NextGen

1. Agency and Authority

Creation and Capacity

Rule: Agency forms by mutual assent that an agent act on the principal's behalf under the principal's control. Neither pay nor writing is required; oral authority covers UCC goods, while equal-dignities requires writing mainly for land transfers or statutory mandates.

Source (unverified): Restatement (Third) §§ 1.01, 3.01, 3.02 & cmt. b, 3.04–3.05.
Elements
  • Mutual assent, acting on principal's behalf, control.
Invented Example

Unpaid Neighbor agrees to buy $700 paint for Owner in Linden; oral agency.

Usual Traps
  • Minors may be agents for competent principals (a minor principal's appointment is voidable); "independent contractor" labels never defeat agency when control exists.

Actual Authority and Termination

Rule: Actual authority exists when an agent reasonably believes, from principal manifestations, that the principal desires the act (including incidental tasks). Under Restatement (Third), death/incapacity ends actual authority only upon agent notice (common law ended it automatically); durable POAs survive incapacity, and powers coupled with an interest survive both.

Source (unverified): Restatement (Third) §§ 2.01–2.02, 3.06–3.10, 3.12; Restatement (Second) §§ 120, 122.
Elements
  • Manifestations to agent; ends on revocation, renunciation, completion, or death/incapacity notice.
Invented Example

Manager runs a Linden bookstore; implied authority covers buying shipping boxes.

Usual Traps
  • Restatement (Third) needs death notice; common law ended authority automatically.

Apparent Authority, Estoppel, and Undisclosed Principals

Rule: Apparent authority arises from principal manifestations to third parties causing reasonable reliance, lingering until termination notice. Estoppel (§ 2.05) binds one who intentionally/carelessly induces (or fails to correct) detrimental reliance. Under § 2.06, undisclosed principals are bound without actual authority by failing to correct known reliance or secretly cutting customary authority (replacing § 195).

Source (unverified): Restatement (Third) §§ 2.03, 2.05, 2.06, 3.11; Restatement (Second) § 195.
Elements
  • Apparent: words/title/dealings + reliance. Estoppel: inducement/silence + detrimental reliance.
Invented Example

Owner fires Buyer without telling Supplier; next order binds via apparent authority.

Usual Traps
  • Apparent authority never covers undisclosed principals; § 2.06(2) bars secret customary cuts.

Ratification

Rule: Principals ratify unauthorized acts by affirming or knowingly retaining benefits. Restatement (Third) requires acting/purporting to act for the principal (letting undisclosed principals ratify, unlike Second Restatement), material knowledge, existence at the act and capacity at ratification, all-or-nothing affirmance, and no prior withdrawal. Voluntary ratification releases the agent from breach-of-authority liability (unless compelled or fraud-induced).

Source (unverified): Restatement (Third) §§ 4.01–4.07, 4.02 cmt. c; Restatement (Second) § 85.
Elements
  • Acted/purported for principal; existence at act, capacity at ratification; informed all-or-nothing affirmance.
Invented Example

Clerk buys unauthorized Oakridge grinder; Owner uses it knowingly, ratifying and releasing Clerk.

Usual Traps
  • No partial ratification; prior withdrawal blocks ratification.

Duties to Third Parties: Principal Disclosure

Rule: Disclosed principal: only principal bound. Unidentified/undisclosed principal: both bound; under Restatement (Third) § 6.09 (and always for unidentified), liability lasts until satisfaction, whereas common-law election (undisclosed only) required electing before judgment once identity was learned.

Source (unverified): Restatement (Third) §§ 1.04(2), 6.01–6.03, 6.09; Restatement (Second) §§ 184(1), 210.
Key Distinctions
  • Disclosed: principal only. Unidentified/Undisclosed: both bound until satisfaction (common-law election pre-judgment).
Invented Example

Agent signs Linden lease "for unnamed client"; both stay liable until satisfaction.

Usual Traps
  • Signing only agent's name without representative/agency title risks personal liability.

Fiduciary Duties and Implied Warranty

Rule: Unauthorized actors purporting to bind principals breach an implied warranty of authority. Agents owe loyalty, care, obedience, and must indemnify principals for losses from unauthorized acts binding via apparent authority (absent ratification); principals owe pay and indemnification for authorized acts.

