Torts Study Guide
Black-letter rules, elements, invented examples, and exam traps aligned to NextGen headings, with legacy MBE topics labeled.
Written for study. Not legal advice. Exam Labels: NextGen = NextGen headings; Legacy exam only (through February 2028) = MBE-only topics.
1. Intentional Torts and Defenses
Intent and Transferred Intent
Rule: Intent means purpose or substantial certainty of consequences. Intent to commit battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, or trespass to chattels transfers across those five torts and to different victims.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 8A, 16(2), 20(2), 32(2), 43; Garratt; Prosser & Keeton § 8.- Volitional act plus purpose or substantial certainty.
- Transferred intent covers only the five trespassory torts.
Actor throws a stone at Neighbor's Linden window, misses, and hits Walker. Intent transfers to battery against Walker.
- Children and mentally impaired actors form intent; transferred intent never applies to IIED or conversion.
Battery and Assault
Rule: Battery is intentional harmful or offensive contact with plaintiff's body or closely connected object. Assault is an intentional overt act putting plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 13, 18, 19, 21, 24, 31, 33.- Battery: intent; harmful or offensive contact (reasonable-person standard); causation.
- Assault: intent; overt act creating reasonable apprehension (awareness plus apparent present ability) of imminent contact; causation.
Actor yanks Rider's briefcase at a Linden stop without touching skin. Contacting a held object is battery.
- Battery needs no awareness or physical injury; words alone or future threats fail assault.
False Imprisonment and Shopkeeper's Privilege
Rule: False imprisonment is intentional confinement within fixed boundaries without a known reasonable exit, causing awareness or actual harm. A merchant reasonably suspecting shoplifting may detain reasonably for a brief investigation.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 35, 36, 42, 120A.- Intentional barrier, force, threat of force, or invalid authority; bounded space with no safe, known exit; awareness or harm.
A Linden clerk reasonably suspects Shopper pocketed goods and detains Shopper five minutes to check a receipt. Shopkeeper's privilege applies.
- Economic threats (e.g., firing) are not confinement; a known unlocked ground-floor exit defeats confinement.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Rule: Extreme, outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causing severe emotional distress creates liability for distress and resulting bodily harm. Bystander IIED covers a present immediate relative without bodily harm, or any present person with bodily harm, if the actor knows (or recklessly disregards) the bystander's presence.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 46(1)–(2) & cmt. l, 48.- Extreme, outrageous conduct exceeding decency; intent or recklessness; causation and severe distress.
Knowing Patron is fragile, Actor falsely reports Patron's sibling died in a Linden crash, causing severe anguish. Actor commits IIED.
- Mere insults fail unless exploiting known fragility or by a common-carrier/innkeeper employee; direct IIED needs no physical symptoms.
Trespass to Land, Trespass to Chattels, and Conversion
Rule: Trespass to land is intentional tangible invasion of real property without needing damage. Trespass to chattels requires intentional intermeddling causing actual impairment or dispossession; conversion is dominion so serious the actor owes full market value.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 158, 163–164, 217–218, 222A, 229.- Land / Chattels: intentional tangible entry onto possessed land; intermeddling plus actual harm or substantial loss of use.
- Conversion: serious dominion weighed by extent, duration, good/bad faith (bad faith not required), and harm.
Borrower borrows Neighbor's Linden bicycle, repaints it, and sells it. Borrower owes full value for conversion.
- Good-faith ownership mistake is no defense; intangible noise or odors are nuisance, not trespass to land.
Defenses to Intentional Torts
Rule: Valid consent bars liability unless exceeded or induced by essential fraud or duress. Reasonable non-deadly force is privileged in self-defense, defense of others/property, and fresh recapture after demand; public necessity is absolute, while private necessity (and act-of-God recapture entry) requires paying actual property damage.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 63, 65, 76–77, 85, 100–106, 196–198, 892; Katko; Vincent.- Consent & Defense: sports consent excludes flagrant fouls; deadly force allowed only for imminent death/serious injury, never for property or spring guns.
