NextGen

1. General Principles

Acts and Omissions

Rule: Liability requires a voluntary act (no reflexes/unconsciousness) or capable omission under legal duty (statute, contract, special status, isolating care, or created peril) with concurrent mens rea.

Source (unverified): MPC §§ 2.01(1)–(3); Jones v. United States; Thabo Meli v. R.
Elements
  • Voluntary act or capable omission knowing duty-triggering facts.
  • Concurrence: mens rea actuates physical act (status alone is unpunishable).
Invented Example

Walker watches a stranger drown in Linden; absent a legal duty, no crime occurs.

Usual Traps
  • Post-accident intent fails concurrence.
  • Moving a sick guest indoors creates a duty by isolating aid.

State of Mind, Transferred Intent, and Causation

Rule: Common law uses specific intent (solicitation, conspiracy, attempt, premeditated murder, assault, larceny, embezzlement, false pretenses, robbery, burglary, forgery), general intent, malice, and strict liability; MPC uses purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. Intent transfers across unintended victims of the same crime; result crimes need actual ("but-for") and foreseeable proximate cause.

Source (unverified): MPC §§ 2.02, 2.03, 2.05; Morissette v. United States.
Elements
  • MPC States: conscious object, practical certainty, conscious risk disregard, gross unawareness.
  • Causation: ordinary negligent medical care is foreseeable; extraordinary acts supersede.
Invented Example

Actor shoots at Rival in Linden, missing and killing Bystander: murder plus attempted murder.

Usual Traps
  • Transferred intent never applies to attempt or different crime types.
  • Unreasonable mistake/intoxication negate specific intent (common law); MPC honest mistake negates recklessness.

Jurisdiction and Burdens of Proof

Rule: States have territorial jurisdiction when conduct, result, or a conspiracy overt act occurs in-state. Due Process requires prosecution proof beyond a reasonable doubt for every element, though defendants may bear burdens on non-negating affirmative defenses.

Source (unverified): MPC § 1.03; Strassheim v. Daily; In re Winship; Patterson v. New York.
Elements
  • Jurisdiction: in-state conduct, result, or overt act (federal requires enumerated power).
  • Burdens: cannot shift elements (Mullaney); may shift affirmative defenses (Patterson).
Invented Example

Actor mails poison into Oakridge, killing Resident; Resident's state has result jurisdiction.

Usual Traps
  • Mandatory element presumptions violate Due Process.
  • Illegal arrest suppresses evidence, never personal jurisdiction.

Defenses: Insanity, Intoxication, and Infancy

Rule: M'Naghten excuses mental disease preventing knowledge of act's nature or wrongfulness; MPC tests substantial capacity to appreciate criminality or conform conduct. Voluntary intoxication negates specific intent (common law) or purpose/knowledge (MPC § 2.08), never recklessness; involuntary intoxication equals insanity.

Source (unverified): M'Naghten's Case; MPC §§ 2.08, 4.01, 4.10.
Elements
  • Other Tests: Irresistible Impulse (volitional loss); Durham (product of mental illness).
  • Infancy (Common Law): under 7 incapable; 7–14 rebuttable; 14+ adult.
Invented Example

Drunk Resident shoots into a Linden home, killing Neighbor: voluntary intoxication never excuses depraved-heart murder or MPC recklessness.

Usual Traps
  • Common-law voluntary intoxication lowers premeditated murder only to second degree.
  • Competency tests trial comprehension; insanity tests the crime's moment.

Defenses: Self-Defense, Duress, Necessity, Mistake, and Entrapment

Rule: Non-aggressors may use proportional force against imminent attack (deadly only against death or serious harm); initial aggressors regain self-defense only after communicated withdrawal or sudden deadly escalation against non-deadly force. Defending any third party applies when reasonably believed justified (MPC § 3.05); defense of property allows non-deadly force only, never deadly force or spring guns (§ 3.06). Duress excuses non-intentional-homicide crimes (including felony murder via the predicate) under imminent death/serious-harm threats; necessity justifies lesser evils not recklessly created (never killing an innocent at common law); entrapment turns on predisposition (majority) or police overreach (MPC).