Source (unverified): Restatement (Third) §§ 6.10, 8.01–8.15, 8.09(2).
Elements
  • Warranty: no power + ignorant third party. Duties: no self-dealing, secret profits, disobedience.
Invented Example

Agent buys Maplewood land Principal wanted and resells at markup; Principal recovers profit.

Usual Traps
  • Honest authority mistakes breach implied warranty unless disclaimed.
Contents
NextGen

2. Vicarious Liability of a Principal

Respondeat Superior, Contractors, and Fraud

Rule: Employers are vicariously liable for employee torts within scope (minor detours, not frolics or personal intentional torts unless force/friction is inherent). Hirers avoid vicarious liability for independent contractors absent nondelegable duties, inherently dangerous work, or apparent agency; principals are liable for agent fraud within actual/apparent authority.

Source (unverified): Restatement (Third) §§ 2.04, 7.03, 7.05, 7.07–7.08; Torts §§ 409, 416, 427, 429.
Elements
  • Employee: manner/means control; time, space, purpose to serve.
Invented Example

Courier makes a two-block coffee detour in Linden and hits a cyclist; stays in scope.

Usual Traps
  • Hirers stay directly liable for negligent contractor selection/supervision (§ 7.05).
Contents
NextGen

3. Formation, Management, and Control of General Partnerships

Formation and Partnership by Estoppel

Rule: General partnerships form when two or more persons associate to carry on as co-owners a for-profit business, regardless of intent or writing. Neither co-ownership (§ 202(c)(1)) nor gross-revenue sharing (§ 202(c)(2)) raises a presumption; net-profit sharing raises a presumption unless paid as debt, variable interest, wages, or rent. Holding out creates estoppel liability.

Source (unverified): RUPA (1997) §§ 202, 308.
Elements
  • For-profit co-ownership (profits + control); estoppel: holding out + credit reliance.
Invented Example

Lender funds Oakridge bakery for 20% profits + pricing votes; control creates partnership.

Usual Traps
  • "Loan" labels never defeat co-ownership; gross revenues or debt/interest shares raise no § 202 presumption.

Partnership Property and Transferable Interests

Rule: Partnerships are entities: firm-titled property is firm property (§ 204(a)); property bought with firm funds is presumed firm (§ 204(c)); partner-titled property bought without firm funds is presumed separate even if firm-used (§ 204(d)). Transfers convey only distributions.

Source (unverified): RUPA §§ 201, 203, 204, 501–504.
Key Distinctions
  • Transferable Interest: reachable by charging order without management/voting rights.
Invented Example

Partner assigns Maplewood interest to Buyer; Buyer gets distributions, not votes.

Usual Traps
  • Charging orders reach distributions, not firm equipment.

Partner Authority, Governance, and Finances

Rule: Ordinary-course acts bind absent third-party knowledge/notice of no authority; extraordinary acts need unanimity. Statements of Authority (§ 303): grants bind absent actual knowledge; filed limits give constructive notice only for locally recorded land transfers—never ordinary contracts. Defaults: equal votes (majority ordinary), equal profits, loss shares matching profits, no salary except winding up.

Source (unverified): RUPA §§ 301, 303, 401.
Elements
  • Ordinary course binds absent notice; profit split sets loss split.
Invented Example

A invests $90k, B $10k in Linden (no agreement); $40k profit splits $20k each.

Usual Traps
  • 70/30 profit split sets 70/30 loss split; filed limits never bind non-land deals constructively.

Dissociation, Buyout, Dissolution, and Winding Up

Rule: Partners may dissociate anytime; early term exit is wrongful, dissolving only if half the remaining partners vote within 90 days to wind up (§ 801(2)(i))—else the firm continues and buys out the partner (§ 701). Apparent authority lingers up to two years (one year in 2013 RUPA) absent actual notice or 90 days post-Statement of Dissociation (§ 704(c)). Winding up (§ 807) pays creditors, then settles capital accounts by loss ratios.

