Fact Pattern
In 2010, Grantor, a resident of Maplewood, executed and delivered an irrevocable inter vivos trust transferring Maplewood Farm and $300,000 in cash to Trustee "in trust to pay the net income to Child for life, and upon Child's death, to distribute the principal to Child's children who reach age 25, and if none of Child's children reach age 25, then to Sibling; provided, however, that Child shall have a testamentary power to appoint the trust principal among any persons Child selects, including Child's estate or creditors, by explicit reference to this power in Child's will."
At the creation of the trust in 2010, Grantor, Child, Sibling, and Child's first child, Grandchild-1 (then age 11), were all alive. In 2012, Child had a second child, Grandchild-2. In 2024, while Child was still alive, Trustee invested $200,000 of the trust's $300,000 cash reserve in a speculative, closely held software startup owned entirely by Trustee's spouse, without informing or obtaining consent from any beneficiary. Six months later, the startup failed, losing $100,000 of the invested trust funds.
In 2025, Child died leaving a valid will whose residuary clause stated simply: "I give all the residue of my property, real and personal, to Friend." The will did not mention the Maplewood Family Trust or Child's power of appointment. At Child's death in 2025, Grandchild-1 was age 26, Grandchild-2 was age 13, and Grantor and Sibling were both still living.
Call of the Question
Under general United States property and trust law (addressing both common-law and modern statutory rules), determine: (1) the interests created by the 2010 trust and whether Child's will exercised the power of appointment in favor of Friend; (2) the validity of the remainder interests under the Rule Against Perpetuities and the effect of class-closing rules; and (3) whether Trustee breached any fiduciary duties and what remedies are available.
Model Answer (IRAC)
1. Classification of Interests and Power of Appointment
Issue: What property interests did the 2010 trust create, and did Child's residuary clause exercise the testamentary power of appointment in favor of Friend?
Rule: A remainder is contingent if given to an unascertained person or subject to an express condition precedent. When a grantor creates contingent remainders without exhausting the fee, the grantor retains a reversion. A general power of appointment permits the donee to appoint to the donee, the donee's estate, or creditors; a testamentary power is exercisable only by will. Under both the majority common-law rule and UPC §§ 2-608 and 2-704 (as well as the Uniform Powers of Appointment Act), a general residuary clause does not exercise a power of appointment when the donor's instrument expressly requires specific reference to the power, nor generally when there is a gift in default unless clear intent appears.
Application: In 2010, the trust gave Child an equitable life estate, gave Child's children a contingent remainder subject to the condition precedent of reaching age 25 (and open to after-born children), gave Sibling an alternative contingent remainder if no child reached 25, and left Grantor with a reversion (resulting trust interest) if all gifts failed. Child's power to appoint to anyone, including Child's estate or creditors, solely by will is a general testamentary power of appointment. Because Child was a life in being at the trust's creation in 2010, the power itself was exercisable at Child's death and does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. However, the 2010 trust expressly required an "explicit reference to this power in Child's will," and provided a gift in default to Child's children / Sibling. Child's blanket residuary clause ("all the residue of my property") made no mention of the trust or power. Under both common law and the UPC specific-reference rule, Child failed to exercise the power.
Conclusion: Child's residuary clause did not exercise the power of appointment, so Friend takes nothing from the trust, and distribution turns on the validity of the default remainders.
2. Common-Law Rule Against Perpetuities and Modern Reforms
Issue: Are the contingent remainders to "Child's children who reach age 25" and to Sibling valid under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) or modern RAP reforms?
Rule: Under the common-law RAP, no contingent remainder or open class gift is valid unless it must vest (or fail), if at all, within 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. For an irrevocable inter vivos trust, the perpetuities period begins at delivery of the trust (2010). Under the common-law "all-or-nothing" class-gift rule, if any possible member of a class could vest beyond lives in being plus 21 years, the entire class gift fails. Modern reforms save otherwise invalid gifts through: (1) "wait-and-see" (judging actual events during lives in being plus 21 years), (2) the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP), which validates any interest that vests or terminates within 90 years of creation, and (3) cy pres reformation, such as reducing an age contingency over 21 down to 21.