- Private Necessity: entry privileged to save life or higher-value property of actor or third person; owner cannot expel, but actor pays actual damage.
In a Linden storm, Boatman ties a skiff to Owner's dock, splintering planks. Private necessity bars trespass, but Boatman pays repairs.
- Reasonable mistake preserves self-defense, not property recapture unless plaintiff caused it; collateral fraud does not void consent.
2. Negligence: Duty, Breach, Causation, Damages, and Defenses
General Duty and Foreseeable Plaintiffs
Rule: Actors owe objective reasonable care accounting for physical disabilities and superior knowledge; children owe peer care of like age, intelligence, and experience unless doing an adult activity (under age 5—or 7 at common law—incapable). Duty runs to foreseeable zone-of-danger plaintiffs (Cardozo) or anyone harmed (Andrews).
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 283–283C, 289(b); Third §§ 3, 7, 10–12; Palsgraf.- Objective adult standard (no discount for poor judgment or mental illness); minors driving vehicles face adult care.
Driver hits a Linden pole; a surge three blocks away breaks Shopkeeper's lamp. Under Cardozo, Shopkeeper is outside the zone of danger.
- Rescuers are foreseeable plaintiffs ("danger invites rescue"); beginners face the objective adult standard.
Affirmative Duties, Premises, Professionals, Negligence Per Se, and NIED
Rule: No rescue duty absent a special relationship, prior conduct creating peril (even innocently), or negligent undertaking. Premises duty turns on entrant status (or unitary care; contractors share possessor rules, § 383); professionals owe the skill and knowledge of a member in good standing (national for specialists; custom sets the standard) and material-risk informed consent; unexcused safety-statute or ordinance violations establish negligence per se (minority: evidence); NIED covers zone-of-danger, bystander distress, or corpse/death-notice errors.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 286, 288A–C, 299A, 313–314A, 321–324, 329–343B, 368, 383, 436A; Third §§ 14, 37, 39–40, 47–48, 51; Rowland; Canterbury; Dillon; Thing.- Premises: undiscovered trespasser (no condition duty, except traveler deviation beside public ways, § 368); discovered trespasser (active care; warn/fix known artificial deadly traps); licensee (active care; warn/fix known hidden natural/artificial dangers); invitee (active care; inspect and fix/warn); attractive nuisance for child trespassers.
- Per Se & NIED: protected class + targeted harm without excuse; zone of danger or present relative contemporaneously witnessing death/serious injury (plus physical symptoms, majority, or severe distress, modern), or corpse/death-notice errors.
A Linden store ignores an aisle puddle and Customer slips. As an invitee, Customer was owed inspection and cleanup.
- Statutory compliance is non-conclusive evidence (§ 288C); the firefighter's rule bars ordinary-negligence responder suits.
Acts of Others: Parents, Bailors, Entrustment, and Controlling Third Parties
Rule: No duty to control third persons absent a special relationship with the third person (custodian, on-premises employee, or therapist whose patient threatens an identifiable victim, Tarasoff) or victim (carrier, innkeeper, invitor, landlord). Parents and car owners/bailors are not vicariously liable at common law, but face direct liability for negligent supervision or negligent entrustment.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 315–319, 390; Third § 41; Tarasoff.- Parents: no common-law vicarious liability; directly liable when knowing of necessity and opportunity to control a child's dangerous propensity (§ 316).
- Owners / Entrustment: no common-law vicarious liability for permissive drivers (absent agency, family-purpose, or owner-consent statute); directly liable for entrusting to one likely to misuse due to youth, incompetence, or intoxication (§ 390).
Owner lends a car in Linden knowing Friend is drunk, and Friend hits Cyclist. Owner owes direct negligent entrustment.
- Parent-child or owner-driver status never creates common-law vicarious liability without agency or statute.
Breach of Duty
Rule: Conduct breaches care when precaution burden is less than probability times gravity of harm. Industry custom is non-conclusive evidence; res ipsa loquitur permits inferring negligence when an accident ordinarily implies negligence and alternative causes are eliminated.
Source (unverified): Carroll Towing; T.J. Hooper; Byrne; Restatement (Second) §§ 291–293, 328D; Third §§ 3, 13, 17.- Accident ordinarily implies negligence; other causes eliminated (often exclusive control); negligence within defendant's duty.
A shutter falls from a calm Linden facade while only Contractor works there. Res ipsa lets Pedestrian reach the jury.
- Res ipsa creates a permissible inference, not a directed verdict; custom never shields lagging industries.
Actual and Proximate Causation
Rule: Actual cause uses but-for, substantial factor (concurrent sufficient causes), or burden-shifting alternative liability. Proximate cause limits liability to foreseeable risks, applying the eggshell-skull rule to extent of injury and cutting off liability only for unforeseeable superseding causes.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 431, 432(2), 457, 461; Third §§ 26–29, 31, 34; Summers; Wagon Mound No. 1; McCahill.- Factual Cause: but-for, independently sufficient merging fires, or alternative liability (two negligent actors, one hits plaintiff; each disproves causation).
- Intervening vs. Superseding: ordinary medical negligence/rescues stay liable; gross medical misconduct, unrelated elective care, or unforeseeable crimes supersede.
Driver lightly bumps Cyclist in Linden, fracturing brittle bones. Under eggshell-skull, Driver owes the full fracture.
- Eggshell-skull covers injury extent, not unforeseeable plaintiffs; gross/extraordinary medical misconduct or unrelated elective care supersedes (§ 457).
Damages and Pure Economic Loss
Rule: Physically injured plaintiffs recover economic and noneconomic damages without insurance offsets (collateral source rule), subject to mitigation; punitive damages require recklessness or malice. Negligence ordinarily bars purely economic loss without physical harm to person or property, except negligent misrepresentation and pecuniary-engagement professional malpractice.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 552, 901–920A; Robins Dry Dock; Third: Economic Harm §§ 1, 4, 5.- Actual harm (no nominal damages in negligence) and mitigation; physical harm required for economic loss absent negligent misrepresentation or legal/accounting malpractice.
Excavator cuts a Linden power line, halting Baker's ovens without physical damage. Baker recovers no lost profits in ordinary negligence.
- Attorney fees are excluded; health insurance never reduces defendant's verdict.
Defenses to Negligence
Rule: Comparative negligence reduces damages by fault share (pure) or bars at 50% or 51% (modified); minority contributory negligence (Legacy exam only) bars fault absent last clear chance or defendant's reckless/willful conduct. Express releases bar ordinary negligence unless against public policy; primary implied assumption of risk (sports/recreation) bars ordinary negligence as no-duty, while secondary implied assumption merges into comparative fault.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 467, 479–482, 496A–E, 503; Third: Apportionment §§ 2 & cmt. j, 3, 7.- Modified Bar: 50%-bar cuts off 50% fault; 51%-bar allows 50% recovery.
- Primary vs. Secondary Assumption: inherent sports/spectator risks (primary) bar negligence (reckless/intentional play still liable); secondary merges into comparative fault.
A Linden jury finds Pedestrian 50% at fault on $100,000: $50,000 in pure/51% states; $0 in 50%-bar/contributory states.
- Last clear chance covers helpless (knew or should have known, § 479) and inattentive plaintiffs (actual knowledge of peril and inattention, § 480); reckless/willful conduct also defeats contributory negligence (§ 503).
3. Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities
Abnormally Dangerous Activities and Defenses
Rule: An abnormally dangerous activity—creating high, foreseeable risk despite reasonable care and uncommon—brings strict liability for harm from that risk. Under traditional strict liability, ordinary contributory negligence is no defense while knowing, unreasonable assumption of risk is a complete bar; under comparative fault, plaintiff's fault reduces recovery proportionally.
