Fact Pattern
Builder, a citizen of State A, operates a small construction business in the city of Linden, State A. Maker Co., a corporation incorporated in State B with its headquarters, executive offices, and sole manufacturing plant in State B, builds commercial hydraulic lifts. Maker Co. has no offices, warehouses, employees, or registered agents in State A, does not advertise in State A, and sells its lifts solely through independent regional distributors.
At a regional equipment trade show in State B, Builder bought a new Maker Co. hydraulic lift from Midwest Supply LLC, an independent distributor. Builder told Midwest Supply LLC that the lift would be shipped to and used at a construction project in Linden, State A. Maker Co. had no involvement in that trade-show sale. However, Maker Co. operates an online parts portal through which it occasionally ships replacement components directly to buyers in State A; after the sale, Builder ordered three replacement hydraulic seals through the portal, and Maker Co. shipped them directly to Builder in Linden.
Two months later, while Builder and Builder's employee, Worker (also a citizen of State A), were using the lift in Linden, a factory-installed main hydraulic hose ruptured, dropping the platform. The collapse caused $60,000 in damage to Builder's equipment and $45,000 in medical expenses and lost wages to Worker.
Builder and Worker joined as co-plaintiffs in a single complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of State A against Maker Co., asserting state-law negligence and strict products-liability claims. Builder demanded $60,000, and Worker demanded $45,000. State A's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed by the United States Constitution. In addition, a State A statute requires every plaintiff filing a products-liability complaint to attach a sworn pre-suit engineer's affidavit or face automatic dismissal. Builder and Worker did not attach an engineer's affidavit.
Maker Co. timely moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), and improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3)—or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the District of State B—and also moved to dismiss for failure to attach the State A pre-suit engineer's affidavit.
Call of the Question
How should the federal district court rule on Maker Co.'s motions regarding (1) subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) personal jurisdiction, (3) venue and transfer (assuming subject-matter jurisdiction existed), and (4) the State A pre-suit engineer's affidavit requirement under the Erie doctrine?
Model Answer (IRAC)
1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (Diversity, Aggregation, and Supplemental Jurisdiction)
Issue: Does the federal district court have subject-matter jurisdiction over Builder's $60,000 claim and Worker's $45,000 claim against Maker Co.?
Rule: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal-question jurisdiction requires a federal claim or embedded federal issue on the face of the well-pleaded complaint. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. A corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and its nerve-center principal place of business. Multiple plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims—such as property damage to one and personal injury to another—may not aggregate their claims to meet the $75,000 threshold (aggregation is allowed only for a single plaintiff's claims against a single defendant, or multiple plaintiffs enforcing a single undivided right). Furthermore, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., supplemental jurisdiction covers a joined Rule 20 plaintiff's under-$75,000 claim only when diversity is complete and at least one plaintiff independently satisfies the over-$75,000 requirement.
Application: Builder and Worker assert only state-law tort claims, so § 1331 federal-question jurisdiction is absent. Complete diversity exists because both Builder and Worker are citizens of State A, while Maker Co. is incorporated and headquartered in State B, making it solely a citizen of State B. However, Builder's $60,000 equipment-damage claim and Worker's $45,000 personal-injury claim are separate and distinct rights; they cannot be aggregated to reach $105,000. Because neither Builder nor Worker asserts a claim exceeding $75,000, there is no qualifying anchor claim to support supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367.
Conclusion: The court must grant Maker Co.'s Rule 12(b)(1) motion and dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
2. Personal Jurisdiction Over Maker Co. in State A
Issue: Assuming subject-matter jurisdiction existed, does State A have general or specific personal jurisdiction over Maker Co.?
Rule: Under Rule 4(k)(1)(A), a federal court generally has personal jurisdiction to the same extent as a state court in the forum state. Because State A's long-arm statute reaches the constitutional limit, the inquiry turns on Fourteenth Amendment due process. General ("all-purpose") jurisdiction exists over a corporation only where its affiliations are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially "at home"—paradigmatically its state of incorporation and principal place of business. Specific ("case-linked") jurisdiction requires that (1) the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state (not merely via a third party's or buyer's unilateral movement of a product), (2) the plaintiff's claim arises out of or relates to those forum contacts, and (3) jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. In stream-of-commerce cases, Supreme Court pluralities divide between requiring purposeful targeting of the forum ("something more" than placing goods in commerce, O'Connor/Kennedy) and allowing jurisdiction based on regular distribution with awareness the product will reach the forum (Brennan). Under Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, systematic forum marketing and servicing of the product model can satisfy relatedness without strict but-for causation.
