Contracts Study Guide
NextGen headings, in order. Common law and Article 2 sit side by side inside each heading.
Written for study. Not legal advice.
1. Which law governs
Goods, services, and the predominant purpose
Rule: Article 2 governs movable goods. Growing crops and timber to be cut are goods whether buyer or seller severs them; minerals and structures are goods only if the seller severs them, fixed at formation. Hybrid deals take one law—Article 2 if goods predominate, common law if services do (weighing language, supplier business, and price split); minority gravamen splits by dispute. A merchant deals in goods of the kind or holds out skill in business practices: practice rules (§§ 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207, 2-209) bind most business buyers; merchantability (§ 2-314), infringement (§ 2-312(3)), and entrustment (§ 2-403(2)) require a dealer in the kind.
Source (unverified): UCC §§ 2-102, 2-104, 2-105, 2-107; Bonebrake v. Cox.- Classify subject (goods, services, land, hybrid) and merchant prong.
Installation dominates oven price, so common law governs.
- Never apply perfect tender to services.
2. Formation
Offer and certainty
Rule: An offer manifests commitment so assent closes the deal. Ads and quotes are usually invitations. Common-law essentials must identify a breach; Article 2 fills price, place, and time, not quantity (except output or requirements). Identified goods known to be elsewhere are delivered there. A revocable offer ends by lapse, rejection, counteroffer, revocation, or the offeror's death or incapacity without notice; an option survives death.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 24, 26, 33, 41, 48; UCC §§ 2-204, 2-305, 2-306, 2-308.- Reasonable offeree reads words as commitment.
One mixer, one price, first comer: an offer.
- Missing price defeats land or services more often than goods.
Acceptance, the mailbox rule, and silence
Rule: Common-law acceptance must mirror the offer; changed terms are counteroffers. Starting performance binds both sides if a promise was also invited, and creates an irrevocable unilateral option if only performance was invited (preparation does not). Unilateral performance needs notice only if offeree has reason to know offeror lacks prompt means to learn; then offeror is discharged unless offeree diligently notifies, offeror learns timely, or notice is waived. Proper acceptance binds on dispatch unless barred; revocation operates on receipt (including reliable notice of an inconsistent act). Acceptance after rejection binds only if received first; acceptance mailed first binds unless a later rejection arrives first and is relied on. Options bind on receipt; sloppy dispatches bind on dispatch if received timely, else on receipt while open. Silence accepts only via services taken with reason to expect pay, prior course, or agreement. Foreseeable substantial pre-acceptance reliance can create an option.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 42, 43, 45, 50, 54, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 87(2).- Mirror the offer, or treat reply as counteroffer.
Tuesday's mailed acceptance beats Wednesday's arriving revocation.
- Mailbox rule excludes options.
Article 2 formation and the battle of forms
Rule: Prompt-shipment goods offers invite a promise or prompt shipment unless stated otherwise. Nonconforming goods accept and breach unless seasonably called an accommodation—a counteroffer creating no contract or breach, which buyer may accept or reject. Where starting requested performance accepts, an offeror unnotified within a reasonable time may treat the offer as lapsed. Definite, seasonable acceptance may add terms unless expressly conditional on assent (counteroffer; no contract on writings). Added terms are proposals: non-merchants require express assent; between business-practice merchants they enter unless the offer limits acceptance, the term materially alters, or objection is prompt. Different terms are usually knocked out. Conduct recognizing a contract uses shared terms plus Code gap fillers.
Source (unverified): UCC §§ 2-104, 2-206, 2-207.- Determine whether contract formed on writings or conduct.
Merchants perform anyway: shared terms plus gap fillers govern.
- Business equipment buyers are merchants under § 2-207; skip mirror-image under Article 2.
Consideration and the pre-existing duty
Rule: Consideration is a bargained-for performance or return promise; a peppercorn suffices, gift conditions do not. A duty already owed to the promisor is not consideration unless honestly disputed, fairly rescinded, or enlarged; a duty owed only to a third party can be. Whim promises are illusory. Output and requirements contracts use good-faith actual output or needs, barring quantities unreasonably disproportionate to stated estimates or prior normal levels.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 71, 73, 77; UCC § 2-306.- Identify what each side bargained for.
Same painting is not consideration for a raise.
- Honestly disputed debts can settle for less.