Source (unverified): MPC §§ 2.04, 2.09, 2.13, 3.02, 3.04–3.06; Dudley; Jacobson.
Elements
  • Retreat & Imperfect Defense: minority requires outside-home retreat; honest unreasonable belief lowers murder to manslaughter.
  • Mistake of Fact: common law: honest negates specific intent, reasonable negates general intent; MPC: honest negates recklessness too.
Invented Example

Hikers enter an Oakridge cabin in a blizzard: necessity justifies trespass.

Usual Traps
  • Duress bars common-law intentional murder (MPC § 2.09 lacks this bar).
  • Mistake of law excuses only on official reliance, unavailable statute, or knowledge-of-law element.
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NextGen

2. Statutory Crimes

Homicide (Including Felony Murder)

Rule: Common-law murder requires malice aforethought: intent to kill, grievous harm, depraved-heart indifference, or felony murder (death during an inherently dangerous independent felony or immediate flight until reaching a place of temporary safety; premeditation makes first degree). Voluntary manslaughter requires adequate provocation before objective or actual subjective cooling off (or MPC extreme emotional disturbance); involuntary manslaughter involves criminal negligence (MPC recklessness) or a malum in se misdemeanor.

Source (unverified): Common-law homicide; People v. Washington; Tison; MPC §§ 210.2–210.4.
Elements
  • Felony Murder: burglary, arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping (never non-violent larceny; assault merges); majority agency covers co-felon killings only (minority proximate cause covers third parties).
  • Provocation: serious battery, mutual combat, or spousal adultery (never words alone).
Invented Example

Robber holds up a Linden shop while Driver waits; Clerk kills Robber. Agency theory acquits Driver of felony murder.

Usual Traps
  • Any defense defeating the predicate felony defeats felony murder.
  • MPC abolishes murder degrees and requires purpose, knowledge, or extreme recklessness.

Theft: Larceny, Embezzlement, False Pretenses, and Stolen Property

Rule: Larceny is trespassory taking and carrying away personal property with intent to permanently deprive; embezzlement is fraudulent conversion from lawful possession. Fraud inducing reliance passing possession is larceny by trick; passing title is false pretenses; receiving stolen property needs knowing control with intent to deprive.

Source (unverified): MPC §§ 223.2, 223.3, 223.6; People v. Ashley.
Elements
  • Larceny vs. Embezzlement: trespassory taking (mere custody) vs. fraudulent conversion from lawful possession.
  • False Pretenses vs. Trick: knowing false past/present fact inducing reliance (title vs. possession).
Invented Example

Seller sells Buyer a brass ring as gold in Linden; obtaining title by fraud is false pretenses.

Usual Traps
  • Register cashiers hold mere custody and commit larceny, not embezzlement.
  • Police-recovered goods lose "stolen" status, leaving only attempt.

Burglary

Rule: Common-law burglary is breaking and entering another's dwelling at night with felonious intent at entry. Modern statutes cover unauthorized entry into any structure anytime intending a felony or theft.

Source (unverified): MPC § 221.1; common-law burglary.
Elements
  • Breaking & Entering: opening closed door/window (or fraud/threat) plus body or target-felony tool (not breaking tools like crowbars).
  • Intent: felonious intent must concur at entry.
Invented Example

Actor opens an unlocked Linden door at midnight to sleep, later stealing a watch: no entry intent defeats burglary.

Usual Traps
  • Entering an open window is no common-law breaking.
  • A warehouse where a guard occasionally naps is no common-law dwelling.

Robbery and Extortion

Rule: Robbery is larceny from a person or presence by force or threat of immediate physical harm. Common-law extortion is corruptly taking an unlawful fee under color of office; modern extortion (blackmail) uses threats of future physical harm or immediate/future non-physical harm (economic, reputational, or criminal accusation).

