Fact Pattern
Owner is on trial in federal district court for federal arson after a fire destroyed Owner's heavily insured warehouse in the town of Oakridge. No homicide charge was filed. Owner pleads not guilty and claims the fire was an electrical accident.
During its case-in-chief—before Owner puts on any evidence—the prosecution offers four items of proof, to all of which Owner timely objects:
(1) Testimony from Former Partner (a) that Owner has a reputation in Oakridge for dishonesty and financial greed, and (b), offered after the prosecution gave proper written pretrial notice, that three years earlier Owner intentionally burned down a failing retail kiosk to collect insurance money.
(2) Testimony from Spouse, whom Owner married six months before the warehouse fire and remains married to at trial. Spouse is willing to testify for the prosecution (a) that Spouse saw Owner load five red gasoline cans into Owner's van on the night of the fire, and (b) that two nights before the fire, Owner privately told Spouse at their kitchen table with nobody else home: "Don't worry about the mortgage—the warehouse won't be standing Friday." Owner invokes both spousal privileges.
(3) Testimony from Store Clerk to prove Owner bought five gasoline cans on the afternoon of the fire. On the witness stand, Clerk testifies, "I genuinely have no memory of selling anyone gas cans that day." The prosecutor shows Clerk a handwritten receipt Clerk made immediately after the sale; Clerk reads it silently and says, "I still do not remember the sale, though I know I wrote this receipt accurately right after ringing up the customer." The prosecutor asks to read the receipt aloud and admit the paper receipt as a prosecution exhibit. On cross-examination, defense counsel confronts Clerk with an unsworn signed statement Clerk gave a defense investigator saying Owner never entered the store that afternoon; Clerk denies making the statement, and defense counsel offers the signed statement both to impeach Clerk and to prove Owner was absent.
(4) Two out-of-court accusations: First, a recording of a 911 call placed while the warehouse was actively burning by Night Guard, who was trapped inside suffering severe smoke inhalation and gasped, "The building is on fire—Owner locked the side door and ran out with a torch!" Night Guard died at the hospital two days later. Second, testimony from Cellmate that Accomplice—who properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify—bragged to Cellmate in jail: "I disabled the warehouse sprinklers because Owner paid me five hundred dollars."
Call of the Question
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, how should the court rule on each of the four evidentiary disputes, and why?
Model Answer (IRAC)
1. Reputation Character Evidence and Prior Arson (MIMIC)
Issue: May the prosecution introduce Former Partner's testimony about Owner's reputation for dishonesty and greed and Owner's prior kiosk arson during its case-in-chief?
Rule: Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1), evidence of a person's character or trait is inadmissible to prove propensity—that the person acted in conformity on a particular occasion. In a criminal trial, the prosecution may not initiate character evidence against the accused; only after the defendant offers pertinent good-character evidence under Rule 404(a)(2)(A) may the prosecution rebut it. Under Rule 608(a), reputation or opinion evidence attacking character for truthfulness is admissible only to impeach a witness who has testified. Under Rule 404(b), evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is inadmissible to prove propensity, yet may be admitted for a non-propensity purpose such as motive, intent, plan, identity, or absence of mistake or accident (MIMIC), provided the prosecution gives reasonable written pretrial notice and the probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403.
Application: First, Owner has presented no defense evidence and has not placed Owner's character at issue; moreover, dishonesty and greed are not pertinent traits to arson propensity, and the prosecution cannot open character proof in its case-in-chief under Rule 404(a)(1). In addition, because Owner has not testified as a witness, Rule 608(a) bars attacking Owner's character for truthfulness. Thus, Former Partner's reputation testimony is barred by Rules 404(a) and 608(a). Second, Owner's prior arson of an insured failing kiosk is barred if offered to show Owner is an arsonist by disposition, yet it is strongly probative of intent, motive (insurance recovery), and absence of an electrical accident—directly rebutting Owner's accident defense. Because the prosecution gave proper written pretrial notice, the court should admit the prior arson under Rule 404(b) with a limiting instruction (Rule 105), unless Rule 403 unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.
Conclusion: The court should exclude the reputation testimony under Rules 404(a) and 608(a) and admit the prior kiosk arson under Rule 404(b) for intent, motive, and absence of accident, subject to Rule 403 balancing.
2. Spousal Testimonial Immunity and Confidential Marital Communications
Issue: Can Owner invoke either spousal privilege to bar Spouse from testifying to observing the gasoline cans or to Owner's kitchen-table statement?
Rule: Federal common law (Rule 501) recognizes two distinct spousal privileges. First, spousal testimonial immunity provides that a married person cannot be compelled to testify against a current spouse in a criminal case; under Trammel v. United States, the witness-spouse alone holds this privilege and may voluntarily choose to testify (though a minority of states allow the defendant-spouse to block it). Second, the confidential marital communications privilege applies in both civil and criminal cases and allows either spouse to bar disclosure of private communications made during a valid marriage, absent an exception such as joint participation in a crime.