Obligations without a bargain
Rule: A promise reasonably inducing reliance binds to prevent injustice (remedy may stop at reliance); reliance can also lock an offer before acceptance. A merchant's signed writing assuring a goods offer stays open needs no consideration up to three months; on an offeree's form, offeror must sign that term separately. At common law, unpaid recitals do not bind options (Restatement enforces signed recitals of fair exchange within a reasonable time). Traditional common law rejects past-benefit promises except duties voidable for incapacity or promises (usually signed and limited to their terms) to pay time-barred debts; under 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), promises to pay bankruptcy-discharged debts fail without formal pre-discharge reaffirmation. Material-benefit rules bind only to prevent injustice, never for gifts or disproportionately to the benefit.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 82, 85, 86, 87, 90; UCC § 2-205; 11 U.S.C. § 524(c).- Estoppel: promise, foreseeable reliance, injustice.
Firm-offer term on buyer's form needs seller's separate signature.
- Firm offer over three months holds for three months unless paid.
Modification
Rule: At common law, executory modifications need consideration unless unanticipated circumstances make them fair or material reliance makes enforcement just; no-oral-modification clauses do not bar later oral changes. Under Article 2, good-faith modifications need no consideration, but if the modified contract is $500 or more it needs its own statute writing (original writing is not enough). Unlike common law, a signed Article 2 clause barring oral change binds even under $500; on a merchant's form it binds a non-merchant only if separately signed. Oral attempts can operate as waivers, retractable on reasonable notice absent material reliance.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 73, 89, 149; UCC §§ 2-201, 2-209.- Pick common law or Article 2 first.
A signed note adds the charge; a bare oral price change fails.
- Common-law raise for the same work fails without new event.
3. Defenses
Incapacity, duress, and undue influence
Rule: A minor may avoid and must return what remains, owing reasonable value for necessaries. A person adjudicated incompetent under guardianship cannot contract: the deal is void (estate may owe restitution for necessaries). Unadjudicated mental illness makes a contract voidable if the person cannot understand it, or cannot act reasonably and the other side has reason to know. Intoxication is a defense only if the other side has reason to know. Physical compulsion makes a contract void; an improper threat leaving no reasonable alternative makes it voidable. Unfair persuasion of a dominated or trusting person is undue influence.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 13, 14, 15, 16, 174, 175, 177.- Protected person may avoid; ratification cuts off avoidance.
Minor avoids the watch, owes reasonable value for the coat.
- Threatening a lawful act is not duress alone.
Mistake and misrepresentation
Rule: Mutual mistake on a basic assumption material to the exchange lets the hurt party avoid unless it bore the risk—by agreement, conscious ignorance (knowing knowledge was limited yet treating it as enough), or court allocation. Unilateral mistake allows avoidance absent risk-bearing if enforcement is unconscionable or the other party knew or caused it. Fraudulent or material misrepresentation inducing justified reliance makes contracts voidable (concealment and required nondisclosure count). Fraud in the execution—deceiving a signer lacking reasonable chance to know the document's character—makes the signing void.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 152, 153, 154, 160, 161, 163, 164.- Identify basic assumption, hurt party, and risk allocation.
Both mistake a gutted 1970 kiln shell for a working 1990 kiln; only hurt buyer avoids absent risk-bearing.
- Wrong guesses about future prices are not mistakes of present fact.
Illegality and unconscionability
Rule: Terms are unenforceable if barred by statute or clearly outweighed by public policy. Missing a regulatory license often bars recovery; revenue-only licenses usually do not. Unconscionability is judged at formation (procedural unfairness plus harsh terms), allowing courts to refuse or limit enforcement.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 178, 208; UCC § 2-302.- Check whether license is regulatory or revenue-only.
Harsh tiny-print deposit term can be refused.
- Later hardship does not make a fair bargain unconscionable.
Statute of frauds
Rule: Covered promises need a writing signed by the party to be charged: executor promises to pay estate debts from personal funds, suretyship, marriage beyond mutual marriage promises, land, or deals impossible to perform within one year from the making. Sureties whose main purpose is their own economic gain fall outside it. Lifetime or early-completion deals fall outside the one-year clause. Full performance by one side removes the one-year bar; part performance of >1-year services leaves restitution only absent § 139 reliance. Land part performance supports specific performance only. Goods of $500+ need a signed quantity. Between merchants, a signed confirmation sufficient against sender satisfies the statute against a recipient with reason to know contents unless written objection is given within ten days after receipt (does not prove an oral contract). Specially made goods unfit for ordinary resale bind once substantially begun or committed before repudiation. Admission, acceptance, or payment covers only that quantity.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 110, 111, 116, 124, 129, 130, 139, 375; UCC § 2-201.- Identify class, signed writing, or statutory exception.
