a judge with actual knowledge of a substantial-fitness violation by a lawyer or judge must report it, and a judge receiving information indicating a substantial likelihood of any violation must take appropriate action.

Trap
  • Reporting to authorities is a must, but only for actual knowledge of a violation raising a substantial question (unless exempt under Rule 1.6 or an approved assistance program).

Professional misconduct

Rule 8.4 treats as misconduct:

  • Violating or attempting to violate the Rules, knowingly assisting or inducing another to do so, or doing so through another's acts.
  • A criminal act reflecting adversely on honesty, trustworthiness or fitness, even without prosecution or conviction.
  • Dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, even outside law practice.
  • Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
  • Stating or implying an ability to improperly influence an agency or official, or to achieve results by means violating the Rules or other law.
  • Knowingly assisting a judge or judicial officer in violating judicial conduct rules or other law.
  • Engaging in practice-related conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on protected grounds. Legitimate advice or advocacy, and Rule 1.16 decisions, remain allowed.
Trap
  • No conviction is needed for the criminal-act ground.

Supervision and practice across state lines

Partners and managers must make reasonable efforts to maintain measures giving reasonable assurance that lawyers and nonlawyer assistants conform to the Rules; direct supervisors must make reasonable efforts to ensure conformity. A lawyer is responsible for another's violation by ordering or knowingly ratifying it, or as a partner, manager or direct supervisor who knows of it while consequences can be avoided or mitigated and fails to act. A subordinate is protected only when following a supervisor's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

A lawyer may not practice in violation of a jurisdiction's regulation or assist unauthorized practice, and an unadmitted lawyer may not establish an office or systematic presence or hold out as admitted. A lawyer admitted elsewhere and not disbarred or suspended anywhere may still provide temporary services (associating active local counsel, tribunal-related, home-related arbitration or mediation, or reasonably related to home practice), in-house services to an employer or its affiliates, or services authorized by federal or other law.

Trap
  • The subordinate's protection covers only an arguable question, not an obvious violation.
  • The in-house permission excludes appearances needing pro hac vice admission.

Independence: fee sharing, partnerships, covenants and law-related services

A lawyer may not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except death benefits to a deceased lawyer's estate or beneficiaries, a Rule 1.17 practice purchase price, nonlawyer employee compensation or retirement plans, and court-awarded fees shared with a nonprofit that employed, retained or recommended the lawyer. A lawyer may not partner with a nonlawyer if any partnership activity is law practice, let one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer direct professional judgment, or practice in a for-profit entity with nonlawyer ownership, corporate office or control.

Agreements restricting practice after the relationship ends are barred, except conditions on retirement benefits; settlement agreements may not restrict a lawyer's practice. Under Rule 5.7, the Rules govern law-related services provided in circumstances not distinct from legal services, or through a lawyer-controlled entity unless the lawyer takes reasonable measures to assure recipients know the services are not legal services and that client-lawyer protections do not apply.

Trap
  • The fee-sharing exceptions are a closed list.
  • The retirement-benefit exception applies to partnership and employment agreements, never to client settlement agreements.

Part II. The Client-Lawyer Relationship (10 to 16 percent)

One of the three heaviest areas: the relationship from formation to its end.

Forming the relationship; prospective clients

A relationship arises when a person manifests intent to obtain legal services and the lawyer consents; when the lawyer fails to decline although the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the person reasonably relies on the lawyer; or when a tribunal appoints the lawyer. No fee and no written agreement is required.

A person who consults a lawyer about possibly forming a relationship is a prospective client; someone who communicates unilaterally without a reasonable expectation of representation is not. Even with no representation, the lawyer may not use or reveal what was learned, except as Rule 1.9 permits for a former client.

Example

Ines emails a lawyer she has never met and describes her dispute at length. The lawyer does not reply, and Ines had no reasonable expectation of representation. She is not a prospective client.

Trap
  • Reliance can create the relationship even though the lawyer never said yes.

Who decides: objectives, means and criminal cases

The client decides the objectives and whether to settle. In a criminal case, after consultation, the client decides the plea, whether to waive a jury and whether to testify, and counsel may not concede guilt over the client's express objection. After reasonable consultation, the lawyer controls tactical means, including which nonfrivolous appellate issues to raise.

A limited scope is allowed if reasonable and the client gives informed consent. Representing a client is not endorsing the client's views. A lawyer may not counsel or assist conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but may discuss legal consequences and may assist a good-faith effort to test the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.

Communication and the three levels of consent

A lawyer must promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance requiring informed consent, reasonably consult about means, keep the client reasonably informed about status, and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. If the lawyer knows the client expects forbidden assistance, the lawyer must consult about the limits. Explanations must be enough to permit informed decisions.

The three forms of consent are tested constantly:

  • Informed consent: adequate information and explanation about material risks and reasonably available alternatives.
  • Confirmed in writing: the client's written consent, or a writing the lawyer promptly sends confirming oral consent (or within a reasonable time if immediate writing is infeasible); no client signature needed.
  • Signed writing: a physical or electronic signature executed or adopted with intent to sign.
Trap
  • The lawyer's confirming letter satisfies confirmed in writing but not a rule demanding a writing signed by the client.

