Fact Pattern
Earlier in the week, Oakridge police received an anonymous telephone tip claiming that Driver was selling stolen luxury watches around town, without any details explaining how the caller knew. On Thursday at 10:30 p.m., Officer saw Driver driving with a broken rear tail light, a civil traffic infraction under state law. Hoping to investigate the watch tip, Officer activated patrol lights and pulled Driver over.
Officer approached the car and ordered Driver to step out. Noticing a small bulge in Driver's jacket pocket, Officer patted down Driver's outer jacket. Feeling a small, hard plastic cylinder that Officer immediately knew was neither a gun nor a knife, Officer squeezed and rolled the cylinder between fingers through the jacket fabric, recognized it as a prescription pill bottle, reached inside the pocket, and pulled out a bottle bearing Neighbor's name containing controlled painkillers. Officer immediately arrested Driver for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, handcuffed Driver, and locked Driver inside the back seat of the patrol cruiser. Officer had no arrest warrant and no other probable cause before finding the bottle.
While Driver sat handcuffed inside the locked cruiser, Officer walked back to Driver's car, opened the unlocked glove compartment, and found a handwritten ledger listing stolen watches. Officer returned to the cruiser, opened the rear door without reading Miranda warnings, and asked, "Where are the rest of the watches?" Driver answered, "They're in my house safe, in the basement." Officer then read Driver full Miranda warnings. Driver stated, "I want a lawyer before I answer anything else." Officer stopped questioning and drove Driver to the Oakridge station for booking.
Two hours later, before any formal charges were filed, Detective—who did not know Driver had asked for a lawyer—entered the interview room, read Driver fresh Miranda warnings, and asked if Driver wanted to talk about the watches. Driver signed a written waiver and confessed to stealing Neighbor's watches. Meanwhile, relying solely on Driver's patrol-car statement ("They're in my house safe, in the basement"), police obtained a warrant to search Driver's house and seized the stolen watches from the basement safe.
Call of the Question
Under the United States Constitution, what motions to suppress should defense counsel file regarding (1) the pill bottle, (2) the glove-compartment ledger, (3) Driver's patrol-car statement and station-house confession, and (4) the watches seized from the basement safe, and how should the court rule?
Model Answer (IRAC)
1. Traffic Stop, Terry Frisk, and Plain-Feel Doctrine (The Pill Bottle)
Issue: Should the court suppress the pill bottle seized from Driver's jacket pocket under the Fourth Amendment?
Rule: Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer with probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation may stop a vehicle even if the officer's subjective motive is to investigate another crime (pretextual stop), and may order the driver out of the car. However, a Terry frisk of outer clothing is lawful only if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. Even during a valid frisk, the plain-feel doctrine permits seizing non-weapon contraband only when its incriminating character is immediately apparent by touch; squeezing, rolling, or manipulating an object after determining it is not a weapon exceeds the scope of a Terry frisk and violates the Fourth Amendment.
Application: The initial traffic stop for a broken tail light was valid regardless of Officer's subjective interest in the anonymous tip, and ordering Driver out of the car was permissible. However, a bare anonymous tip without predictive corroboration does not establish reasonable suspicion of weapons, and a small bulge alone in a jacket pocket provides weak justification for a weapons frisk. More decisively, even assuming the pat-down began lawfully, Officer immediately recognized that the small hard cylinder was not a gun or knife, yet squeezed and rolled it through the fabric to figure out what it was. Under Minnesota v. Dickerson, manipulating the object to identify it as a pill bottle violated the Fourth Amendment.
Conclusion: The pill bottle was seized through an unconstitutional search exceeding Terry and must be suppressed.
2. Glove-Compartment Search (The Ledger)
Issue: Should the court suppress the handwritten ledger found inside Driver's unlocked glove compartment?
Rule: Under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, evidence derived from an unconstitutional search or unlawful arrest is inadmissible unless an exception applies. Independently, under Arizona v. Gant, police may search a vehicle's passenger compartment incident to an occupant's lawful arrest only when (1) the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the cabin, or (2) it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Under the automobile exception, police may search a vehicle without a warrant only with probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence.
Application: First, Officer had no probable cause to arrest Driver before unlawfully seizing the pill bottle; because the arrest itself was the direct fruit of the unlawful Dickerson search, any search incident to that unlawful arrest is tainted and invalid. Second, even if the arrest were treated as valid, Driver was handcuffed inside a locked patrol cruiser—so the reaching-distance prong of Gant fails—though the prosecution could argue that a glove compartment might reasonably hold additional controlled pills related to the pill-possession arrest. Finally, the automobile exception fails as to stolen watches because an uncorroborated anonymous tip lacking any basis of knowledge falls far short of probable cause.
Conclusion: Because the arrest rested solely on the unlawfully seized pill bottle and no probable cause existed for the watches, the glove-compartment ledger must be suppressed as fruit of the unlawful search and arrest.
3. Fifth and Sixth Amendments: Patrol-Car Statement and Station-House Confession
Issue: Are Driver's unwarned patrol-car statement and subsequent station-house confession admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief?