Signed confirmation without written objection in ten days removes only the statute defense; oral objection fails.
- Land part performance usually requires possession plus payment or improvements.
4. Content and meaning
Parol evidence
Rule: A final writing discharges contradictory prior deals and contemporaneous oral deals (contemporaneous writings read with it). A complete integration also drops consistent prior or contemporaneous oral terms in its scope unless naturally omitted (or under Article 2 not certainly included). Ambiguity, fraud, duress, mistake, illegality, formation conditions, and later modifications stay admissible. Article 2 presumes incompleteness: course of performance, dealing, and usage explain or add consistent terms unless excluded.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 209, 213, 214, 216; UCC § 2-202.- Test whether writing is final and whether complete.
Complete lease bars an oral side deal made at signing.
- Bars prior talks and signing-table oral deals, not later modifications.
Interpretation, usage, and omitted terms
Rule: Shared meaning controls. If meanings differ, the unknowing party's meaning controls when the other knew or had reason to know; if neither (or both) knew or had reason to know on a material term, no contract forms. Express terms beat course of performance, then dealing, then usage. Public-interest meaning is preferred; tie breaks against the drafter. Formed contracts fill omitted terms reasonably. Open Article 2 price is a reasonable price at delivery if intent to contract exists; delivery is seller's place or known situs of identified goods; time is reasonable; quantity is not filled. Good faith—honesty in fact and fair dealing—binds every party.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 20, 201, 204, 205, 206, 207; UCC §§ 1-201(b)(20), 1-303, 1-304, 2-305, 2-308.- Rank: express words, performance, dealing, trade usage.
Blank price with intent to contract takes reasonable delivery-time price.
- Party knowing the other's meaning is bound by it.
5. Performance
Conditions and the order of performance
Rule: A condition is an uncertain event required before a duty is due. Express conditions require strict compliance; constructive conditions yield to substantial performance absent material breach. Timed work precedes payment; simultaneous acts are due together. Mechanical or commercial satisfaction uses a reasonable-person test; personal taste uses good-faith dissatisfaction. Waiver, disproportionate forfeiture, or hindrance excuses a condition. Waiver of a non-material condition is retractable in time absent material reliance; waiving a material condition needs consideration or estoppel.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 84, 224, 228, 229, 234, 237, 245.- Words like 'provided that' mark express conditions.
No certificate, no final draw, unless owner blocked inspection.
- Substantial performance never satisfies an express condition.
Article 2 tender, cure, and rejection
Rule: Any nonconformity lets buyer reject all, accept all, or take a commercial unit within a reasonable time with seasonable notice (omitting an ascertainable curable defect can waive it). Seller may cure within contract time on seasonable notice, or a further reasonable time if acceptance was reasonably expected. Acceptance is sign-off, non-rejection, or acting as owner. Revocation requires substantial impairment, an excuse for accepting, timely notice, and no substantial change not caused by the goods' defects. Installments need substantial uncurable impairment of that installment; whole contracts breach only if default substantially impairs the whole. Agreement controls risk of loss; otherwise breach leaves risk on the breacher. Absent breach, carrier deals default to shipment contracts (and F.O.B. seller's place), passing risk on carrier delivery; F.O.B. buyer's place passes risk on tender there. Without carriers, merchant risk passes on receipt, non-merchant on tender. Pre-risk total casualty to identified goods avoids the deal; partial loss lets buyer avoid or take price allowance.
Source (unverified): UCC §§ 2-508, 2-509, 2-510, 2-601, 2-602, 2-605, 2-608, 2-612, 2-613.- Perfect tender for first rejection; substantial impairment for revocation and installments.
Seller cures wrong grade within contract date.
- Never apply perfect tender to common-law construction.