Source (unverified): RUPA §§ 401(b), 601–603, 701–704, 801, 804, 807.
Winding-Up Priority
  • 1) Outside/partner creditors; 2) adjust capital accounts by loss shares (negative pay in, positive out).
Invented Example

Partner quits Oakridge term firm early; absent 90-day wind-up vote, firm continues and buys out Partner.

Usual Traps
  • Service-only partners pay cash for shortfalls by loss ratios (not pro rata by capital).
Contents
NextGen

4. Formation of Corporations and Limited Liability Companies

Corporate Formation, Bylaws, and Defective Incorporation

Rule: Filing articles creates a de jure corporation. Bylaws are unfiled internal rules subordinate to articles (articles control); incorporators/board adopt initial bylaws, shareholders always retain amendment power, and boards may amend unless reserved (MBCA § 10.20) or only if charter-authorized (DGCL § 109(a)). Defective filing: minority uses de facto/estoppel; MBCA § 2.04 binds only knowing actors without incorporation.

Source (unverified): MBCA §§ 2.02–2.04, 2.06, 10.20; DGCL § 109; Cantor.
Elements
  • De Facto: statute, good-faith attempt, corporate use. Estoppel: dealt as corporation.
Invented Example

Founder mails Linden articles and contracts believing filing succeeded; shielded.

Usual Traps
  • Estoppel bars contract suits, never torts; bylaws conflicting with articles are void.

LLC Formation and Operating Agreement

Rule: LLCs form by filing articles of organization. An operating agreement (oral, written, or implied) overrides defaults except nonwaivable duties like good faith.

Source (unverified): RULLCA (2006) §§ 110, 201 (2013 §§ 105, 201).
Elements
  • Filed articles + operating agreement.
Invented Example

Maplewood founders file articles and orally agree on a 70/30 profit split.

Usual Traps
  • Pre-filing contracts trigger promoter liability.
Contents
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5. Promoters: Pre-Organization Acts and Fiduciary Duties

Pre-Incorporation Contracts and Promoter Duties

Rule: Under Restatement (Third) § 6.04 (and MBCA § 2.04), promoters stay personally liable on pre-incorporation contracts absent a sole-recourse disclaimer or novation. Because nonexistent entities cannot ratify (§ 4.04 cmt. c), corporate liability needs express/implied adoption; promoters owe full disclosure and fair dealing.

Source (unverified): MBCA § 2.04; Restatement (Third) §§ 4.04 cmt. c, 6.04.
Elements
  • Adoption: resolution or accepting benefits. Fiduciary: disclose secret profits.
Invented Example

Promoter leases gear for "Linden Labs, Inc., to be formed"; post-formation use binds both absent novation.

Usual Traps
  • Adoption binds the corporation without releasing the promoter.
Contents
NextGen

6. Management and Control: Corporations and LLCs

Shareholder Voting, Director Removal, Proxies, and Inspection

Rule: Shareholders act at noticed majority-quorum meetings (directors by plurality; ordinary items: votes for > against under MBCA, majority present under DGCL) or written consent (unanimous under MBCA § 7.04(a) unless articles alter; minimum full-turnout votes under DGCL § 228(a) unless barred). Opt-in cumulative voting gives shares × seats votes. Shareholders (never fellow directors) remove directors with/without cause, except charter for-cause limits (MBCA § 8.08(a)) or Delaware classified boards (DGCL § 141(k)(1)), cumulative-voting protection, and class-only removal. MBCA proxies last 11 months, revocable unless coupled with an interest. Inspection: MBCA § 16.02 gives 5-day notice for basic records (proper purpose for accounting/lists); DGCL § 220 requires sworn proper-purpose demand for all records.

Source (unverified): MBCA §§ 7.01–7.07, 7.21–7.28, 8.08–8.09, 16.02; DGCL §§ 141(k), 212, 216, 220, 228.
Key Distinctions
  • DGCL § 220 Burden: firm proves improper purpose for stock ledger; holder proves proper purpose for books.
Invented Example

Shareholder gives Friend a proxy marked "irrevocable" without any interest; revocable anytime.

Usual Traps
  • Delaware classified boards default to for-cause removal (DGCL § 141(k)(1); MBCA § 8.08(a) needs charter limit); unstated MBCA proxies expire in 11 months.

Board Authority, Officers, and Meetings

Rule: Boards act at regular (unnoticed) or noticed special meetings (majority quorum, majority present) or unanimous written consent; attendance waives special-meeting notice unless objecting at start without voting/assenting (§ 8.23(b)). Individual directors lack agency power alone. Board-appointed officers are agents with express, ordinary-course implied (president: ordinary deals; secretary: certifying records), and apparent authority; boards may remove officers anytime without cause, preserving fixed-term contract damages (§ 8.44).

Source (unverified): MBCA §§ 8.01, 8.20–8.24, 8.40–8.44; DGCL §§ 141–142; Restatement (Third) §§ 2.01–2.03, 3.03.
Elements
  • Special-meeting notice/waiver + majority quorum (min one-third), OR unanimous consent; no proxies.
Invented Example

One Linden director signs a lease alone; unbound, unlike president signing ordinary deal.

Usual Traps
  • Appointment creates no tenure right, yet firing without cause preserves contract damages.

Powers of LLC Members and Managers

Rule: Under RULLCA § 407(a), LLCs are member-managed unless the operating agreement elects manager management (1996 ULLCA used articles). RULLCA § 301(a) abolished statutory apparent authority: member status grants no agency power, requiring actual (§ 407), common-law apparent, or Statement of Authority (§ 302; grants bind absent actual knowledge; filed limits give constructive notice only for locally recorded land transfers). Extraordinary acts need unanimity.

Source (unverified): RULLCA §§ 301, 302, 407; 1996 ULLCA §§ 203(a)(6), 301.
Key Distinctions
  • Member-Managed: majority ordinary, unanimity extraordinary. Manager-Managed: managers hold ordinary authority (§ 407(c)).
Invented Example

Passive member in manager-managed Oakridge LLC signs lease; unbound under § 301.

Usual Traps
  • RULLCA § 301 rejects 1996 ULLCA statutory apparent authority; filed limits never bar non-land deals constructively.

LLC Distributions, Transfers, Dissociation, and Dissolution

Rule: RULLCA splits pre-dissolution distributions equally unless altered. Transfers convey only distributions without votes unless remaining members admit the transferee. Members may dissociate anytime (wrongful triggers damages), ending management rights without dissolution and granting no default buyout (§§ 404(b), 603(a)(3)—unlike RUPA § 701). Dissolution (§ 701): agreement event, unanimity, 90 days memberless, or judicial decree for unlawfulness, impracticability, or fraud/oppression. Winding up (§ 707(b)) pays creditors, unreturned contributions, then equal surplus—no member shortfall contributions (§ 304(a)).

Source (unverified): RULLCA §§ 304(a), 404, 502, 601–603, 701, 707.
Elements
  • Transfer: distributions only; admission needs unanimity. Dissociation: transferee status absent agreement buyout.
Invented Example

Member quits Linden LLC with no buyout clause; holds transferee rights until payout/dissolution.

Usual Traps
  • Unlike general partners (RUPA §§ 701, 807(b)), dissociated LLC members get no buyout and owe no shortfalls.
Contents
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7. Fiduciary Duties: Partners, Corporate Officers and Directors, LLC Members and Managers

General Partner Fiduciary Duties

Rule: Partners owe loyalty (account for property/opportunities; no adverse dealing or pre-dissolution competition), care (no gross negligence, recklessness, intentional misconduct, or knowing law violations), and nonwaivable good faith.

Source (unverified): RUPA §§ 103(b), 404.
Elements
  • Agreements may reasonably narrow loyalty, never eliminate good faith.
Invented Example

Partner diverts Linden client to side firm; must disgorge profits.

Usual Traps
  • Ordinary negligence never breaches partner care (§ 404(c)).