Reasonable fees and contingent fees

A lawyer may not agree to, charge or collect an unreasonable fee or unreasonable expenses. Eight factors govern: time and skill, preclusion of other employment, customary local rates, amount and results, time limits, length of relationship, the lawyer's experience, and whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Scope, basis or rate of the fee and expenses, and later changes, must be communicated before or within a reasonable time after starting, preferably in writing, except for a regular client charged on the same basis.

A contingent fee requires a writing signed by the client stating how the fee is calculated, including the percentages for settlement, trial or appeal, which expenses are deducted and whether before or after the percentage, and any expenses owed regardless of outcome. At the end the lawyer must give a written closing statement showing the outcome and any remittance and its calculation. Contingent fees are barred in criminal defense and in domestic-relations matters contingent on a divorce or on future alimony, support or property awards; collecting past-due arrearages is permitted.

Trap
  • Ordinary fees are communicated, preferably in writing; a contingent fee needs a client-signed writing.
  • The domestic-relations ban covers future support, not past-due arrearages.

Dividing fees between lawyers in different firms

Lawyers in different firms may divide a fee only if all three hold: the division is proportional to services performed, or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility; the client agrees to the arrangement, including each lawyer's share, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and the total fee is reasonable. The rule does not govern compensation within a firm, and fee division with nonlawyers is restricted separately by Rule 5.4.

Trap
  • The client must agree to each lawyer's share, and Rule 1.5(e) requires only confirmation in writing, not the client's signature.

Clients with diminished capacity

When capacity is diminished, the lawyer must as far as reasonably possible maintain a normal relationship. The lawyer may, but need not, take reasonably necessary protective action if the lawyer reasonably believes the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest. Rule 1.6 still protects the information; the lawyer is impliedly authorized to reveal it only as reasonably necessary to protect the client.

Declining, withdrawing and ending the representation

The lawyer must inquire into and assess the facts and circumstances of each representation. The lawyer must decline or withdraw if the representation will violate the Rules or other law, the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs it, the lawyer is discharged, or the lawyer knows the client or prospective client seeks to use or persists in using the lawyer's services to commit or further a crime or fraud despite counseling on conduct limits.

The lawyer may withdraw if there is no material adverse effect on the client, or if:

  • the client persists in conduct involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes criminal or fraudulent, or has used them to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
  • the client insists on repugnant action, or there is a fundamental disagreement;
  • the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation after reasonable warning;
  • the representation imposes an unreasonable financial burden or is made unreasonably difficult by the client; or other good cause exists.
  • Duties on exit: follow a tribunal's notice or permission rules, and continue if ordered despite good cause; give reasonable notice, allow time for new counsel, return papers and property, and refund unearned advances.
Trap
  • A client who seeks or persists in using the lawyer's services for known crime or fraud despite counseling triggers a must; ongoing conduct only reasonably believed criminal or fraudulent, or past use of the services for crime or fraud, gives a may.

Selling a law practice

A lawyer or firm may sell or purchase a practice or area of practice, including goodwill, if the seller ceases private practice, or practice in the sold area, in the geographic area or jurisdiction; the entire practice or area is sold to one or more lawyers or firms; each client receives written notice of the proposed sale, the right to retain other counsel or take the file, and that consent is presumed if no objection within 90 days (if a client cannot be given notice, a court order must authorize the transfer); and fees are not increased because of the sale.

Part III. Client Confidentiality (6 to 12 percent)

Know which of three protections is in play, and know the Rule 1.6(b) exceptions.

Privilege, work product and confidentiality compared

Three protections differ.

  • Attorney-client privilege: an evidentiary rule covering confidential communications between privileged persons made to obtain or provide legal assistance; it bars compelled disclosure and survives termination and death. Exceptions and limits: waiver, crime-fraud, disputes between joint clients, lawyer-client disputes, and disputes among claimants through a deceased client.
  • Work product: materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or its representative. Ordinary work product yields to substantial need and undue hardship; mental impressions and legal theories get near-absolute protection.
  • Rule 1.6 confidentiality: all information relating to the representation, from any source; it applies outside proceedings and survives termination and death.
Trap
  • Information that is not privileged may still be confidential under Rule 1.6.

The general duty and safeguarding information

A lawyer may not reveal information relating to the representation unless the client gives informed consent, disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, or a Rule 1.6(b) exception applies. The duty covers information from any source, even if publicly accessible, and continues after the representation ends. Except as the Rules permit or require, a lawyer may not use such information to a current client's disadvantage without informed consent, or to a former client's disadvantage unless it has become generally known.

A lawyer must make reasonable efforts to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, client information. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b), an inadvertent disclosure does not waive privilege if it was inadvertent, the holder took reasonable steps to prevent it, and the holder promptly took steps to rectify the error.