Warranties and disclaimers
Rule: Every seller warrants good title and no undisclosed lien; dealers in those goods warrant against infringement. Facts, descriptions, or samples in the basis of the bargain create express warranties (puffery does not). Merchants dealing in goods of the kind warrant merchantability. Fitness arises when seller knows the purpose and reliance, merchant or not. Disclaiming merchantability must name it (conspicuous if written); fitness needs a conspicuous writing. "As is" excludes implied quality warranties only, never express warranties or title. Pre-contract examination (or refusal after seller demand) drops implied warranties for patent defects inspection should reveal. Accepting buyers must give timely breach notice. Under § 2-318 (majority Alternative A), warranties reach family, household, or home guests reasonably expected to use goods who suffer personal injury. Thieves pass void title; voidable title passes good title to good-faith purchasers for value; entrusting goods to a merchant in that kind lets it pass rights to buyers in ordinary course (Legacy MBE).
Source (unverified): UCC §§ 2-312, 2-313, 2-314, 2-315, 2-316, 2-318, 2-403, 2-607(3).- Sort express warranty, merchantability, fitness, and title.
Dealer selecting the line for a known use gives fitness.
- Fitness needs no merchant; merchantability and entrustment require a dealer in the kind.
6. Breach and discharge
Material breach and substantial performance
Rule: A breach is material—suspending the other side and discharging if uncured—when § 241 factors weigh so: lost benefit, adequacy of money, forfeiture, likelihood of cure, and good faith. Missing a date is ordinarily a minor breach unless "time is of the essence" by express term or circumstances. Substantial performance recovers the price minus cost to finish (or lost value if completion is economic waste and non-willful); willful breach generally bars substantial performance, leaving restitution. Divisible contracts pay for performed parts.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 237, 240, 241, 242; Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent.- Weigh Restatement factors; never use a rigid percentage.
Accidental brand swap pays contract price minus value drop.
- Willful breach generally bars substantial performance, not just value measure.
Anticipatory repudiation and assurances
Rule: Repudiation is a clear statement of total breach or voluntary act making performance impossible. The injured party may await performance briefly, sue now, and suspend—unless it has fully performed and only future money remains (then wait for due dates). Reasonable insecurity allows a written Article 2 assurance demand and suspension; failure to assure within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days (ceiling) is repudiation. Retraction works until cancellation, reliance, or final election.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 250, 253; UCC §§ 2-609, 2-610, 2-611.- Worry is insecurity; repudiation must be clear.
Clear refusal of June shipment is a repudiation.
- Demanding assurance is not a breach.
Impracticability, impossibility, and frustration
Rule: Death of an essential performer or faultless destruction of a needed specific thing discharges duties. Accidental destruction of a building being built from scratch does not excuse the builder; destruction of an existing building under repair discharges both sides (restitution for prior work). Impracticability discharges when an assumed event fails absent risk allocation (cost spikes alone rarely suffice); Article 2 excuses good-faith compliance with regulation. Frustration requires the principal purpose be nearly worthless, not merely less profitable.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 261, 262, 263, 265; UCC § 2-615; Taylor v. Caldwell; Krell v. Henry.- Identify failed basic assumption and who bore risk.
Canceled parade can excuse the hall rental.
- A party cannot rely on an event its own breach caused.
Discharge devices and employment-contract breach
Rule: While both sides owe work, mutual rescission needs no new consideration and may be oral unless land must be re-transferred; after full performance on one side, release needs consideration or a substitute. A substituted contract replaces and immediately discharges the old duty (suit lies only on it). An accord promises a different future performance, needs consideration (satisfied by cashing a good-faith "payment in full" check for an unliquidated or honestly disputed debt, unlike part payment of an undisputed due debt), and suspends the old duty until performed; on accord breach, the creditor may sue on either the old duty or the accord. A novation substitutes a new party and discharges the old one only if all parties, including the creditor, assent. Term-less employment is at will; early termination without cause yields remaining wages minus actual or available comparable pay (not inferior work). Serious loyalty breach is material.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 73, 148, 279, 280, 281, 283, 347, 350; UCC § 3-311; Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.- Check creditor assent for novation; accord suspends until performed.
Fired editor recovers the gap after comparable work.
- Discrimination statutes are outside this heading.
7. Remedies
Expectation, foreseeability, certainty, and mitigation
Rule: Expectation equals lost value plus other loss, minus costs and losses avoided. Ordinary loss is foreseeable at formation; special loss requires known special facts then. Loss must be reasonably certain. Avoidable loss (short of undue risk, burden, or humiliation) is barred, though reasonable failed efforts count. Emotional-distress and punitive damages are generally unavailable for pure breach.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 347, 350, 351, 352, 353, 355; Hadley v. Baxendale.- Subtract savings caused by the breach.
Known opening-week need makes the rental foreseeable.