Corporate Duty of Care, BJR, Exculpation, and Indemnification

Rule: Directors/officers act in good faith, with ordinary care, in corporate best interests, and may rely in good faith on reliable officers, counsel, CPAs, or committees absent contrary knowledge (MBCA §§ 8.30(d)–(f), 8.42(c); DGCL § 141(e)). BJR presumes informed, disinterested decisions valid absent fraud, illegality, waste, or gross negligence; utter oversight failure or ignoring red flags (Caremark; Stone) breaches loyalty (bad faith). Exculpation: MBCA § 2.02(b)(4) covers directors only; DGCL § 102(b)(7) covers directors and senior officers in direct care suits—never officers in derivative/corporate suits (§ 102(b)(7)(v))—and never loyalty/bad faith/unlawful distributions. Indemnification: mandatory if wholly successful; barred if adjudged liable to firm or improper benefit; permissive if good-faith best-interest conduct (criminal: no reasonable cause to believe unlawful).

Source (unverified): MBCA §§ 2.02(b)(4), 8.30–8.31, 8.42, 8.51–8.56; DGCL §§ 102(b)(7), 141(e), 145; Van Gorkom; Caremark; Stone.
Elements
  • BJR Rebuttal: conflict, bad faith, illegality, waste, gross negligence. Indemnity: mandatory (successful), permissive (good faith), barred (liable to firm).
Invented Example

Charter exculpates officers; CFO derivative care suit proceeds (§ 102(b)(7)(v)).

Usual Traps
  • Caremark failure is non-exculpable loyalty; MBCA covers directors only; DGCL shields officers only directly.

Corporate Loyalty and Corporate Opportunities

Rule: Conflicting-interest deals are voidable unless cleansed by disclosure and disinterested director/shareholder approval, or proven fair. DGCL § 144(d)(1) (amended March 2025) counts interested directors toward quorum; § 144(a)(1) requires good-faith approval without gross negligence by a disinterested-director majority—or a >=2 disinterested-director committee if a board majority is conflicted (§ 144(a)(2) disinterested-stockholder votes cast; § 144(a)(3) fairness). Opportunities: Delaware (Guth/Broz) weighs financial ability with presentation as safe harbor (low cash alone fails); ALI § 5.05 bars inability defenses without prior presentation (MBCA § 8.70 is safe harbor).

Source (unverified): MBCA §§ 8.60–8.63, 8.70; DGCL § 144; ALI § 5.05; Guth; Broz; Northeast Harbor.
Elements
  • Cleansing: DGCL § 144(d)(1) counts interested directors (>=2 committee if majority conflicted); MBCA § 8.62 needs >=2 qualified directors deliberating alone.
Invented Example

Director sells secretly owned LandCo lot to Oakridge Corp. at double price; voidable unless fair.

Usual Traps
  • One disinterested director cannot cleanse conflicted-majority board at full meeting (§ 144(a)(1); MBCA § 8.62(c)).

LLC Member and Manager Fiduciary Duties

Rule: Member-managed LLCs: members owe loyalty, care, good faith. Manager-managed LLCs: managers owe loyalty and care; passive members owe only good faith and fair dealing.

Source (unverified): RULLCA (2006) § 409(g) (2013 § 409(i)).
Elements
  • Manager-Managed Shield: passive members may invest in rivals absent agreement bars.
Invented Example

Passive member in a manager-managed Oakridge LLC invests in a rival; no breach.

Usual Traps
  • Agreements may narrow loyalty if reasonable, never eliminate good faith.
Contents
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8. Shareholder and Member Litigation

Corporate Direct vs. Derivative Suits and Demand

Rule: Direct suits redress personal shareholder injuries; derivative suits redress corporate injuries and require contemporaneous ownership (including by operation of law) plus continuous ownership through judgment. MBCA § 7.42 requires written demand and a 90-day wait unless earlier rejected or irreparable injury threatens; Delaware's Zuckerberg test evaluates demand futility claim-by-claim and director-by-director.

Source (unverified): MBCA §§ 7.41(1)–(2), 7.42–7.44; FRCP 23.1(b)(1); Tooley; Zuckerberg; Auerbach; Zapata.
Key Distinctions
  • SLC: NY (Auerbach) defers to independent SLC; Delaware (Zapata) adds court judgment.
Invented Example

Shareholder sues directors for selling corporate land cheaply to CEO's sibling; derivative.

Usual Traps
  • Selling shares mid-suit ends standing; unrelated conflicts never aggregate (Zuckerberg).

LLC Member Direct vs. Derivative Litigation

Rule: Members sue directly only for injury not solely from LLC injury. Derivative suits require demand and reasonable wait unless futile; only current members throughout suit—never dissociated members or transferees—hold standing (§§ 603(a)(1), 803).

Source (unverified): RULLCA §§ 603(a)(1), 801–806 (2013 §§ 801–805).
Elements
  • Direct vs. Derivative: withheld payout = direct; manager self-dealing = derivative.
Invented Example

Manager diverts Maplewood LLC revenue to side firm; current member sues derivatively.

Usual Traps
  • Drop in LLC value is derivative; dissociated members/transferees lack standing.
Contents
NextGen

9. Liability Rules, Including Piercing the Veil

General Partnership Liability Rules

Rule: General partners are jointly and severally liable for firm contract/tort debts (§ 306(a)); reaching personal assets requires a personal judgment (§ 307(c)) and exhausting firm assets (§ 307(d)). Incoming partners owe no personal liability for prior debts (capital stays at risk, § 306(b)); outgoing partners stay liable for pre-dissociation debts absent release (§ 703).

Source (unverified): RUPA §§ 306, 307(c)–(d), 703; UPA § 15.
Key Distinctions
  • UPA vs. RUPA: UPA made contracts joint, torts joint/several; RUPA makes all debts joint/several.
Invented Example

Creditor holds judgment against Linden firm ($5,000 cash); must sue Partner and exhaust $5,000.

Usual Traps
  • Firm judgments never reach partners' personal assets (§ 307(c)).

Piercing the Corporate and LLC Veil

Rule: Shareholders and LLC members/managers are shielded unless courts pierce for fraud/injustice as alter ego. Factors: commingling, siphoning, gross undercapitalization at formation, ignoring formalities (less weight on LLC meetings under RULLCA § 304(b)).

Source (unverified): RULLCA § 304; Walkovszky; Sea-Land.
Elements
  • Unity of interest + injustice; easier piercing for tort victims than contract creditors.
Invented Example

Maplewood trucking corp. has $50 capital and pays personal groceries; tort victims pierce.

Usual Traps
  • Single-owner status never justifies piercing without abuse/undercapitalization.
Contents
Legacy exam only (through February 2028)

10. Legacy MEE Topics

Limited Partnerships (LPs) and LLPs

Rule: LPs form only by filing a certificate of limited partnership with at least one general partner (unlimited liability) and one limited partner; no filing defaults to a general partnership (exposing would-be limited partners absent ULPA § 306 / RULPA § 304 cure). ULPA (2001) § 303 shields limited partners even when managing; RULPA (1985) § 303 strips protection for control if third parties reasonably think the limited partner is a GP. Filing a statement of qualification creates an LLP, shielding all partners from vicarious debts while keeping own-misconduct liability.

Source (unverified): ULPA §§ 201, 303, 306, 404; RULPA §§ 303–304; RUPA §§ 306(c), 1001.
Key Distinctions
  • LP Failure: no certificate = default GP. LLP: statement of qualification shields vicarious debts.
Invented Example

Maplewood LLP Partner X commits malpractice; firm and X liable, Y shielded.

Usual Traps
  • Missing an LP filing leaves passive investors liable as general partners unless cured.

Financing: Stock Consideration and Preemptive Rights

Rule: Shares issue for cash, property, services, notes, or future-service contracts; good-faith board valuation of non-cash consideration is conclusive absent fraud (MBCA § 6.21(c); DGCL § 152). Par-value rules (DGCL) impose watered-stock liability below par; MBCA § 6.22(a) abolished par. Preemptive rights require charter opt-in and exclude compensation shares, shares issued within six months of incorporation, and non-cash issuances (§ 6.30(b)(3)).

Source (unverified): MBCA §§ 2.02(b)(2)(iv), 6.21–6.22, 6.30; DGCL §§ 102(b)(3), 152–153, 162.
Key Distinctions
  • Watered Stock: DGCL par rules, not MBCA no-par rules.
Invented Example

Delaware board issues $10 par shares for $4; creditors recover $6 deficit.