Rule 1.6(b) exceptions: bodily harm, crime and fraud

Under the Model Rules these exceptions are permissive, and in each the lawyer reveals only what the lawyer reasonably believes necessary. Other rules, such as Rule 3.3, may make disclosure mandatory. A lawyer may reveal information:

  • to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, whoever causes it;
  • to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to another's financial interests or property;
  • to prevent, mitigate or rectify such substantial injury reasonably certain to result or already resulting from a client crime or fraud.
  • The two financial exceptions require that the client has used or is using the lawyer's services in furtherance; the bodily-harm exception does not.
Trap
  • An answer saying the lawyer must reveal is wrong unless another rule, such as Rule 3.3, requires it.

Rule 1.6(b) exceptions: ethics advice, self-defense, law and conflict checks

A lawyer may also reveal client information, to the extent reasonably believed necessary:

  • to secure legal advice about the lawyer's own compliance with the Rules;
  • for self-defense: to establish a claim or defense in a lawyer-client controversy (such as a fee or malpractice dispute), to defend against a criminal charge or civil claim based on conduct involving the client, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding about the representation;
  • to comply with other law or a court order, after asserting nonfrivolous privilege or protection claims;
  • to detect and resolve conflicts arising from a change of employment or a change in firm composition or ownership, if disclosure will not compromise privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.
Trap
  • Informal online reviews are not a proceeding, so self-defense does not cover answering one.

Part IV. Conflicts of Interest (12 to 18 percent)

The heaviest area. Keep a running list of who can be screened and what each screen requires.

Concurrent conflicts and when consent works

A concurrent conflict exists if representation will be directly adverse to another current client, even in an unrelated matter, or if there is a significant risk of material limitation from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person, or from a personal interest of the lawyer.

Even so, the lawyer may represent the client only if all four hold: the lawyer reasonably believes competent and diligent representation can be provided to each affected client; the representation is not prohibited by law; it does not involve one client asserting a claim against another client represented by the lawyer in the same proceeding before a tribunal; and each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

Trap
  • Adversity to a current client is a conflict even in an unrelated matter.
  • No consent cures a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same proceeding before a tribunal.

Representing co-clients together

Co-clients in the same matter may be represented only if all Rule 1.7(b) conditions are met, including the lawyer's reasonable belief that each can be represented competently, diligently and impartially, and each client's informed consent, confirmed in writing, after explanation of the information to be shared. Co-clients ordinarily have no confidentiality from each other about the common representation, which the lawyer should explain at the outset. If one insists on hiding material information from the other, the lawyer must withdraw. Privilege does not protect joint communications in a later dispute between them. If an unconsentable conflict arises, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from representing all co-clients.

Business deals with clients, gifts and media rights

A lawyer may not enter a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an adverse pecuniary interest unless: the terms are fair and reasonable and fully disclosed in understandable writing; the client is advised in writing of the desirability of independent counsel and given a reasonable opportunity to seek it; and the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms and the lawyer's role, including whether the lawyer represents the client.

Ordinary cash fee agreements and standard commercial transactions generally marketed to others are excluded; taking nonmonetary property as a fee is covered. Except as the Rules permit or require, a lawyer may not use representation information to the client's disadvantage without informed consent. A lawyer may not solicit a substantial gift from a client, or prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a relative a substantial gift, unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the client. A lawyer may not make or negotiate literary or media rights based substantially on the representation before it concludes.

Trap
  • The consent is a signed writing from the client, not a confirming writing from the lawyer.
  • A nonmonetary fee is covered by the rule; a cash fee agreement is not.

Financial assistance, payors, aggregate settlements, proprietary interests and sex

In connection with pending or contemplated litigation, a lawyer may not give a client financial assistance, except: advancing court costs and litigation expenses (repayment may be contingent on outcome); paying them outright for an indigent client; and modest gifts for basic living needs to an indigent pro bono client, without prior promise, reimbursement or advertising.

  • Third-party payor: the client's informed consent, no interference with independent judgment, and Rule 1.6 confidentiality preserved.
  • Aggregate civil settlement or criminal plea for two or more clients: disclose all claims or pleas and each person's participation; each client gives informed consent in a signed writing.
  • No proprietary interest in the cause of action, except an authorized fee lien or a reasonable civil contingent fee.
  • No sexual relations with a client unless a consensual relationship predated the representation.
  • Imputation to the firm covers Rule 1.8(a) through (i), but not the sexual-relations ban in (j).
Trap
  • A basic-needs gift to an indigent pro bono client cannot be promised in advance, repaid or advertised.

Duties to former clients

A lawyer who formerly represented a client in a matter may not represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter with interests materially adverse to the former client, unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. Substantially related means the same transaction or dispute, or a substantial risk that confidential factual information normally obtained would materially advance the new client's position.

Where the lawyer's former firm represented the former client, the bar applies to knowingly representing an adverse person only if the lawyer acquired material protected information. Separately, except as the Rules permit or require, a lawyer may not reveal a former client's information, or use it to the former client's disadvantage unless it has become generally known.

Trap
  • Unlike current clients, a former client must be adverse in the same or a substantially related matter; unrelated adversity is no conflict here.

Imputation and lateral screening

While lawyers are associated in a firm, none may knowingly represent a client when any one of them alone would be barred by Rule 1.7 or 1.9. There are two exceptions. A personal-interest conflict is not imputed if it presents no significant risk of materially limiting the others' representation. And a Rule 1.9(a) or (b) conflict arising from a lawyer's prior firm is not imputed if the disqualified lawyer is timely screened, gets no part of the fee, and prompt written notice goes to any affected former client. The screened lawyer and a firm partner must certify compliance at reasonable intervals on written request and when screening ends.

After a lawyer leaves a firm, the firm is barred from representing a person with interests materially adverse to a client represented by the departed lawyer and not currently represented by the firm only if the matter is the same or substantially related and a remaining lawyer holds material protected information. Imputed conflicts may be waived under Rule 1.7. Government-lawyer conflicts follow Rule 1.11.

Trap
  • Screening cures a prior-firm Rule 1.9(a) or (b) conflict, not a Rule 1.7 conflict from the lawyer's current work.
  • After a lawyer leaves, the old firm is barred from materially adverse representation only when the matter is the same or substantially related and a remaining lawyer holds material protected information.

Former and current government lawyers

A former government officer or employee follows Rule 1.9(c) and may not represent a client in a specific-party matter (not general rulemaking or legislation) in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially, unless the agency gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. The firm may act if the lawyer is timely screened, gets no part of the fee, and prompt written notice goes to the agency.

A lawyer who knows confidential government information about a person acquired in government service may not represent an adverse private client where it could be used to that person's material disadvantage. Agency consent cannot waive this bar, but timely screening and no fee share let the firm proceed. A current government lawyer follows Rules 1.7 and 1.9, may not participate in a matter of personal and substantial prior private involvement without the agency's informed consent confirmed in writing, and may not negotiate for private employment with a party or its lawyer in a matter of personal and substantial participation (law clerks are covered by Rule 1.12(b)).

Trap
  • The agency can consent to a matter the lawyer worked on, but cannot waive the known-confidential-information bar.

Former judges, arbitrators, mediators and law clerks

A lawyer may not represent anyone in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, as a law clerk to one, or as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing. Others in the firm may proceed if the lawyer is timely screened, gets no part of the fee, and prompt written notice goes to the parties and any appropriate tribunal.

A judge, adjudicative officer or neutral may not negotiate for employment with a party or its lawyer in a matter in which participating personally and substantially; a law clerk may, after notifying the judge or officer. A partisan arbitrator on a multimember panel may later represent that party.

Prospective clients and short-term limited legal services

A lawyer who received information from a prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person may not represent a client with materially adverse interests in the same or a substantially related matter, and the firm is barred too, unless there is a cure:

  • Cure one: informed consent, confirmed in writing, from both the affected client and the prospective client.
  • Cure two: the lawyer took reasonable measures to avoid more disqualifying information than necessary, is timely screened, gets no part of the fee, and prompt written notice goes to the prospective client.
  • In a nonprofit or court-annexed short-term limited legal services program with no expectation of continuing representation, Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) apply only if the lawyer knows of a conflict, and Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows another firm lawyer is disqualified; the clinic matter is not imputed across the firm.
Trap
  • The information must be significantly harmful to trigger the bar.

Part V. Competence, Legal Malpractice, and Other Civil Liability (6 to 12 percent)

Keep three things apart: a rule violation, a malpractice claim, and liability to people who are not clients.

Competence, technology and diligence

Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary, including understanding the benefits and risks of relevant technology. A lawyer may become competent by reasonable study or by associating with a competent lawyer. In an emergency where referral or consultation is impractical, a lawyer may give assistance limited to what is reasonably necessary. A lawyer must act with reasonable diligence and promptness and avoid neglect, and a sole practitioner should plan for death or disability.

In a criminal case, a Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance claim needs both deficient performance and prejudice, shown by a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

Malpractice, discipline and fiduciary breach

Violating an ethics rule creates no civil cause of action and is not negligence per se, though it may be relevant evidence of breach of the standard of care. Negligence malpractice requires a duty, a breach of the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances, causation (typically shown by a case within a case), and actual damages. Many jurisdictions also require a criminal-defense plaintiff to obtain post-conviction relief or prove innocence.

A clear and serious fiduciary breach, such as a serious conflict or confidentiality breach, can support partial or complete fee forfeiture without proof of a litigation loss. A firm and its general partners are vicariously liable for firm-course malpractice; non-participating, non-supervising lawyers in a limited-liability entity generally are not personally liable.

Trap
  • Breaking a rule is admissible on the standard of care but is not negligence per se.
  • Fee forfeiture for a serious fiduciary breach needs no proof the client lost the underlying case.

Civil liability to nonclients

A lawyer's duty of care generally runs only to clients. Under Restatement Section 51, a duty to a nonclient arises:

  • toward prospective clients;
  • when the lawyer, or the client with the lawyer's acquiescence, invites a non-remote nonclient to rely on the lawyer's opinion or services and the nonclient reasonably relies;
  • when the lawyer knows a primary objective of the client is to benefit the nonclient, such as an intended will beneficiary, and the duty neither impairs duties to the client nor duplicates other enforcement;
  • when a fiduciary client's unprotected beneficiary needs protection from a known criminal, fraudulent or lawyer-assisted breach of fiduciary duty.
  • Under general law (Restatement Sections 44 and 56), mishandling entrusted property or participating in fraud or torts also creates liability. For a Rule 2.3 third-party evaluation, the lawyer must reasonably believe it is compatible with the client relationship, and needs the client's informed consent if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know it will likely affect the client materially and adversely.

Limiting malpractice liability and settling malpractice claims

A lawyer may not make an agreement prospectively limiting liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making it. A lawyer may settle an existing or potential claim with an unrepresented client or former client only if that person is advised in writing of the desirability of independent counsel and given a reasonable opportunity to obtain it. An agreement to arbitrate fee disputes or future malpractice claims needs no independent counsel if it is enforceable under law and the client is fully informed of its scope and effect.

Trap
  • The settlement requirement is written advice plus a reasonable opportunity, not that the client actually retain counsel.

Part VI. Litigation and Other Forms of Advocacy (10 to 16 percent)

The third heavy area. Its center is Rule 3.3, candor to the tribunal, which overrides confidentiality.

Meritorious claims and expediting litigation

A lawyer may not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue, without a nonfrivolous basis in law and fact; a good-faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law qualifies. A lawyer for a criminal defendant, or a respondent facing possible incarceration, may nevertheless require every element to be established. A lawyer must make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the client's legitimate interests; a financial or tactical benefit from improper delay is not legitimate.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, presenting a paper certifies, after reasonable inquiry, no improper purpose, nonfrivolous legal contentions and evidentiary support. Sanctions on a party's motion are subject to a 21-day safe harbor.

Trap
  • Putting the prosecution to its proof on every element is not a frivolous position.

Candor toward the tribunal and client perjury

A lawyer must not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal, must correct the lawyer's own prior false statement of material fact or law, and must disclose legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to be directly adverse to the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. A lawyer must not offer evidence known to be false, and may refuse to offer evidence reasonably believed false, except a criminal defendant's own testimony.

If the lawyer comes to know that the lawyer, the client or a witness the lawyer called has offered false material evidence, or knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures: remonstrate, withdraw if appropriate, and if necessary disclose to the tribunal. This overrides Rule 1.6 and lasts through the conclusion of the proceeding, meaning final judgment affirmed on appeal or the review time expired. Refusing to aid client perjury does not violate the Sixth Amendment (Nix v. Whiteside). In an ex parte proceeding the lawyer must disclose all known material facts, adverse or not.

Trap
  • Knowledge bars offering false evidence; reasonable belief only permits refusing it, and never for the criminal defendant's own testimony.
  • Legal authority must be disclosed only if known to the lawyer, in the controlling jurisdiction, directly adverse and undisclosed by opposing counsel.

Fairness to the opposing party and counsel

A lawyer must not unlawfully obstruct access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal material of potential evidentiary value (applicable law may permit temporary possession of physical evidence of a client crime for a limited non-destructive examination before turning it over); falsify evidence, counsel false testimony or offer illegal witness inducements; or knowingly disobey a tribunal obligation except by open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists. A fact witness may receive reasonable expenses and lost wages; an expert, a reasonable non-contingent fee.

A lawyer must not make frivolous discovery requests and must make diligent compliance efforts. At trial, a lawyer must not allude to irrelevant or inadmissible matter, assert personal knowledge unless testifying, or state a personal opinion. A lawyer may ask a nonclient to refrain from volunteering information only if the person is a client's relative, employee or agent and the lawyer reasonably believes the person's interests will not be harmed.

Trap
  • A tribunal's rule may be disobeyed only by open refusal asserting no valid obligation exists.

Impartiality and decorum of the tribunal

A lawyer may not seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law, or communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized by law or court order. After the jury is discharged, a lawyer may not communicate with a juror or prospective juror if prohibited by law or court order, if the juror has made known a desire not to communicate, or if the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment. A lawyer may not engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.

Trap
  • After discharge, contact is barred only in the three listed circumstances.

Extrajudicial trial publicity

A lawyer who is participating or has participated in investigating or litigating a matter may not make an extrajudicial statement the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be publicly disseminated and have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding (such as confessions, test results, prior record or opinions on guilt). Colleagues in the firm or agency are likewise bound.