Source (unverified): MPC §§ 222.1, 223.4; common-law robbery and extortion.
Elements
  • Unnoticed pickpocketing is larceny; overcoming resistance is robbery.
  • Robbery needs immediate physical threats; modern extortion covers future physical or any non-physical threats.
Invented Example

Actor threatens to leak Merchant's letters unless paid in Oakridge: non-physical threat is extortion.

Usual Traps
  • Honest claim of right negates larceny and robbery intent.
  • Yanking a strapped purse off a resisting arm supplies robbery force.

Assault and Battery

Rule: Battery is unlawful force causing injury or offensive touching (general intent). Assault is attempted battery (specific intent) or purposefully creating reasonable apprehension of imminent bodily harm via an overt physical act beyond mere words (traditionally specific intent to frighten; some statutes treat menacing as general intent).

Source (unverified): MPC § 211.1; common-law assault and battery.
Elements
  • Attempted-battery assault needs no awareness; apprehension assault does.
  • Indirect force (poisoning a drink) suffices for battery.
Invented Example

Actor swings at Clerk in Oakridge and misses as Clerk ducks: assault under both theories.

Usual Traps
  • Conditional threats ("Cash or I shoot") are imminent assault.
  • Future-harm threats alone are not criminal assault.

Possession and Trafficking

Rule: Possession requires knowing dominion and control over contraband—actual (physical custody) or constructive (knowledge plus power and intent to control). Trafficking adds distribution intent, inferred from quantity, packaging, scales, or cash.

Source (unverified): MPC § 2.01(4); controlled-substances doctrine.
Elements
  • Constructive: knowledge of illicit item + power and intent to control.
  • Trafficking: possession + distribution intent (simple possession is lesser-included).
Invented Example

Police find 60 cocaine packets and a scale in Resident's locked Linden safe, proving constructive possession and trafficking.

Usual Traps
  • Passenger proximity alone fails constructive possession without control.
  • Unknowing possession lacks fault unless retained after discovery.

Impaired Driving and Vehicular Manslaughter

Rule: DUI/DWI prohibits operating or controlling a vehicle while impaired or at/above a per se BAC limit (often strict liability). Vehicular manslaughter is unintentional killing caused by criminally negligent, reckless, or intoxicated driving.

Source (unverified): General DUI/DWI and vehicular-homicide doctrine; MPC § 210.4.
Elements
  • DUI/DWI: voluntary operation/control + impairment or per se BAC (0.08%).
  • Vehicular Manslaughter: death from gross negligence, recklessness, or DUI.
Invented Example

Texting Driver speeds in a Linden school zone, killing Pedestrian: gross negligence proves vehicular manslaughter.

Usual Traps
  • Sleeping in driver's seat with keys accessible can prove "physical control."
  • Reasonable mistake on BAC never excuses per se DUI.
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NextGen

3. Inchoate Crimes and Parties

Attempt

Rule: Attempt requires specific intent to commit a target crime plus a substantial step (MPC/majority) or dangerous proximity (common law). Factual impossibility is no defense, and attempt merges into the completed crime.

Source (unverified): MPC § 5.01; People v. Rizzo.
Elements
  • Specific intent + substantial step (MPC) or dangerous proximity (common law).
  • Abandonment: no common-law defense; voluntary renunciation excuses under MPC.
Invented Example

Buyer purchases baking soda believing it is cocaine in Linden: factual impossibility never bars attempt.

Usual Traps
  • Attempted felony murder cannot exist (attempt requires specific intent to kill).
  • True legal impossibility (intended act is lawful) is a defense.

Conspiracy and Pinkerton Liability

Rule: Conspiracy requires an agreement, intent to agree, and specific intent for an unlawful objective. Common law (MBE default) and federal law are bilateral (two guilty minds), whereas MPC and many states are unilateral; MPC, federal general conspiracy, and most states require an overt act. Common-law withdrawal never excuses conspiracy itself, though notice to all co-conspirators ends Pinkerton liability; MPC § 5.03(6) excuses conspiracy only by thwarting it.