Rule: Under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda, statements made during custodial interrogation—when a reasonable person would feel restrained to the degree of formal arrest and police engage in express questioning—are inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief absent prior warnings and a valid waiver (though voluntary unwarned statements may be used for impeachment). Once a suspect unambiguously invokes the Miranda right to counsel, Edwards v. Arizona bars police-initiated interrogation unless counsel is present or the suspect personally reinitiates communication; Arizona v. Roberson extends this bar to any offense and binds unaware officers, and Maryland v. Shatzer terminates the presumption only after a 14-day break in Miranda custody. Separately, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and attaches only upon formal adversarial judicial proceedings.
Application: First, Driver was handcuffed inside a locked patrol car (custody) when Officer asked directly, "Where are the rest of the watches?" (interrogation) without Miranda warnings. Thus, Driver's statement identifying the basement safe is inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief (though voluntary unwarned statements and Fourth Amendment fruits may impeach a testifying defendant's direct testimony—or, for Fourth Amendment evidence, answers to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by direct testimony—but never other defense witnesses). Second, after Officer read warnings, Driver unambiguously requested a lawyer ("I want a lawyer before I answer anything else"), triggering Edwards. When Detective reinitiated questioning two hours later without counsel present and without Driver initiating the conversation, Driver's signed waiver was invalid under Edwards and Roberson regardless of Detective's good-faith ignorance of Driver's request. Note that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached because Driver had not been formally charged or indicted.
Conclusion: Both the patrol-car statement and the station-house confession must be suppressed from the prosecution's case-in-chief under the Fifth Amendment (and as Fourth Amendment fruits of the unlawful arrest).
4. Physical Fruits and Warrant Search (The Basement Watches)
Issue: Must the watches seized from Driver's basement safe under a search warrant be suppressed?
Rule: Under United States v. Patane, failure to administer Miranda warnings alone does not require suppression of nontestimonial physical fruits obtained from a voluntary, unwarned statement. However, under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule (Wong Sun), physical evidence discovered through a warrant obtained by exploiting an unlawful Fourth Amendment search or arrest must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree unless saved by an independent source, inevitable discovery, attenuation, or an untainted good-faith warrant.
Application: If Driver's patrol-car statement were defective solely because Officer omitted Miranda warnings, Patane would allow admission of the physical watches found in the safe because physical watches are nontestimonial. Here, however, the patrol-car statement itself immediately followed an unlawful arrest predicated solely on the unconstitutional Dickerson search of Driver's pocket, with no intervening break, independent probable cause, or inevitable discovery. Because the police relied solely on that tainted statement to obtain the residential search warrant—and good-faith reliance under Leon does not cure a warrant grounded on an unconstitutional search by officers—the watches remain tainted under the Fourth Amendment.
Conclusion: Although Patane prevents suppression on Miranda grounds alone, the watches from the basement safe should be suppressed as fruit of the underlying Fourth Amendment violation.
Points-Based Grading Guide
Total Possible: 20 Points
Issue 1: Traffic Stop & Plain-Feel Frisk (5 Points)
- 1 pt Explains that the broken tail light justified a valid traffic stop regardless of Officer's pretextual watch motive, and ordering Driver out was lawful.
- 1 pt States the Terry frisk requirement (reasonable suspicion the suspect is armed and dangerous) and notes the anonymous tip lacked corroboration.
- 1 pt States the plain-feel rule: non-weapon contraband may be seized only if immediately apparent without squeezing or manipulation.
- 1 pt Applies facts: Officer knew the cylinder was not a weapon yet squeezed and rolled it to identify the pill bottle.
- 1 pt Concludes the pill bottle must be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.
Issue 2: Glove-Compartment Ledger (4 Points)
- 1 pt Identifies that the arrest was unlawful because it rested solely on the unlawfully seized pill bottle, tainting any search incident to arrest.
- 1 pt States both prongs of Arizona v. Gant (unsecured within reach OR reasonable to believe evidence of the arrest offense is inside).
- 1 pt Applies facts: Driver was handcuffed in the locked cruiser, and the uncorroborated anonymous tip provided no probable cause for the automobile exception.
- 1 pt Concludes the ledger must be suppressed.
Issue 3: Patrol-Car Statement & Station Confession (6 Points)
- 1 pt Identifies custodial interrogation in the locked patrol cruiser and suppresses the unwarned statement from the case-in-chief under Miranda.
- 1 pt Recognizes Driver's unambiguous request for counsel ("I want a lawyer") triggered Edwards v. Arizona.
- 1 pt Explains that under Edwards, Roberson, and Shatzer, police may not reinitiate questioning on any offense unless counsel is present, Driver reinitiates, or a 14-day custody break occurs.
- 1 pt Notes Detective's lack of knowledge of the counsel request does not excuse the Edwards violation or validate the written waiver.
- 1 pt Notes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached yet because no formal charges were filed.
- 1 pt Concludes both the patrol-car statement and station-house confession are suppressed from the case-in-chief.
Issue 4: Basement Watches & Physical Fruits (5 Points)
- 1 pt States the Patane rule: a mere Miranda violation does not require suppressing nontestimonial physical fruits of a voluntary unwarned statement.
- 1 pt Distinguishes Fourth Amendment fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine (Wong Sun) from Miranda's physical-fruits rule.
- 1 pt Traces the taint from the unlawful Dickerson search and arrest directly to the patrol-car statement used solely to get the warrant.
- 1 pt Checks and rules out exceptions (no independent source, inevitable discovery, attenuation, or untainted good-faith warrant).
- 1 pt Concludes the watches from the basement safe must be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment.