Fact Pattern
Owner, a citizen of State A, hired Contractor, a citizen of State B, to construct a warehouse in the city of Oakridge, State B. Owner paid Contractor a $120,000 progress deposit. After the roof trusses failed a municipal inspection, Owner filed a diversity action against Contractor in federal district court in State A seeking $120,000 for breach of the warehouse contract. Proper diversity jurisdiction existed.
Contractor timely responded by filing a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, arguing that Owner's complaint did not adequately allege satisfaction of a contractual inspection clause. Contractor did not raise lack of personal jurisdiction or insufficient service of process in that motion. After the court denied the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Contractor timely filed an answer that (1) asserted affirmative defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) and insufficient service of process under Rule 12(b)(5), and (2) asserted a counterclaim against Owner for $60,000 in unpaid framing work performed under the same Oakridge warehouse contract.
Ten days after serving its answer, Contractor also filed a third-party complaint under Rule 14(a) against Truss Co. (incorporated and headquartered in State B), alleging that Truss Co. manufactured the defective trusses and is contractually obligated to indemnify Contractor for any liability to Owner. Meanwhile, after the applicable statute of limitations expired, Owner moved for leave to amend its complaint under Rule 15 to add a new claim against Contractor for $30,000 in temporary storage expenses caused by the same Oakridge truss failure.
Finally, Contractor moved to dismiss Owner's warehouse suit as barred by claim preclusion based on an earlier final summary judgment Contractor won against Owner in State B court on an unrelated paving contract at a different site. In the alternative, Contractor moved for summary judgment on the warehouse claim, submitting sworn engineer affidavits and certified inspection logs showing the trusses met all contractual specifications. Owner opposed summary judgment solely by pointing to the unverified allegations in Owner's complaint.
Call of the Question
How should the federal district court rule on (1) Contractor's Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5) defenses, (2) subject-matter jurisdiction and propriety of Contractor's counterclaim and Rule 14(a) third-party complaint, (3) Owner's motion to amend under Rule 15, and (4) Contractor's claim-preclusion defense and summary judgment motion?
Model Answer (IRAC)
1. Waiver of Rule 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(5) Defenses
Issue: Did Contractor waive its objections to personal jurisdiction and service of process by omitting them from its earlier Rule 12(b)(6) motion?
Rule: Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) and 12(h)(1), a party that makes a pre-answer Rule 12 motion must consolidate all available threshold defenses—including lack of personal jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(2)), improper venue (Rule 12(b)(3)), insufficient process (Rule 12(b)(4)), and insufficient service of process (Rule 12(b)(5)). Omitting any of those four waivable defenses from the first Rule 12 motion permanently waives them, and raising them in a subsequent answer does not cure the waiver (unless added via an amendment to the answer as a matter of course when no prior Rule 12 motion was filed).
Application: Contractor chose to file a pre-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion before answering. Both personal jurisdiction and service defects were available when Contractor filed that motion, yet Contractor omitted them. Under Rules 12(g)(2) and 12(h)(1), Contractor permanently forfeited both defenses, so asserting them later in its answer is ineffective.
Conclusion: The court should strike or reject Contractor's Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(5) defenses as waived.
2. Counterclaim and Rule 14(a) Impleader (Joinder & Supplemental Jurisdiction)
Issue: Are Contractor's $60,000 counterclaim against Owner and Rule 14(a) third-party complaint against nondiverse Truss Co. procedurally proper and supported by subject-matter jurisdiction?
Rule: Under Rule 13(a), a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim is compulsory and automatically falls within supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) without needing an independent $75,000 amount. Under Rule 14(a)(1), a defending party may—within 14 days after serving its original answer, without leave—implead a nonparty who is or may be liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against it (derivative liability such as indemnity or contribution). Even in a diversity suit, § 1367(b) bars supplemental jurisdiction only over claims by plaintiffs against Rule 14 parties; it does not bar claims by a defendant/third-party plaintiff against a nondiverse third-party defendant sharing a common nucleus of operative fact.
Application: Contractor's $60,000 counterclaim for unpaid framing work arises out of the exact same Oakridge warehouse contract as Owner's deposit claim, making it a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a). Although $60,000 alone falls short of § 1332's over-$75,000 requirement, § 1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction attaches because it shares a common nucleus of operative fact (and § 1367(b) restricts only plaintiffs). Likewise, Contractor's third-party complaint against Truss Co. was timely filed within 14 days of Contractor's answer without needing leave, and properly seeks derivative indemnity for Owner's defective-truss claim. Even though Contractor and Truss Co. are both citizens of State B, § 1367(b) does not apply to a defendant's Rule 14(a) claim, so supplemental jurisdiction covers it under § 1367(a). (Note that while § 1367(b) bars a plaintiff from asserting a direct claim against a nondiverse Rule 14 third-party defendant, here Owner is a citizen of State A and Truss Co. is a citizen of State B, so complete diversity would still exist if Owner asserted a direct claim exceeding $75,000.)
Conclusion: Both Contractor's $60,000 compulsory counterclaim and its Rule 14(a) third-party indemnity complaint against Truss Co. are procedurally proper and supported by supplemental subject-matter jurisdiction.
3. Owner's Rule 15 Motion to Amend and Relation Back
Issue: Should the court grant Owner leave to amend to add the $30,000 storage-expense claim, and does the claim relate back past the expired statute of limitations?
Rule: Under Rule 15(a)(1), a party may amend once as of right within 21 days of serving its pleading or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion, whichever is earlier. Thereafter, under Rule 15(a)(2), the party needs opposing consent or leave of court, which the court should freely give when justice so requires absent undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, or futility. Under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), an amendment asserting a new claim against an existing party relates back to the original filing date if the claim arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out (or attempted to be set out) in the original pleading.
Application: Because Contractor already served a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and answer, Owner's 21-day window to amend as of right has likely closed, requiring leave under Rule 15(a)(2). Leave should be freely granted because adding $30,000 in consequential storage expenses stems from the very same truss failure and involves no apparent bad faith or surprise. Crucially, the amendment is not futile despite the expired statute of limitations: under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), the temporary storage costs arose directly from the same Oakridge warehouse truss failure set out in Owner's original complaint, so the claim relates back to the timely original filing date.
Conclusion: The court should grant leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), and the $30,000 storage claim relates back under Rule 15(c)(1)(B).
4. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata) and Summary Judgment
Issue: Is Owner's warehouse suit barred by claim preclusion from the earlier State B paving judgment, and how should the court rule on Contractor's summary judgment motion?
Rule: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a federal court gives a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect it would receive in that state's courts. Generally, claim preclusion (res judicata) bars a later suit when (1) the parties (or privies) are identical, (2) the prior action ended in a valid final judgment on the merits (which includes summary judgment), and (3) both suits involve the same claim or cause of action—defined by the majority transactional test as all rights arising from the same transaction or series of connected transactions (and by the minority primary-rights test by the distinct primary right invaded). Separately, under Rule 56, summary judgment must be granted when the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once a movant supports its motion with affidavits or record materials negating breach, the nonmovant cannot rest on bare, unverified pleading allegations, but must cite specific admissible record materials showing a genuine factual dispute.
Application: Although the earlier State B paving action involved the same parties and ended in a final summary judgment on the merits, it concerned an unrelated paving contract at a different site. Under either the transactional test or the primary-rights test, an unrelated contract at a separate site is a distinct claim, so claim preclusion does not bar the Oakridge warehouse suit (nor does issue preclusion apply, because truss compliance was never litigated in the paving suit). On summary judgment, however, Contractor carried its initial Rule 56 burden by submitting sworn engineer affidavits and certified inspection logs demonstrating the trusses met contractual specifications. Owner responded only by pointing to unverified allegations in the complaint rather than producing affidavits, depositions, or inspection records to create a genuine factual dispute.
Conclusion: The court must deny Contractor's claim-preclusion defense, but grant Contractor's Rule 56 motion for summary judgment unless Owner is given and uses an opportunity to submit record evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact.
Points-Based Grading Guide
Total Possible: 20 Points
Issue 1: Rule 12 Waiver (4 Points)
- 1 pt Identifies Rules 12(g)(2) and 12(h)(1) consolidation and waiver requirements.
- 1 pt Classifies Rule 12(b)(2) (personal jurisdiction) and Rule 12(b)(5) (insufficient service) as waivable threshold defenses.
- 1 pt Explains that omitting them from the earlier Rule 12(b)(6) motion permanently waived them despite inclusion in the answer.
- 1 pt Concludes both defenses fail as waived.
Issue 2: Counterclaim & Rule 14 Impleader (6 Points)
- 1 pt Classifies Contractor's $60,000 framing counterclaim as compulsory under Rule 13(a) (same warehouse contract).
- 1 pt Explains that supplemental jurisdiction (§ 1367(a)) covers the $60,000 compulsory counterclaim despite being under $75,000.
- 1 pt Notes Rule 14(a) allows impleading a third party for derivative indemnity liability without leave within 14 days of serving the answer.
- 1 pt Identifies common nucleus of operative fact under § 1367(a) for the indemnity claim.
- 1 pt Explains § 1367(b) restricts only claims by plaintiffs, not a defendant's Rule 14(a) third-party claim against a same-state third-party defendant.
- 1 pt Concludes both the counterclaim and third-party complaint are proper.
Issue 3: Rule 15 Amendment & Relation Back (4 Points)
- 1 pt Notes Owner needs leave under Rule 15(a)(2), which is freely given when justice so requires.
- 1 pt States the Rule 15(c)(1)(B) relation-back standard for new claims (same conduct, transaction, or occurrence).
- 1 pt Applies the standard to the $30,000 temporary storage costs arising from the same Oakridge truss failure.
- 1 pt Concludes the amendment is timely via relation back and should be allowed.
Issue 4: Claim Preclusion & Summary Judgment (6 Points)
- 1 pt States the three elements of claim preclusion (same parties, valid final judgment on the merits, same claim) and cites § 1738.
- 1 pt Notes summary judgment is on the merits, but rejects claim preclusion because the unrelated paving contract is a separate transaction/claim.
- 1 pt States the Rule 56 summary judgment standard (no genuine dispute of material fact; judgment as a matter of law).
- 1 pt Explains Contractor met its initial burden with sworn affidavits and certified inspection logs.
- 1 pt Explains Owner cannot defeat summary judgment by relying solely on unverified complaint allegations.
- 1 pt Concludes claim preclusion fails, while summary judgment should be granted for Contractor.