Safe harbors cover the claim, offense or defense and the persons involved (unless barred by law), public records, an ongoing investigation, the scheduling or result of any litigation step, requests for evidence, and danger warnings; in criminal cases, also the accused's background, arrest facts, officers' identities and aid in apprehension. A lawyer may also reply as a reasonable lawyer would believe required to protect a client from substantial undue prejudice from recent publicity the lawyer or client did not initiate. In Gentile, the substantial-likelihood standard satisfied the First Amendment, but the vague safe-harbor application was held void.

Trap
  • The right of reply is limited to what is required to mitigate recent, uninitiated publicity.

The lawyer as witness

A lawyer may not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness, unless the testimony relates to an uncontested issue, relates to the nature and value of legal services in the case, or disqualification would cause substantial hardship to the client. The prohibition applies to trial advocacy, not pretrial work, and is not imputed: another firm lawyer may serve as advocate unless Rule 1.7 or 1.9 bars it.

Special responsibilities of a prosecutor

A prosecutor must not prosecute a charge known to lack probable cause; must make reasonable efforts to assure the accused is advised of the right to counsel and given a reasonable opportunity to obtain it; and must not seek waiver of important pretrial rights from an unrepresented accused. A prosecutor must timely disclose known evidence or information tending to negate guilt or mitigate the offense, and unprivileged sentencing mitigation to the defense and tribunal absent a protective order; this is broader than constitutional materiality.

Before subpoenaing a lawyer in a criminal proceeding about a past or present client, the prosecutor must reasonably believe the information is unprivileged, essential and without a feasible alternative. A prosecutor must refrain from comments substantially likely to heighten public condemnation of the accused, except statements necessary to inform the public of the prosecutor's action that serve a legitimate law-enforcement purpose, and must exercise reasonable care over investigators' statements.

After conviction, known new, credible, material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood of innocence requires prompt disclosure to an appropriate court or authority (plus notice to the defendant and investigation if convicted in the prosecutor's jurisdiction). Clear and convincing evidence in the jurisdiction requires seeking to remedy the conviction.

Trap
  • The disclosure duty is not limited to constitutionally material evidence.

Advocacy in nonadjudicative proceedings

Before a legislative body or administrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding, a lawyer must disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity, and must follow Rule 3.3(a) through (c) on candor, Rule 3.4(a) through (c) on fairness, and Rule 3.5 on impartiality and decorum. The ex parte disclosure duty of Rule 3.3(d) and the discovery and trial rules of Rule 3.4(d) through (f) are not incorporated.

Trap
  • The duty to disclose all material facts ex parte does not apply here.

Part VII. Transactions and Communications with Nonclients (2 to 8 percent)

A small part with favorite contrast questions.

Truthfulness in statements to others

In representing a client, a lawyer must not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person, or fail to disclose a material fact when necessary to avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud, unless Rule 1.6 prohibits disclosure. Under negotiation conventions, estimates of price or value, a party's intentions about an acceptable settlement, and the existence of an undisclosed principal (unless nondisclosure would be fraud) are ordinarily not statements of material fact.

Rule 4.1(b) yields to Rule 1.6, unlike Rule 3.3. When Rule 1.6 bars the disclosure needed to avoid assisting ongoing client crime or fraud, the lawyer must withdraw under Rule 1.16(a) and may give notice of withdrawal and disaffirm tainted opinions or documents.

Example

Corin tells a buyer, "my client will not take a penny less" about her client's bottom line. That is ordinarily not a statement of material fact. Telling the buyer that no lawsuit is pending, when she knows one is, is a knowing false statement of material fact.

Trap
  • Candor to a tribunal overrides Rule 1.6 through the end of the proceeding; the Rule 4.1(b) duty to disclose to a third person yields to Rule 1.6, though Rule 1.6 never permits a false statement under Rule 4.1(a).

Communication with represented persons

A lawyer may not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows is represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless that lawyer consents or law or a court order authorizes it. The rule applies even if the represented person initiates or consents to the contact. Parties may speak directly to each other if the lawyer does not use the client or an intermediary to violate the rule.

For a represented organization, the bar covers constituents who supervise, direct or regularly consult with the organization's lawyer on the matter, who can obligate the organization in the matter, or whose act or omission in it may be imputed to the organization; a constituent's own counsel may consent. Former constituents may be contacted without organizational consent, but the lawyer must not seek privileged information.

Unrepresented persons, third-party rights and inadvertent documents

With an unrepresented person, a lawyer must not state or imply disinterest, must make reasonable efforts to correct a misunderstanding of the lawyer's role the lawyer knows or reasonably should know exists, and must give no legal advice other than to secure counsel if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the person's interests are or may be in conflict with the client's.

A lawyer must not use means with no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a third person, or evidence-gathering methods that violate a third person's legal rights. A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation and knows or reasonably should know it was inadvertently sent must promptly notify the sender; whether to return or delete it is left to other law.

Trap
  • The Rules require prompt notice to the sender, not return or deletion.

Part VIII. Different Roles of the Lawyer (4 to 10 percent)

The lawyer as advisor, evaluator, neutral and lawyer for an organization.