Application: First, as to Spouse's observation of Owner loading five red gasoline cans into the van, loading cans is non-communicative conduct rather than a marital communication. Because Spouse is willing to testify, Owner cannot invoke federal spousal testimonial immunity to stop Spouse—only Spouse holds that privilege under Trammel. Second, as to Owner's kitchen-table statement ("the warehouse won't be standing Friday"), Owner and Spouse were validly married, spoke privately with nobody else present, and intended the remark to remain confidential. Because either spouse holds the confidential marital communications privilege, Owner may block Spouse from repeating that statement unless Spouse participated in the arson (no facts suggest joint participation).
Conclusion: Spouse may testify to observing the gasoline cans, but Owner may successfully bar Spouse from testifying to the confidential kitchen-table statement.
3. Past Recollection Recorded, Refreshing Memory, and Prior Inconsistent Statement
Issue: May the prosecutor read and admit Clerk's receipt, and may defense counsel offer Clerk's unsworn statement to the investigator both to impeach and substantively?
Rule: Under Rule 612, a writing may refresh a witness's present recollection, in which case the witness testifies from revived memory and the proponent may not introduce the writing. When memory still fails after reviewing a record, Rule 803(5) (recorded recollection) permits the record to be read into evidence if the witness once knew the matter, made or adopted the record while fresh, and attests to its accuracy—yet the proponent may not introduce the record as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. For prior inconsistent statements, Rule 613(b) (as amended Dec. 1, 2024) prohibits extrinsic proof for impeachment until after the witness has an opportunity to explain or deny and the opponent can examine the witness (unless the court orders otherwise). For substantive admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as amended effective December 1, 2026, when the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination, any prior statement inconsistent with the declarant's testimony is non-hearsay and substantively admissible whether or not given under oath or at a formal proceeding (whereas pre-December 2026 federal law required the statement to have been given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, other proceeding, or deposition, limiting unsworn statements to impeachment; a minority of states already admitted all prior inconsistent statements substantively).
Application: First, showing Clerk the receipt did not revive Clerk's memory, so Rule 612 refreshing recollection fails. However, Clerk once knew of the sale, personally wrote the receipt immediately afterward when fresh, and vouched for its accuracy while still unable to recall. Thus, Rule 803(5) allows the prosecutor to have Clerk read the receipt into evidence, while barring the prosecutor from introducing the paper receipt itself as an exhibit (only Owner could offer it as an exhibit). Second, defense counsel confronted Clerk with the investigator's signed statement on cross-examination, giving Clerk an opportunity to deny it and the prosecution an opportunity to examine Clerk under Rule 613(b), so defense counsel may introduce the signed statement extrinsically to impeach Clerk's credibility. As to substantive admissibility to prove Owner was absent, Clerk testified at trial and is subject to cross-examination about the inconsistent statement: under amended Rule 801(d)(1)(A) (effective December 1, 2026), the unsworn signed statement to the defense investigator is non-hearsay and admissible substantively as well as for impeachment (whereas under pre-December 2026 federal law, because it was unsworn and not given at a formal proceeding, it failed Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and entered solely to impeach).
Conclusion: The court should allow Clerk's receipt to be read aloud under Rule 803(5) without admitting it as a prosecution exhibit, and admit Clerk's statement to the investigator both to impeach under Rule 613(b) and substantively under amended Rule 801(d)(1)(A) effective December 1, 2026 (noting that under pre-December 2026 federal law, it entered solely to impeach).
4. Night Guard's 911 Call, Accomplice's Jailhouse Remark, and Confrontation Clause
Issue: Are Night Guard's 911 call and Accomplice's jailhouse statement to Cellmate admissible under hearsay exceptions and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause?
Rule: Under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause (Crawford v. Washington), the prosecution may not introduce testimonial hearsay against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Under Davis v. Washington and Michigan v. Bryant, statements to 911 or police whose objective primary purpose is to resolve an ongoing emergency are nontestimonial, and casual remarks to fellow inmates are likewise nontestimonial. As to hearsay, Rule 804(b)(2) admits dying declarations only in homicide prosecutions or civil cases, whereas Rule 803(2) admits excited utterances in any case regardless of availability. Under Rule 804(b)(3)(B), an unavailable declarant's statement exposing the declarant to criminal liability requires corroborating circumstances clearly indicating trustworthiness in a criminal case—whether offered to exculpate or inculpate the accused—considering supporting or contradicting independent evidence. Under Williamson v. United States, a court must parse a multi-part narrative into individual declarations: Rule 804(b)(3) admits only truly self-inculpatory declarations and excludes collateral non-self-inculpatory statements implicating a third party (though non-custodial remarks to a fellow inmate admitting participation in a crime-for-hire may qualify if genuinely disserving in context rather than made to curry favor with authorities).