Source (unverified): Rylands; Restatement (Second) §§ 519–520, 523–524; Third §§ 20, 24–25.- High risk despite maximum care; uncommon activity (blasting, bulk toxics); harm from that risk.
Blaster uses dynamite carefully for a Linden tunnel, cracking Homeowner's foundation. Blaster is strictly liable.
- A dynamite truck causing an ordinary traffic crash without exploding triggers negligence, not strict liability.
4. Products Liability
Strict Products Liability and Defects
Rule: Commercial sellers in the distribution chain are strictly liable for physical harm to persons or other property from a defective, unreasonably dangerous product existing at sale: manufacturing flaws, design defects (consumer-expectation or risk-utility with a reasonable alternative design), or inadequate warnings.
Source (unverified): Greenman; Restatement (Second) § 402A; Third: Products §§ 1, 2, 6(d).- Seller & Plaintiff: commercial maker/wholesaler/retailer (sealed-box retailers included; yard sales/medical services excluded); foreseeable user, consumer, or bystander.
- Defect: manufacturing departure, feasible safer design, or missing warning (prescription drugs warn physician under learned intermediary rule).
A cracked assembly-line latch makes a Linden blender lid fly off, cutting Buyer. Maker is strictly liable for a manufacturing defect.
- Retailers selling sealed factory boxes remain strictly liable in tort.
Negligence, Warranty, Misrepresentation, and Defenses
Rule: Claimants may also sue for negligence, express/implied warranties (merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose), or commercial misrepresentation of material product facts. Pure economic loss to the product itself belongs in warranty; unforeseeable misuse or substantial alteration defeats tort claims, and comparative fault reduces recovery.
Source (unverified): UCC §§ 2-313–315; Restatement (Second) § 402B; Third: Products §§ 2 cmt. p, 9, 17–18, 21; East River.- Warranty & Misrepresentation: goods fit for ordinary use; public false material quality statement relied on causing physical harm.
- Defenses: foreseeable misuse/alteration is no bar; unforeseeable misuse/alteration bars tort claims; disclaimers cannot bar personal-injury strict liability.
Builder's new pump burns out in Linden from an internal valve flaw without harming people or other property. Builder sues in warranty.
- A toaster burning Buyer's kitchen damages "other property" recoverable in tort; failing to inspect never cuts strict recovery.
5. Nuisance
Private and Public Nuisance
Rule: Private nuisance is substantial, unreasonable interference with land use and enjoyment, weighing gravity against utility. Public nuisance is unreasonable interference with a public right, actionable privately only upon special injury different in kind from the public's.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 821B–D, 822, 826, 840D; Boomer; Spur.- Private: possessory interest; substantial interference offensive to an ordinary resident; unreasonable conduct or balanced hardship.
- Public & Remedies: distinct injury type (blocked driveway); courts may award permanent damages instead of injunction, and "coming to the nuisance" is one equity factor.
A Linden tannery emits nightly odors keeping Neighbor awake. A court may award permanent damages instead of closing a major employer.
- Unusual sensitivity fails private nuisance; frequent public-road delay is difference in degree, not kind.
6. Misrepresentation: Fraudulent and Negligent
Fraudulent Misrepresentation (Deceit)
Rule: Deceit requires a false material past/present fact (or active concealment, or nondisclosure under a fiduciary, half-truth, new-info, or basic-fact duty), scienter (knowing or reckless falsity), intent to induce reliance by plaintiff or an expected class, actual and justifiable reliance, and actual pecuniary damages (benefit-of-the-bargain majority; out-of-pocket minority).
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 525–551; Third: Economic Harm §§ 9–15.- Material fact, active concealment (§ 550), or nondisclosure duty (§ 551); opinion/puffery fails absent expertise/fiduciary duty.
- Scienter (§ 526), intended class reliance (§ 531), justifiable reliance (no investigation duty unless falsity is patent, § 540), pecuniary loss (no nominal damages).
Seller paints over termite damage in Linden and says beams are sound. Buyer relies and recovers pecuniary loss for deceit.
- Contributory/comparative negligence is never a defense to intentional fraud (§ 545A).
Negligent Misrepresentation
Rule: A pecuniary-interest or business actor who negligently supplies false material information to guide business transactions owes pecuniary loss (out-of-pocket plus consequential harm) to justifiably relying recipients within the person or limited group intended/known to rely in that or a substantially similar transaction—an exception to the pure economic loss rule.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 552–552B; Third: Economic Harm § 5.- False business guidance without reasonable care by pecuniary-interest actor; comparative fault applies (§ 552A).
- Duty limited to intended/known recipient group in same or substantially similar transaction (not general public).
Auditor carelessly misstates inventory knowing Client will show Bank for a loan. Bank relies and recovers pecuniary loss.
- Merely foreseeable unknown readers outside the intended group cannot recover; comparative fault reduces recovery.
7. Defamation and Privacy
Defamation, Libel, and Slander Per Se
Rule: Defamation requires a false, defamatory factual statement of or concerning a living plaintiff, unprivileged publication to a third party, fault, and damages. Libel is actionable without special pecuniary loss; spoken slander requires special pecuniary loss unless imputing a serious crime, loathsome disease, professional unfitness, or serious sexual misconduct.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 558, 566, 568–574; Gertz.- Provably false defamatory statement concerning a living plaintiff, published intentionally or negligently.
- Actionable without special pecuniary loss (libel / slander per se; presumed damages on public-concern speech require actual malice under Gertz) or special pecuniary loss (ordinary slander).
At a Linden cafe, Competitor tells diners Accountant falsifies tax returns. That is slander per se without proving lost fees.
- Hurt feelings are not special damages; deceased people cannot be defamed, and large-group insults fail "of and concerning."
Constitutional Fault, Falsity Burden, and Privileges
Rule: Whenever plaintiff is a public official/figure OR speech involves public concern, plaintiff bears the constitutional burden to prove falsity (Hepps). Public officials/figures must prove actual malice (knowing or reckless falsity) clearly and convincingly; private plaintiffs on public concern need negligence for proven actual injury and actual malice for presumed/punitive damages. Truth (private concern), absolute, fair-report, and qualified privileges apply.
Source (unverified): Sullivan; Gertz; Hepps; Dun & Bradstreet; Restatement (Second) §§ 580B, 581A, 585–605A, 611, 613.- Public Official/Figure: falsity + actual malice; Private + Public Concern: falsity + negligence (actual harm) / actual malice (presumed/punitive).
- Private + Private Concern: First Amendment allows presumed/punitive damages without actual malice (most states require negligence, § 580B).
- Privileges: absolute (judicial, legislative, executive, spousal); fair-report (§ 611: accurate report/abridgement of official proceeding—not lost by wide publication/malice); qualified (references/common interest—lost by malice/over-publication).
A Linden paper negligently prints that a bakery failed a health check. Owner must prove falsity and recovers proven lost sales, not punitive damages without actual malice.
- Actual malice means subjective doubt about truth, not spite; saying "In my opinion" never shields a false factual accusation.
Invasion of Privacy
Rule: Invasion of privacy covers: (1) intrusion upon seclusion in a private space; (2) unauthorized appropriation of name/likeness for own use or benefit; (3) public disclosure of offensive, non-newsworthy private facts; and (4) false light publicity highly offensive to a reasonable person (actual malice on public-interest matters).
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 652B–E & § 652C cmt. b; Time, Inc. v. Hill.- Intrusion & Appropriation: privacy expectation (no publication); identity used for own benefit (excludes news).
- Disclosure & False Light: widespread publicity required, not private gossip.