Application: General jurisdiction clearly fails: Maker Co. is incorporated and headquartered in State B and has no offices or employees in State A. On specific jurisdiction, Maker Co. will argue that Midwest Supply LLC's unilateral trade-show sale in State B—even with knowledge Builder would take the lift to State A—cannot be attributed to Maker Co. under World-Wide Volkswagen, and that Maker Co. did not advertise in State A or direct the lift there under the stricter Asahi/McIntyre stream-of-commerce test. Conversely, Builder and Worker will point to Maker Co.'s direct online portal sales and shipment of replacement hydraulic seals into Linden, State A, arguing Maker Co. purposefully served the State A market for its lifts and that the hydraulic-hose failure relates to those contacts under Ford Motor. However, unlike Ford Motor—where the automaker extensively advertised, sold, and serviced vehicles in the forum—Maker Co. made only occasional online parts shipments and had no State A dealers or advertising, and the ruptured main hose was factory-installed rather than a replacement seal. Under the prevailing purposeful-targeting standard, occasional unrelated parts shipments are likely too attenuated to establish specific jurisdiction for a lift sold by an independent distributor in State B, though a court applying a broader relatedness view could treat the parts portal as borderline forum-market service.
Conclusion: State A lacks general jurisdiction, and specific jurisdiction is likely lacking (though close because of the direct replacement-seal shipments to Linden), meaning the Rule 12(b)(2) motion would likely be granted.
3. Venue and Transfer (§ 1391, § 1404(a), and § 1406(a))
Issue: Is venue proper in the District of State A, and how should the court handle Maker Co.'s alternative motion to transfer to the District of State B?
Rule: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in (1) a district where any defendant resides if all defendants reside in the same state, (2) a district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or (3) a fallback district where any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if neither (1) nor (2) applies. A corporate defendant resides in any district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction for the action (§ 1391(c)(2)). When venue is proper, § 1404(a) permits transfer for convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice to a district where the suit might have been brought, and the transferee court generally applies the transferor state's choice-of-law rules (Van Dusen). When venue is improper (or personal jurisdiction is lacking), § 1406(a) permits dismissal or transfer in the interest of justice to a proper district, where the transferee state's choice-of-law rules apply.
Application: Statutory venue is proper in the District of State A under § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim—the lift collapse and all resulting equipment damage and physical injuries—occurred in Linden, State A. (If personal jurisdiction existed in State A, Maker Co. would also reside there under § 1391(b)(1) and (c)(2).) Accordingly, the court should deny the Rule 12(b)(3) improper-venue dismissal. If the court found personal jurisdiction proper in State A, it could still consider a § 1404(a) convenience transfer to State B (where Maker Co. is at home and design/manufacturing evidence sits), weighing witnesses and hospital records in State A against manufacturing records in State B; if transferred under § 1404(a), State A's choice-of-law rules would travel with the case. If instead the court found personal jurisdiction lacking in State A, it could transfer to State B under § 1406(a) (or § 1631) rather than dismissing, in which case State B's choice-of-law rules would govern.
Conclusion: Venue in State A is statutorily proper under § 1391(b)(2), so Rule 12(b)(3) fails; any transfer to State B would proceed under § 1404(a) (if PJ exists, keeping State A choice of law) or § 1406(a) (if PJ is absent, applying State B choice of law).
4. Erie Doctrine: State Pre-Suit Engineer's Affidavit Requirement
Issue: Must a federal court sitting in diversity enforce State A's statute requiring a pre-suit engineer's affidavit to be attached to a products-liability complaint?
Rule: Under the Erie doctrine and Hanna v. Plumer, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. First, if a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directly collides with the state rule, the Federal Rule governs under the Supremacy Clause so long as it is arguably procedural and does not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (note the Shady Grove split between evaluating the Federal Rule's general procedural character alone versus whether the state rule is bound up with substantive rights). Second, if no Federal Rule directly governs ("unguided Erie"), the court applies state law if disregarding it would be outcome-determinative in light of Erie's twin aims—discouraging forum shopping and avoiding inequitable administration of the laws—unless outweighed by strong countervailing federal interests (Byrd).
Application: Maker Co. will argue that no Federal Rule expressly bars state pre-suit screening conditions and that ignoring the affidavit statute would trigger blatant forum shopping and inequitable outcomes: plaintiffs lacking an engineer's support could survive in federal court while facing immediate dismissal in state court down the street. Builder and Worker will counter under Hanna, Shady Grove, and Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. 187 (2026), that Federal Rule 8(a) sets a pleading ceiling requiring only a short and plain statement of the claim without front-end evidentiary proof, creating a direct collision in which Rule 8 displaces State A's attachment requirement. Resolving a prior federal appellate split over state pre-suit certificate-of-merit/affidavit statutes, the Supreme Court in Berk v. Choy held that such complaint-attachment statutes conflict with Rule 8 and—because Rule 8 validly regulates procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 2072—are unenforceable in federal diversity suits, foreclosing Maker Co.'s unguided Erie argument.
Conclusion: Under Hanna and Berk v. Choy, Rule 8(a) directly governs pleading sufficiency, is valid under the Rules Enabling Act (§ 2072), and displaces State A's affidavit-attachment requirement in federal diversity court.
Points-Based Grading Guide
Total Possible: 20 Points
Issue 1: Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (5 Points)
- 1 pt Rules out § 1331 federal-question jurisdiction because only state-law tort claims are pleaded.
- 1 pt Determines corporate citizenship of Maker Co. (State B incorporation and nerve center) and finds complete diversity against State A plaintiffs.
- 1 pt States the rule barring aggregation of separate and distinct claims by multiple plaintiffs ($60,000 + $45,000).
- 1 pt Explains that § 1367 / Exxon Mobil supplemental jurisdiction cannot attach because neither plaintiff independently exceeds $75,000.
- 1 pt Concludes Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal must be granted.
Issue 2: Personal Jurisdiction (6 Points)
- 1 pt Notes Rule 4(k)(1)(A) borrows State A's coextensive long-arm statute, collapsing the test into Fourteenth Amendment due process.
- 1 pt Rejects general jurisdiction because Maker Co. is neither incorporated nor headquartered ("at home") in State A.
- 1 pt States the specific-jurisdiction elements: purposeful availment, relatedness, and fair play/reasonableness.
- 1 pt Applies stream-of-commerce doctrine (distributor's unilateral trade-show sale and awareness vs. purposeful forum targeting under Asahi/McIntyre).
- 1 pt Weighs Maker Co.'s direct online portal shipments of replacement seals to Linden under Ford Motor relatedness.
- 1 pt Reaches a reasoned conclusion (likely no specific PJ given minimal unrelated parts shipments and no State A marketing).
Issue 3: Venue and Transfer (4 Points)
- 1 pt Identifies § 1391(b)(2) transactional venue in State A based on the lift collapse and injuries in Linden.
- 1 pt Notes corporate residency under § 1391(c)(2) depends on personal jurisdiction in the district.
- 1 pt Distinguishes § 1404(a) convenience transfer (proper → proper; transferor choice of law under Van Dusen) from § 1406(a) transfer (improper venue/absent PJ; transferee choice of law).
- 1 pt Applies convenience factors (Linden accident/medical witnesses vs. State B manufacturing witnesses).
Issue 4: Erie Doctrine & Affidavit Statute (5 Points)
- 1 pt Frames the two-track Hanna framework (Federal Rule collision vs. unguided Erie).
- 1 pt Evaluates whether Federal Rules 8(a) and 11 directly collide with State A's pre-suit expert-affidavit statute.
- 1 pt Applies the Rules Enabling Act (§ 2072) validity test and notes the Shady Grove split.
- 1 pt Applies unguided Erie outcome-determination and twin-aims analysis (forum shopping and inequitable administration).
- 1 pt Concludes that Rule 8(a) displaces State A's complaint-attachment affidavit under Hanna and Berk v. Choy (while addressing the unguided Erie counterargument).