Advisor, evaluator and third-party neutral

A lawyer advising a client must exercise independent professional judgment and give candid advice, which may include moral, economic, social and political considerations. A lawyer may evaluate a matter affecting a client for a third person's use if the lawyer reasonably believes it is compatible with the client relationship; the client's informed consent is required if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the evaluation will likely affect the client materially and adversely, and information relating to the evaluation stays protected by Rule 1.6 except as authorized for the report. A third-party neutral must inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer does not represent them and, when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know a party misunderstands the role, explain the difference between a neutral and a client's advocate.

The organization as client

A lawyer for an organization represents the organization, acting through its authorized constituents, and must explain that when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the organization's interests are adverse to a constituent's.

Reporting up is mandatory. If the lawyer knows a constituent is acting, intends to act or refuses to act in a representation-related matter in violation of a legal duty to the organization or a law reasonably imputable to it, likely causing substantial injury, the lawyer must proceed as reasonably necessary in the organization's best interest, referring the matter to higher and, if warranted, highest authority unless reasonably believed unnecessary.

Reporting out is permissive. If the highest authority fails to timely address a clear violation of law reasonably certain to cause substantial injury, the lawyer may reveal information to the extent reasonably believed necessary to prevent the injury, overriding Rule 1.6, unless hired to investigate an alleged violation or defend the organization or a constituent. A lawyer discharged for reporting or withdrawing must assure the highest authority is informed. Dual representation of the organization and a constituent follows Rule 1.7, with the organization's consent from an uninvolved official or the shareholders.

Trap
  • A lawyer hired to investigate or defend cannot use the reporting-out exception.

Part IX. Safekeeping Funds and Other Property (2 to 8 percent)

Short and mechanical.

Client trust accounts and safekeeping

Client and third-person funds go in a separate trust account in the state of the lawyer's office, or elsewhere with the client's or third person's consent. Other property must be identified and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of account funds and other property must be kept five years after the representation ends under the Model Rule (a bracketed period each jurisdiction sets).

Personal funds may go into the trust account solely to pay bank service charges, and only in the amount necessary. Advance fees and expenses go into trust and are withdrawn only as earned or incurred; a true availability retainer, by contrast, is earned on receipt. On receiving funds or property in which a client or third person has an interest, the lawyer must promptly notify them, promptly deliver what they are entitled to, and promptly account in full on request. A disputed portion stays separate until resolved, and the undisputed portion is distributed promptly.

Part X. Communications About Legal Services (4 to 10 percent)

Advertising is general and mostly allowed if truthful. Solicitation targets a specific person and draws the bans.

Truthful communications, paid recommendations and specialization

A lawyer may not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services: a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or an omission needed to keep the statement as a whole from being materially misleading (including unjustified expectations, unsubstantiated comparisons and misleading trade names). Any media may be used, but each communication must include the name and contact information of at least one responsible lawyer or firm.

Giving anything of value for a recommendation is barred, except reasonable advertising costs, the usual charges of a legal service plan or nonprofit or qualified referral service, a Rule 1.17 practice purchase, non-exclusive reciprocal referral agreements with another lawyer or nonlawyer professional that are disclosed to the client, and nominal gifts of appreciation neither intended nor reasonably expected as compensation. A lawyer may state fields of practice; claiming specialist certification requires clearly naming an ABA-accredited or state-approved certifier. Truthful advertising and bona fide private credentials have First Amendment protection, subject to factual disclaimers.

Trap
  • A reciprocal referral agreement must be non-exclusive and disclosed to the client.

Solicitation of prospective clients

Solicitation is a targeted communication, initiated by or for a lawyer, to a specific person known or reasonably known to need legal services in a particular matter, offering legal services for it. A lawyer may not solicit by live person-to-person contact (in person, live telephone, or real-time audio or video; not ordinary text or email) when a significant motive is pecuniary gain, unless the recipient is a lawyer, has a family, close personal, or prior business or professional relationship with the lawyer or firm, or routinely uses such services for business.

Communications authorized by law or court order, and independent prepaid or group legal plans soliciting members not known to need help with a specific matter, are allowed. Even otherwise permitted solicitation, including written, is barred if the target made known a desire not to be solicited or if it involves coercion, duress or harassment.

States may ban in-person pecuniary solicitation (Ohralik) but must protect nonprofit civil-rights solicitation (Primus) and truthful targeted mail (Shapero); a 30-day waiting period for targeted accident-victim mail was upheld (Went For It).

Trap
  • Written targeted mail is not live contact, but is barred after an opt-out or if it involves coercion, duress or harassment.

Part XI. Lawyers' Duties to the Public and the Legal System (2 to 4 percent)

The smallest part by weight: a handful of short public-service rules.

Pro bono, appointments, boards, pay to play and criticism of judges

Rule 6.1 sets an aspirational, non-disciplinary goal of at least 50 pro bono hours a year, mostly without fee for persons of limited means or organizations serving them. Under Rule 6.2, a lawyer must not seek to avoid a tribunal appointment except for good cause: likely violation of the Rules or law, unreasonable financial burden, or a client or cause so repugnant as likely to impair the relationship or representation.