- New businesses may prove lost profits, never speculation.
Reliance, restitution, liquidated sums, reformation, and specific performance
Rule: Reliance covers preparation and performance spending minus loss breacher proves would have occurred anyway. After total breach, injured party may elect restitution of benefit conferred, even above losing contract rates, unless it fully performed and only a definite sum remains (capped at price). At common law, a breacher recovers only net benefit above loss its breach caused, capped at a ratable portion of price. Liquidated damages stand if reasonable given anticipated or actual loss and proof difficulty; excessive sums are penalties. Under Article 2, on buyer breach without valid liquidated terms, seller keeps the greater of provable actual damages or the smaller of 20 percent of price or $500 (never both stacked), returning the rest. Reformation fixes shared writing mistakes or one party's mistake induced by the other's fraud. Specific performance lies when money is inadequate (land, unique goods), never to compel personal service.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 155, 166, 349, 356, 359, 373, 374; UCC §§ 2-716, 2-718.- Test liquidated clauses against anticipated or actual loss.
Unique lot gets specific performance; tripled fee is a penalty.
- Restitution never rescues a bad deal both can perform.
Article 2 money remedies
Rule: Buyers rejecting, revoking, or receiving no delivery recover price paid and may cover in good faith: cover minus contract, plus incidentals and consequentials, minus savings (or market price when buyer learned of breach minus contract). Accepted-goods warranty damages equal value as warranted minus value accepted at acceptance time and place, plus incidentals and consequentials. Buyer consequentials require loss unpreventable by cover and include personal or property injury proximately caused by warranty breach. Parties may limit remedies, but if an exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose, all Code remedies open; limiting personal-injury consequentials for consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable, unlike commercial loss. Seller resales must be in good faith, commercially reasonable, and on reasonable notice; otherwise seller uses market (contract minus market price at tender time and place) or—for accepted goods, goods lost after risk passed, or identified goods unresalable after reasonable effort—the price. Seller recovers incidentals, never consequentials; lost-volume sellers recover lost profit plus reasonable overhead. Unpaid credit sellers may reclaim goods from insolvent buyers within 10 days of receipt (waived for written solvency misstatements within 3 months prior), subject to good-faith purchasers (Legacy MBE).
Source (unverified): UCC §§ 2-702, 2-706, 2-708, 2-709, 2-710, 2-711, 2-712, 2-713, 2-714, 2-715, 2-719.- Reasonable cover preempts market damages.
Lost-volume dealer recovers one lost sale's profit.
- Late or dissimilar cover may fail reasonableness.
8. Third parties
Intended and incidental beneficiaries
Rule: An intended beneficiary may sue: a creditor beneficiary (paid to satisfy the promisee's debt) may sue promisor and promisee for one satisfaction; a donee beneficiary generally sues only the promisor (promisee may sue either way). Incidental beneficiaries have no claim. Absent a reserved modification clause, original parties may modify or discharge until the beneficiary—before receiving notice of a modification—materially relies, sues, or assents on request. The promisor keeps its defenses against the promisee.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 302, 305, 309, 310, 311.- Ask whether promisee meant to confer an enforceable right.
Supplier may sue roofer who promised to pay the bill.
- Beneficiary's claim is subject to defenses against promisee.
Assignment and delegation
Rule: Rights are assignable unless assignment materially raises duty or risk or is barred by statute or contract. Barring assignment of "the contract" usually bars only delegation. Breach clauses leave assignments effective unless saying "void"; even "void" cannot bar assigning total-breach damages or earned payment. Value makes assignments irrevocable; gifts are revocable unless locked by signed writing, token, reliance, or performance. Assignees take subject to obligor's contract defenses and pre-notice setoffs against assignor. Pre-notice payment to assignor discharges obligor. On successive assignments, a later assignment revokes a revocable gift; if the first was irrevocable, first in time wins unless a later assignee for value, in good faith and without notice, gets judgment, payment, novation, or token. Delegation fails if obligee has substantial interest in the original person; delegator stays liable, and if delegate promises to perform, obligee may sue both. Under Article 2, assigning "the contract" also delegates and supports assurance demands.
Source (unverified): Restatement (2d) §§ 317, 318, 322, 332, 336, 342; UCC § 2-210.- Separate assigned right from delegated duty.
Pre-notice payment to painter discharges owner.
- Payment to assignor before notice discharges; payment after notice does not.