Without consent, a Linden gym puts Resident's photo on billboards endorsing shakes. Even if flattering, that is appropriation.
- Truth is no defense to public disclosure of private facts (legitimate public interest is); public-street photos are not intrusion.
8. Damages, Vicarious Liability, and Apportionment
Respondeat Superior and Independent Contractors
Rule: Employers are vicariously liable for employee torts within scope (including minor detours, not substantial frolics or intentional torts unless force is authorized, friction is inherent, or it furthers business). Hirers are generally not vicariously liable for independent contractors absent nondelegable duties, inherently dangerous work, or apparent agency. Punitive damages require employer authorization, ratification, reckless hiring, or managerial scope (§ 909).
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) Agency §§ 219, 228–229, 245; Third Agency §§ 2.04, 7.07; Second Torts §§ 409, 411, 416–418, 422, 425, 427, 429, 909; Bushey.- Employee & Scope: manner/means control; authorized duties, time/space limits, purpose to serve employer.
- Nondelegable Duties: safe business premises for invitees or public ways cannot be delegated away.
On a Linden route, Driver detours two blocks for lunch and hits a parked car. A slight detour stays within scope.
- Hirers remain directly liable for negligent contractor selection; ordinary commuting is outside scope.
Joint Liability, Divisible Harm, Contribution, and Indemnity
Rule: Under joint and several liability, each tortfeasor causing an indivisible injury owes the full award (many states use several liability by fault share); divisible or successive enhanced injuries are apportioned to each actor's caused share (initial tortfeasors owe foreseeable enhanced medical harm). Contribution splits loss among co-tortfeasors, while solely vicarious defendants, strict-liability retailers, or contract indemnitees get 100% indemnity.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 433A, 457, 875, 879, 886B; Third: Apportionment Tracks A–E, §§ 22–23.- Joint & Several / Divisible: 100% collectible for indivisible harm; distinct/enhanced injuries split by causation.
- Contribution vs. Indemnity: contribution splits pro rata or by fault share (barred for intentional torts); indemnity shifts 100% to active wrongdoer/maker.
Customer collects $40,000 from Store via respondeat superior after Clerk drops a Linden crate. Store recovers $40,000 indemnity from Clerk.
- Contribution shares loss; indemnity shifts 100%; pure several-liability states never shift insolvent shares.
9. Legacy MBE-Only Topics
Topics tested on the Legacy MBE outline through February 2028 outside NextGen Torts headings.
Animals and Livestock Trespass
Rule: Possessors of wild animals or trespassing livestock (excluding wandering household dogs and cats absent statute, negligence, or known dangerous propensity) are strictly liable for physical harm. Domestic animal possessors are strictly liable only with prior knowledge of an abnormally dangerous propensity.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 504(1), 507, 509, 511–512; Third §§ 21, 22–24.- Wild animal: species' dangerous trait; Domestic animal: prior scienter; Livestock trespass: cattle/horses/sheep/hogs (pets excluded).
Keeper houses a fox in a sturdy Linden pen, yet it bites Neighbor's hand. Keeper is strictly liable.
- Animal strict liability protects no trespasser (known trespassers sue in negligence to warn); friendly-dog knockdowns require prior scienter.
Intentional Interference with Business Relations
Rule: Requires a valid contract or reasonable prospective economic expectancy with a third party, defendant's knowledge, intentional and improper interference inducing breach or loss, and pecuniary damage. Fair competition shields prospective or terminable-at-will relations absent wrongful means, but never excuses inducing breach of an existing, non-terminable contract.
Source (unverified): Restatement (Second) §§ 766–768; Third: Economic Harm §§ 17–18.- Valid contract or prospective economic expectancy; knowledge; intentional, improper interference; pecuniary harm.
Rival pays Supplier double to break a fixed two-year supply contract with Baker in Linden. Competition is no defense.
- Fair competition shields prospective or at-will deals unless using wrongful means (fraud, force, defamation, sham suits).