Source (unverified): MPC §§ 1.07(1)(b), 5.03; Callanan; Pinkerton; Hyde; Iannelli.
Elements
  • Bilateral vs. Unilateral: MBE/federal needs two guilty minds (undercover blocks); MPC allows unilateral.
  • Merger & Pinkerton: common law never merges and imposes foreseeable co-conspirator liability until notified withdrawal; MPC merges and rejects Pinkerton.
Invented Example

Driver and Thief agree to rob a Linden shop and buy masks; Thief texts "I quit." Thief stays guilty of conspiracy, not the later robbery.

Usual Traps
  • Wharton's Rule bars conspiracy for two-party-by-definition crimes unless a third joins or legislature differs (Iannelli; rejected by MPC).
  • Acquitting all co-conspirators in one trial defeats common-law conspiracy.

Parties: Accomplice Liability and Withdrawal

Rule: An accomplice aiding or encouraging with purpose to assist conduct and target crime is guilty of that crime—plus foreseeable natural-and-probable collateral crimes at common law (rejected by MPC § 2.06(3), keeping felony-murder accomplice rules distinct). Withdrawal requires neutralizing aid beforehand.

Source (unverified): MPC § 2.06(3)–(4), (6)(c); Rosemond v. United States.
Elements
  • Affirmative aid + purpose for target crime (or result recklessness/negligence, MPC § 2.06(4)).
  • Withdrawal: repudiate verbal aid; reclaim tools or warn police for physical aid.
Invented Example

Helper lends Cutter bolt cutters for a burglary, then texts "Stop" without retrieving them: still an accomplice.

Usual Traps
  • Mere presence or knowledge without purposeful aid is not accomplice liability.
  • Helping escape afterward is accessory after the fact, not the target crime.
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NextGen

4. Constitutional Protections

Arrest, Search, and Seizure: Privacy and Terry Stops

Rule: Fourth Amendment binds government actors invading privacy expectations or property interests (covering porch curtilage, overnight social guests, and cell-site data, not open fields, curb trash, or brief commercial visitors). Arrests need probable cause (arrest warrant in own home; search warrant in third party's home); Terry stops need reasonable suspicion, frisks need weapon suspicion, and plain-feel bars squeezing.

Source (unverified): U.S. Const. amend. IV; Katz; Jardines; Olson; Brendlin; Rakas; Payton; Steagald; Terry; Dickerson.
Elements
  • Stops & Standing: stops seize passengers, who may challenge unlawful stops or suspicionless dog-sniff prolongations (Brendlin; Rodriguez), not searches of another's car interior during lawful stops (Rakas); objective violations allow pretext stops (Whren).
  • Plain Feel: non-weapon contraband must be immediately apparent without squeezing.
Invented Example

After a valid Linden stop, Officer squeezes a non-weapon cylinder to find pills, violating Dickerson.

Usual Traps
  • Uncorroborated anonymous tips fail Terry reasonable suspicion.
  • Public felony arrests need no warrant despite ample time.

Arrest, Search, and Seizure: Warrants, SITA, and Consent

Rule: Warrants need a neutral magistrate, probable cause, and particularity (knock-and-announce errors never suppress; execution detains occupants under Summers, never searches unnamed visitors under Ybarra). SITA covers wingspan (car cabins if unsecured or arrest-crime evidence may be inside; phones need warrants) plus Buie sweeps. Probable cause searches mobile cars and containers (including passenger items, Houghton), never home curtilage (Collins); plain view needs lawful vantage, physical access, and immediately apparent criminality without moving the item (Hicks); consent fails against present objecting co-occupants.

Source (unverified): Gates; Summers; Ybarra; Buie; Gant; Riley; Houghton; Collins; Horton; Hicks; Randolph; Fernandez.
Elements
  • Buie Sweep: adjoining spaces automatically; broader sweep needs reasonable suspicion of a dangerous person.
  • Consent: present objector blocks against self; once removed, co-occupant's consent stands (Fernandez).
Invented Example

Co-Tenant objects at a Linden door, then is arrested and removed; Roommate's consent passes under Fernandez.