Application: Evaluating the irrevocable trust as of 2010 under strict common-law RAP, the measuring lives alive in 2010 were Grantor, Child, Sibling, and Grandchild-1. Because Child was alive in 2010, Child could (and did) have an after-born child, Grandchild-2, in 2012. Suppose Grantor, Child, Sibling, and Grandchild-1 had all died in 2013 when Grandchild-2 was age 1: Grandchild-2 (not a life in being in 2010) would not reach age 25 until 2037—24 years after the death of every measuring life. Even though Grandchild-1 was already a life in being in 2010, the common-law all-or-nothing rule voids the entire class gift to Child's children, and voids Sibling's alternative contingent remainder because it depends on the exact same remote event (whether any child reaches 25). Under common law, the entire trust principal therefore reverts to Grantor via resulting trust. By contrast, under modern reforms: (a) USRAP's 90-year period validates the trust because Grandchild-1 already reached 25 in 2024 and Grandchild-2 (age 13 in 2025) will reach 25 or die by 2037, well within 90 years of 2010; (b) under wait-and-see (lives in being + 21 years), Sibling and Grantor are still alive in 2025, so Grandchild-1 vested within lives in being and Grandchild-2 will reach 25 in 12 years (well within 21 years of Sibling's or Grantor's death); and (c) under cy pres, a court reduces the age from 25 to 21 so all of Child's children must reach 21 within 21 years of Child's death.
Conclusion: Under strict common-law RAP, both remainders are void and Grantor takes by resulting trust; under USRAP, wait-and-see, or cy pres, the remainders to Child's children are saved.
3. Class Closing (Physiological Closing vs. Rule of Convenience) and Survival
Issue: Assuming the remainder survives under modern RAP reform, who is in the class of "Child's children" and how is the principal distributed?
Rule: A class gift to a person's children closes physiologically (biologically) at that parent's death (including any child then in gestation). By contrast, the Rule of Convenience (Restatement (Third) of Property § 15.1) prematurely closes a class that has not yet closed physiologically when any class member becomes entitled to demand immediate possession or distribution (such as at a life tenant's death when the ancestor is another living person), excluding individuals conceived thereafter (or barring posthumously conceived ART children after distribution is demandable). When a class member alive at closing has not yet satisfied an age contingency, that member remains in the class with a contingent interest pending attainment of the specified age, while a qualifying member may demand their minimum share.
Application: Because Child is both the life tenant and the parent of the class ("Child's children"), the class closes physiologically at Child's death in 2025 (and would have closed physiologically then even if neither grandchild had reached age 25, subject only to gestation or posthumous ART rules where the Rule of Convenience bars children conceived after Grandchild-1's right to demand payout). The class therefore contains exactly two members: Grandchild-1 (age 26) and Grandchild-2 (age 13, born in 2012 before Child's death). Because Grandchild-1 has already satisfied the age-25 condition, Grandchild-1 may demand immediate distribution of Grandchild-1's one-half share of the trust principal. Grandchild-2's one-half share remains held in trust until Grandchild-2 reaches age 25 (or 21 if reformed by cy pres); if Grandchild-2 dies before reaching the required age, Grandchild-1 takes Grandchild-2's share (since Grandchild-1 met the condition, Sibling's gift-over "if none reach age 25" cannot occur).
Conclusion: The class closed physiologically at Child's death with Grandchild-1 and Grandchild-2; Grandchild-1 takes an immediate 1/2 share, and Grandchild-2's 1/2 share remains contingent on reaching the required age.
4. Trustee's Fiduciary Breaches (Duty of Loyalty and Prudent Investor Rule) and Remedies
Issue: Did Trustee breach fiduciary duties by investing $200,000 in a speculative startup owned by Trustee's spouse, and what remedies exist?
Rule: Under UTC § 802(b), a trustee owes an undivided duty of loyalty; direct self-dealing for the trustee's own personal account is irrebuttably voidable under the strict "no-further-inquiry" rule regardless of good faith or fair price unless authorized by the trust, approved by the court, or consented to or ratified by all beneficiaries. By contrast, under UTC § 802(c), a transaction with the trustee's spouse, close relatives, agent, or a business in which the trustee or spouse has an interest is rebuttably presumed to be affected by a conflict of interest (rebuttable by proving the transaction was unaffected by the conflict), whereas traditional common law and Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. d–e apply the strict irrebuttable no-further-inquiry rule to spousal transactions as well. Separately, under the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) and UTC § 804, a trustee must invest with reasonable care, skill, and caution, considering the entire portfolio's risk and return, and must diversify investments unless special circumstances dictate otherwise. Under UTC §§ 706, 1001–1002, a breaching trustee is liable for the greater of the amount required to restore trust value (plus lost reasonable return) or any profit made by the trustee, and may be removed.