Usual Traps
  • Opt-in preemptive rights exclude compensation shares and issuances within six months (§ 6.30(b)(3)).

Dividends and Unlawful Distributions

Rule: Dividends lie in board discretion unless bad faith or statutory limits apply: MBCA § 6.40(c) bars distributions failing equity-solvency or balance-sheet tests, whereas DGCL § 170(a) permits dividends from statutory surplus (net assets minus stated capital) or current/preceding fiscal-year net profits ("nimble dividends") with preferred capital unimpaired. Good-faith reliance on officer/CPA reports shields directors; liable directors get contribution and recoupment from knowing shareholders.

Source (unverified): MBCA §§ 6.40, 8.30(f), 8.33 (2016 § 8.32); DGCL §§ 141(e), 160, 170, 172, 174.
Elements
  • MBCA: pay debts as due AND assets >= liabilities + senior preferences. DGCL § 170: surplus or nimble dividends.
Invented Example

Board declares Maplewood dividend relying in good faith on CPA's erroneous balance sheet; shielded.

Usual Traps
  • Courts rarely compel dividends absent bad faith or freeze-out.

Close-Corp Devices, Controlling Shareholders, and Securities

Rule: Voting trusts (title transfer) and voting agreements bind votes. Unanimous written agreements (§ 7.32, conspicuously noted) may eliminate/restrict the board and shift liabilities to managing shareholders; reasonable transfer restrictions (§ 6.27, conspicuously noted) bind transferees, never prior shares without consent. Controllers cannot take control-sale asset premiums (Perlman) or sell to suspected looters (DeBaun); Donahue vs. Nixon governs freeze-outs. Rule 10b-5 bars fraud and insider/tippee/misappropriation trading. Section 16(b) disgorges six-month short-swing profits at reporting firms by >10% owners (>10% at both trades, Foremost-McKesson) or officers/directors holding office at the first trade (post-resignation trades match, Rule 16a-2(b); pre-office trades at already-reporting firms are exempt, Rule 16a-2(a)).

Source (unverified): MBCA §§ 6.27, 7.30–7.32; DGCL § 218; Exchange Act §§ 10(b), 16(b); Rules 10b-5, 16a-2, 16a-10; Perlman; DeBaun; Donahue; Nixon; Dirks; Salman; O'Hagan; Foremost-McKesson.
Elements
  • Tippee: knew/should have known personal-benefit breach. § 16(b): >10% both ends; officers/directors in office at first trade (pre-office exempt).
Invented Example

Outside Lawyer learns Client's tender plan and buys Target shares; Rule 10b-5 violation (O'Hagan).

Usual Traps
  • Rule 10b-5 covers private stock; § 16(b) excludes 10%-crossing buys and pre-office trades (matches post-resignation).

Mergers, Fundamental Changes, and Appraisal

Rule: Fundamental changes need board resolution, notice, and majority-of-outstanding approval (DGCL) or majority quorum with votes for > against (MBCA); in straight asset purchases, buyer shareholders rarely vote or get appraisal. Default appraisal covers mergers/consolidations under DGCL § 262 (plus, under MBCA § 13.02, share exchanges, major asset sales, and adverse charter cuts; never voluntary dissolution), subject to the market-out exception (not for cash-outs, DGCL § 262(b)(2)) and <=20% surviving-corp exception; in a >=90% short-form merger, subsidiary minority shareholders keep appraisal though not a vote; parent shareholders get neither.

Source (unverified): MBCA §§ 7.25(c), 10.03, 11.04–11.05, 12.02, 13.02, 14.02, 14.30; DGCL §§ 242, 251, 253, 262, 271, 275.
Elements
  • Approval & Dissolution: DGCL majority outstanding vs. MBCA for > against; judicial dissolution for deadlock/oppression/waste (§ 14.30).
Invented Example

Linden Corp. approves merger; dissenting Shareholder files notice, votes no, seeks appraisal.

Usual Traps
  • Buyer shareholders lack vote/appraisal in straight asset purchases; no appraisal for voluntary dissolution.
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