Usual Traps
  • Handcuffing a suspended-license driver in a cruiser bars cabin search.
  • Consent after a false warrant claim is invalid.

Arrest, Search, and Seizure: Exigency and Exclusion

Rule: Exigency allows warrantless entry for felon hot pursuit (misdemeanors case-by-case), imminent evidence destruction, or emergency aid unless police unlawfully created it; standardized inventories, sobriety checkpoints, and school/border searches need no warrant. Exclusion yields to independent source, inevitable discovery, attenuation, or good-faith warrant reliance.

Source (unverified): King; Lange; Bertine; Mapp; Strieff; Leon; Havens; James.
Elements
  • Exceptions: independent source, inevitable discovery, attenuation (pre-existing warrant), good faith (fails for lies/bare-bones warrants).
  • Non-Application: grand juries, civil cases, and defendant impeachment.
Invented Example

Unlawfully stopped Walker has a pre-existing Linden warrant; arrest and search are attenuated.

Usual Traps
  • Tainted evidence impeaches defendant's direct or reasonably suggested cross, never other defense witnesses.
  • Drug-interdiction checkpoints and unstandardized inventories fail Fourth Amendment.

Confession and Self-Incrimination

Rule: Due Process bars coerced confessions overbearing free will for all purposes. Fifth Amendment shields natural persons from compelled testimonial communications (use/derivative-use immunity compels testimony, Kastigar) and bars comment on trial or post-Miranda silence (Griffin; Doyle), not uninvoked pre-arrest silence (Salinas). Miranda covers custodial interrogation (excluding public safety and undercover jailmates); unambiguous counsel requests stop questioning under Edwards until counsel attends or suspect reinitiates—extended across offenses and unaware officers by Roberson, ending after a 14-day custody break (Shatzer).

Source (unverified): U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Frazier; Mincey; Kastigar; Doyle; Salinas; Miranda; Edwards; Roberson; Shatzer; Elstad; Seibert; Patane.
Elements
  • Voluntariness & Two-Step: factual deception (Frazier) weighed in totality; inadvertent unwarned statement does not taint later warned confession (Elstad), unlike deliberate question-first evasion (Seibert).
  • Waiver & Invocation: speaking after warnings waives; silence allows cooling-off re-approach; ambiguous "maybe a lawyer" fails.
Invented Example

Suspect invokes counsel in Linden; two hours later an unaware detective interrogates, violating Edwards/Roberson.

Usual Traps
  • Coerced confessions never impeach; voluntary unwarned statements impeach defendant only.
  • Nontestimonial physical fruits remain admissible under Miranda (Patane).

Right to Counsel and Ineffective Assistance

Rule: Sixth Amendment counsel attaches at formal charges, covers felonies and actual or suspended-imprisonment misdemeanors (Shelton; not fine-only), is offense-specific under Blockburger, and bars deliberate elicitation without counsel or waiver (Miranda waiver waives Sixth Amendment questioning under Montejo; Massiah-defective voluntary statements impeach under Ventris). IAC requires deficient performance plus prejudice.

Source (unverified): U.S. Const. amend. VI; Gideon; Shelton; Massiah; Montejo; Cobb; Ventris; Strickland; Padilla; Frye; Lafler.
Elements
  • Scope: allows questioning on uncharged distinct crimes; plea IAC covers uncommunicated offers (Frye) and omitted deportation advice (Padilla).
  • Prejudice: reasonable probability of different outcome, going to trial (Hill), or taking earlier offer (Lafler).
Invented Example

A Linden cellmate informant deliberately questions indicted Resident about the burglary, violating Massiah.

Usual Traps
  • Arrest alone never triggers Sixth Amendment counsel.
  • Reasonable strategic choices do not prove Strickland deficiency.

Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence (Brady)

Rule: Under Brady, prosecutors must disclose favorable material exculpatory or impeachment evidence (including police-held files). Evidence is material if disclosure carries a reasonable probability of changing the outcome.

Source (unverified): U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Brady; Giglio; Ruiz.
Elements
  • Favorable evidence suppressed by prosecution or police, willfully or inadvertently.
  • Materiality: reasonable probability of a different outcome.
Invented Example

Oakridge police withhold a lab note clearing Suspect's car: Brady violation even if prosecutor didn't know.

Usual Traps
  • Prosecutor good faith never excuses suppressed police evidence.
  • Impeachment disclosure is not required before a guilty plea.

Identification

Rule: Sixth Amendment counsel applies at post-charge live lineups and showups, never pre-charge lineups, photo arrays, or scientific sampling. Due Process excludes police-arranged identifications that are unnecessarily suggestive and create substantial likelihood of misidentification.

Source (unverified): Wade; Kirby; Ash; Manson; Perry.
Elements
  • Post-charge corporeal lineup triggers counsel; photo arrays never do.
  • Independent source allows in-court ID despite a tainted pretrial lineup.
Invented Example

Post-indictment, Linden police show Witness a fair photo array without counsel: no Sixth Amendment violation.

Usual Traps
  • Non-police suggestive circumstances trigger no Due Process exclusion (Perry).
  • Scientific sampling (blood, DNA) carries no counsel right.

Jury Trial

Rule: Sixth Amendment guarantees jury trials (6+ state jurors, 12 federal; unanimous verdict, Ramos) for crimes carrying over 6 months' prison, from a fair cross-section. Neither side may strike by race or sex (Batson; McCollum; J.E.B.). Under Apprendi and Alleyne, facts—besides the bare fact of a prior conviction (not different occasions, Erlinger)—raising maximums or minimums must be admitted by defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Source (unverified): U.S. Const. amend. VI; Baldwin; Ballew; Ramos; Batson; McCollum; J.E.B.; Apprendi; Alleyne; Erlinger; Codispoti.
Elements
  • Batson 3-Step: prima facie showing, neutral reason, purposeful discrimination; binds defense (McCollum).
  • Apprendi Scope: prior-conviction exception covers bare elements only (not Erlinger occasions); admissions waive jury proof.
Invented Example

Oakridge judge finds a hate motive by preponderance, doubling the maximum, violating Apprendi.

Usual Traps
  • Fair cross-section governs the venire, not the seated jury.
  • Aggregating statutory petty offenses triggers no jury right (Lewis), except post-verdict criminal contempt over 6 months (Codispoti).
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Legacy exam only (through February 2028)

5. Legacy MBE-Only Topics

Rape and Statutory Rape

Legacy exam only (through February 2028)

Rule: Common-law rape is unlawful sexual intercourse without effective consent, by force, threat of serious harm, or incapacity. Statutory rape is intercourse below the age of consent (generally strict liability on age).

Source (unverified): Common-law rape doctrine; MPC §§ 213.1, 213.6(1).
Elements
  • Forcible Rape: slight penetration suffices; modern laws drop resistance requirements.
  • Statutory Rape: strict liability (MPC allows reasonable mistake over age 10).
Invented Example

Adult has sex with Minor in Linden after seeing a fake ID; strict liability bars age mistake.

Usual Traps
  • Fraud in inducement preserves consent; fraud in factum negates it.
  • Mistake of age fails under majority statutory rape.

Kidnapping

Legacy exam only (through February 2028)

Rule: False imprisonment is unlawful confinement. General statutory/common-law kidnapping adds non-incidental asportation or concealment; MPC § 212.1 requires removal from home/business or substantial distance, or substantial isolation, for an enumerated purpose.

Source (unverified): Common-law kidnapping; MPC §§ 212.1, 212.3.
Elements
  • Confinement alone is false imprisonment; kidnapping adds non-incidental movement/concealment.
  • MPC purposes: ransom, felony facilitation/flight, injury/terror, or political interference.
Invented Example

Robber moves Clerk three steps behind an Oakridge counter: incidental movement merges into robbery.