Application: Investing $200,000 into a company wholly owned by Trustee's spouse without notice or beneficiary consent breaches the duty of loyalty under both rules: under traditional common law and Restatement § 78 cmt. e it is irrebuttably voidable under the no-further-inquiry rule, and under UTC § 802(c) it triggers a presumption of conflict that Trustee cannot rebut (there was no disclosure, court approval, independent arm's-length justification, or beneficiary consent for sinking two-thirds of the trust's cash into a spouse's speculative startup). Even apart from the spousal conflict, putting two-thirds of the trust's entire $300,000 cash reserve into a single speculative, closely held startup violated the duty of prudence and the UPIA's diversification mandate. The trust suffered an actual $100,000 loss of principal, plus lost investment return.
Conclusion: Trustee breached both the duty of loyalty and the duty of prudent investing; beneficiaries can surcharge Trustee personally for the $100,000 principal loss plus lost reasonable profits (or any spousal/trustee profit), and petition to remove Trustee and deny compensation.
Points-Based Grading Guide
Total Possible: 20 Points
Issue 1: Future Interests & Power of Appointment (5 Points)
- 1 pt Classifies Child's life estate, the children's contingent remainder (subject to reaching 25), Sibling's alternative contingent remainder, and Grantor's reversion.
- 1 pt Identifies Child's power as a general testamentary power of appointment (valid under RAP because Child was a life in being).
- 1 pt States the rule on exercising powers by a general residuary clause and notes the trust's explicit specific-reference requirement.
- 1 pt Applies the rule to Child's blanket residuary clause ("all the residue of my property"), finding no exercise under either common law or UPC.
- 1 pt Concludes Friend takes nothing from the trust.
Issue 2: Rule Against Perpetuities & Reforms (6 Points)
- 1 pt States common-law RAP and identifies 2010 (irrevocable trust delivery) as creation date, with Grantor, Child, Sibling, and Grandchild-1 as lives in being.
- 1 pt Demonstrates why "Child's children who reach age 25" violates common-law RAP (after-born Grandchild-2 could reach 25 over 21 years after all measuring lives die).
- 1 pt Applies the "all-or-nothing" class-gift rule to void the entire class gift and Sibling's alternative contingent remainder at common law, resulting to Grantor.
- 1 pt Applies USRAP (90-year period) and wait-and-see to show the gift is saved under modern statutory reforms.
- 1 pt Applies cy pres age reduction (reducing age 25 to 21) as an alternative modern saving doctrine.
- 1 pt Contrasts the common-law outcome (Grantor takes) with the modern outcome (remainders upheld).
Issue 3: Class Closing & Distribution (4 Points)
- 1 pt Distinguishes physiological class closing at Child's death (because Child is the parent) from the Rule of Convenience (which prematurely closes a class before physiological closing).
- 1 pt Includes both Grandchild-1 (26) and Grandchild-2 (13, born before Child's death) in the closed class.
- 1 pt Explains Grandchild-1 takes an immediate 1/2 distribution while Grandchild-2's 1/2 remains contingent until age 25 (or 21 under cy pres).
- 1 pt Notes Sibling takes nothing because Grandchild-1 already satisfied the age condition.
Issue 4: Trustee's Fiduciary Breaches & Remedies (5 Points)
- 1 pt Identifies breach of the duty of loyalty (UTC § 802(c)) due to investing in a spouse-owned company without disclosure, court approval, or consent.
- 1 pt Distinguishes UTC § 802(b) (irrebuttable no-further-inquiry for direct self-dealing) from UTC § 802(c) (rebuttable presumption of conflict for spousal/related-entity deals, vs. common law / Restatement § 78 cmt. e's strict irrebuttable spousal rule) and shows the presumption is unrebutted.
- 1 pt Identifies breach of the duty of prudence and UPIA diversification requirement (investing 2/3 of cash in one speculative startup).
- 1 pt States proper financial remedies: surcharge for $100,000 lost principal plus lost reasonable return (or trustee/spousal profit).
- 1 pt Notes non-monetary remedies: removal of Trustee and denial/reduction of trustee fees.