A lawyer may serve a legal services organization (Rule 6.3) unless knowingly participating in a decision incompatible with Rule 1.7 or materially adverse to an organization client opposing the lawyer's client. A lawyer may serve a law-reform group (Rule 6.4), disclosing without naming the client when knowing a client may be materially benefitted by a decision. A lawyer or firm may not accept a government legal engagement or judicial appointment after making or soliciting political contributions to obtain it (Rule 7.6). A lawyer may not make a knowingly or recklessly false statement about the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory or public legal officer, or candidate (Rule 8.2(a)).

Part XII. Judicial Conduct (2 to 8 percent)

Judges answer to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Most tested: disqualification, remittal and political activity.

Judicial independence, integrity and performance of duties

A judge must comply with the law, promote public confidence in judicial independence, integrity and impartiality, and avoid impropriety and its appearance. A judge must never abuse the prestige of office to advance personal or economic interests of the judge or others (misusing judicial letterhead is an example; references based on personal knowledge are permitted).

Judicial duties take precedence. A judge must act fairly and impartially, refrain from bias, prejudice and harassment and require the same of staff and courtroom lawyers (outside legitimate advocacy), resist outside influence, and perform competently and diligently. Every legally interested person has the right to be heard; a judge may encourage settlement without coercion and must decide assigned matters unless disqualified. A judge must not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict outside a court order or opinion, and must refrain from pledges and from public statements reasonably expected to affect pending or impending matters in any court, except official, procedural or personal-litigation speech. Judges must also supervise staff, appoint on merit without nepotism, address impairment, report serious misconduct and cooperate with discipline.

Ex parte communications and disqualification

A judge must not initiate, permit or consider ex parte communications about a pending or impending matter, except five narrow categories:

  • scheduling, administrative or emergency contacts not addressing substance, where no party gains an advantage and all parties promptly get notice and a chance to respond;
  • written advice from a disinterested legal expert, after advance notice of the person and subject and a chance to object and respond;
  • consultations with court staff or other judges, without receiving off-record facts or abdicating the decision;
  • settlement efforts with party consent;
  • contacts authorized by law.
  • Inadvertently received substantive contacts require prompt notice and a chance to respond, and independent investigation of facts is barred.
  • A judge must disqualify whenever impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Grounds include personal bias or prejudice, personal knowledge of disputed facts, prior involvement, public commitments, a relative within the third degree, a more-than-de-minimis economic interest of the judge, spouse, domestic partner, parent, child (wherever residing) or household family, and campaign support exceeding limits or creating an unconstitutional probability of bias (Caperton).
  • Remittal: any ground except bias or prejudice may be waived if the judge discloses the basis on the record and all parties and counsel agree on the record, outside the presence of the judge and court staff.
Trap
  • Bias or prejudice cannot be remitted.

Extrajudicial activities

Extrajudicial activities must not interfere with judicial duties, cause frequent disqualification, undermine independence or impartiality, or appear coercive. A judge may appear before a governmental body only on the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or personal interests; may not testify as a character witness unless duly summoned; and may not belong to an organization practicing invidious discrimination (isolated event attendance is allowed).

A judge may serve a nonprofit educational, religious, charitable or civic group that will not frequently be in adversary proceedings in the judge's court or any court under its appellate jurisdiction, and may help plan fundraising, but may not personally solicit funds (except from family or judges over whom the judge has no supervisory or appellate authority) or lend judicial prestige. Full-time judges, unlike partly exempt part-time judges, may serve as fiduciary only for family, may not act as private arbitrator or mediator unless law expressly authorizes it, may manage only a closely held family business, and may not practice law, except pro se or unpaid advice and drafting for family without appearing in any forum. Reasonable extrajudicial compensation, reimbursement and ordinary gifts are allowed, subject to public reporting.

Trap
  • Helping plan fundraising is allowed; personal solicitation is not, except from family or judges the judge does not supervise or review.

Judicial political activity and campaigns

A judge or judicial candidate (including a lawyer candidate, also bound by Model Rule 8.2(b)) generally may not lead or hold office in a political organization, make speeches for one, publicly endorse or oppose another candidate, attend or buy tickets to political dinners, or personally solicit or accept campaign contributions.

In a public judicial election, a candidate may within the campaign window attend political events, endorse or oppose candidates for the same judicial office, and, in partisan elections, identify with a party and seek party endorsements. A campaign committee may solicit and accept reasonable contributions and public support. Candidates for appointive office may communicate with appointing authorities and screening commissions and seek endorsements from anyone but a partisan political organization. A candidate may state views on disputed legal or political issues (White), while states may ban personal solicitation (Williams-Yulee) and pledges, promises or commitments inconsistent with impartiality. A judge must resign to run for nonjudicial elective office, not to seek nonjudicial appointive office.

Most-tested distinctions

Side-by-side contrasts, each drawn from the sections above.

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