Usual Traps
  • Brief movement incidental to robbery or rape merges.
  • MPC § 212.1 requires substantial distance or period.

Arson

Legacy exam only (through February 2028)

Rule: Common-law arson is malicious (intentional or reckless) burning of another's dwelling, requiring wood-fiber charring rather than smoke or scorching. Modern statutes cover commercial buildings, personalty, and insurance fraud.

Source (unverified): MPC § 220.1; common-law arson doctrine.
Elements
  • Malicious burning of another's dwelling.
  • Structural wood-fiber charring (smoke stains fail).
Invented Example

Actor chars beams of an empty Linden barn; not being a dwelling, common-law arson fails.

Usual Traps
  • Burning one's own home for insurance is statutory, not common-law, arson.
  • Scorching paint without charring wood fails common-law arson.

Double Jeopardy

Legacy exam only (through February 2028)

Rule: Jeopardy attaches when jury (or first bench witness) is sworn, barring successive trials for the same offense under Blockburger unless each requires a distinct element; single-trial cumulative punishments stand if legislatively authorized (Hunter). Issue preclusion bars relitigating facts resolved by acquittal (Ashe); dual sovereignty lets separate states/federal courts try the same act.

Source (unverified): U.S. Const. amend. V; Blockburger; Hunter; Ashe; Diaz; Gamble; Burks.
Elements
  • Greater/lesser-included crimes are same offense; battery conviction never bars homicide if victim dies post-trial (Diaz).
  • Insufficient-evidence reversal bars retrial; trial error or hung juries do not.
Invented Example

State acquits Driver of Oakridge robbery; federal indictment passes dual sovereignty.

Usual Traps
  • A city and its own state are one sovereign.
  • Hung juries establish manifest necessity, permitting retrial.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Legacy exam only (through February 2028)

Rule: Eighth Amendment bars grossly disproportionate punishments, executing offenders under 18 at the offense or with intellectual disabilities, and capital punishment for non-homicide individual crimes.

Source (unverified): U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Roper; Atkins; Kennedy; Tison.
Elements
  • Categorical Bars: juveniles under 18, intellectual disability, non-homicide individual crimes.
  • Felony-Murder Accomplices: death penalty requires major participation plus reckless indifference.
Invented Example

Unarmed Getaway Driver waits blocks away unaware of a gun while Co-Felon kills Clerk: Eighth Amendment bars execution.

Usual Traps
  • Mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders is barred.
  • Felony-murder conviction stands even when death penalty is barred.

Solicitation, Guilty Pleas, Speedy Trial, and Confrontation

Legacy exam only (through February 2028)

Rule: Solicitation is urging a crime with specific intent (merges into conspiracy/attempt/target). Pleas must be voluntary and intelligent on record; speedy-trial attaches at arrest/charge (Marion), weighs delay length, reason, assertion, and prejudice, with sole remedy dismissal with prejudice (Strunk). Confrontation bars testimonial hearsay absent unavailability and prior cross; Bruton bars non-testifying co-defendant's facially incriminating confession unless they testify, trials sever, or neutral redactions ("another person") with limiting instruction are used.

Source (unverified): MPC § 5.02; Boykin; Marion; Barker; Strunk; Crawford; Bruton; Samia.
Elements
  • Confrontation (NextGen Evidence; Legacy MBE): 911 emergency calls are nontestimonial; past interviews/lab reports are testimonial.
  • Bruton (Samia): neutral substitutions pass; obvious blanks ("deleted") fail.
Invented Example

Caller dials 911 during a Linden break-in to report an intruder: ongoing emergency is nontestimonial.

Usual Traps
  • Hearsay exceptions never override Confrontation for testimonial statements.
  • Bruton permits a confession if the co-defendant testifies for cross-examination.
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More memory hooks

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