Application: First, Night Guard's 911 call does not qualify as a dying declaration under Rule 804(b)(2) because this is an arson prosecution, not a homicide prosecution or civil suit. Nevertheless, it qualifies as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2) (and present sense impression under Rule 803(1)) because Night Guard spoke while trapped inside a burning building under acute startling stress. Under Crawford and Davis, calling 911 during an active fire to seek emergency rescue and warn of an armed arsonist fleeing is nontestimonial, so the Confrontation Clause does not bar it. Second, Accomplice is unavailable under Rule 804(a)(1) after properly invoking the Fifth Amendment, and casual bragging to Cellmate is nontestimonial under Crawford. Under Williamson, the court must sever Accomplice's two declarations rather than ruling on the sentence as a single unit. The first declaration—"I disabled the warehouse sprinklers"—is purely self-inculpatory, shifts no blame to anyone, and is independently relevant to disprove Owner's electrical-accident defense; it is admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) if supported by corroborating circumstances clearly indicating trustworthiness under Rule 804(b)(3)(B). As to the second declaration—"because Owner paid me five hundred dollars"—unlike a custodial confession to police seeking leniency, a non-custodial brag to a cellmate admitting arson-for-hire can be sufficiently against penal interest under Williamson if the context shows admitting a paid conspiracy was itself disserving rather than collateral blame-shifting, and if supported by corroborating circumstances; otherwise, the clause naming Owner must be redacted.
Conclusion: The court should admit Night Guard's 911 call under Rule 803(2) without violating the Confrontation Clause, admit Accomplice's self-inculpatory declaration ("I disabled the warehouse sprinklers") under Rule 804(b)(3) if corroborated under Rule 804(b)(3)(B), and redact the clause implicating Owner ("because Owner paid me five hundred dollars") unless shown to be independently self-inculpatory and corroborated.
Points-Based Grading Guide
Total Possible: 20 Points
Issue 1: Character Evidence & MIMIC (4 Points)
- 1 pt Explains Rule 404(a) bars the prosecution from initiating bad-character propensity evidence in its case-in-chief and Rule 608(a) bars attacking truthfulness before Owner testifies.
- 1 pt Identifies Rule 404(b) non-propensity MIMIC uses (intent, motive, absence of electrical accident) for the prior kiosk arson.
- 1 pt Notes the Rule 404(b) written pretrial notice requirement was met and applies Rule 403 balancing.
- 1 pt Concludes reputation testimony is excluded and prior arson is admitted with a limiting instruction.
Issue 2: Spousal Privileges (5 Points)
- 1 pt Distinguishes spousal testimonial immunity from confidential marital communications privilege.
- 1 pt Applies Trammel to hold that Spouse alone holds federal testimonial immunity and may choose to testify (noting minority rule).
- 1 pt Classifies loading gasoline cans as non-communicative conduct outside the marital communications privilege.
- 1 pt Holds Owner may block the private kitchen-table statement under marital communications privilege (held by both spouses, no joint-crime exception).
- 1 pt Reaches accurate separate rulings on the cans and the kitchen-table statement.
Issue 3: Recorded Recollection & Prior Statement (5 Points)
- 1 pt Explains Rule 612 refreshing recollection fails because Clerk's memory did not revive.
- 1 pt Applies Rule 803(5) recorded recollection (fresh, accurate, forgotten): receipt may be read aloud, NOT admitted as a prosecution exhibit.
- 1 pt Admits Clerk's unsworn statement to the investigator for impeachment under Rule 613(b) after opportunity to deny.
- 1 pt Analyzes substantive admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(A): admits the unsworn inconsistent statement substantively under amended Rule 801(d)(1)(A) effective December 1, 2026 (while noting the pre-December 2026 oath-at-a-proceeding bar and minority state split).
- 1 pt Reaches accurate admissibility and exhibit rulings on both documents.
Issue 4: 911 Call, Statement Against Interest & Crawford (6 Points)
- 1 pt Correctly rejects dying declaration (Rule 804(b)(2)) because Owner is on trial for arson, not homicide.
- 1 pt Admits Night Guard's 911 call as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2) (and/or 803(1)).
- 1 pt Analyzes Crawford/Davis to conclude the 911 call during an ongoing fire emergency is nontestimonial.
- 1 pt Finds Accomplice unavailable via Fifth Amendment (804(a)(1)) and casual jailhouse remark nontestimonial under Crawford.
- 1 pt Applies Rule 804(b)(3)(B) corroboration and Williamson's declaration-by-declaration severance rule (distinguishing custodial blame-shifting from non-custodial jailhouse brags).
- 1 pt Concludes 911 call is admitted, the self-inculpatory sprinkler clause is admissible if corroborated, and the clause naming Owner is redacted unless independently self-inculpatory and corroborated.